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Abstract 
This practice-based PhD is located in the field of live art practice and looks at the 
relationship between the camera and artworks that are critical of phallocentrism. It 
proposes a radical address to maternal methodology, using a series of performance-
to-camera works where the focus is on the matrilineal and mother-daughter 
relationships. It focuses on maternal theorising, which is prevalent in contemporary 
feminist theory, and the renascent maternal aesthetic that forms the subject matter of 
the performance and art-making reviewed here. I include collaborative practice with 
photographer, Alan Duncan, and my eldest daughter, Matilda. I argue that power 
imbalances and representational autonomy cannot be challenged effectively by 
performance-to-camera per se, however, when aligned with maternal aesthetics, in 
this instance, mother-daughter and matrilineal performance, the critique is re-
invigorated because aesthetic distance and the latent influence of binary thought are 
not pre-supposed or engaged with uncritically.  
 
The first chapter locates the practice-based research within a context of feminist 
theory; artists Ana Mendieta and Jemima Stehli, and the philosophy of Luce Irigaray, 
underpin my subsequent performance interventions as inherently resistant to 
phallocentric objectification. The second chapter discusses how critiques are re-
ignited, via Alison Stone, when mother-daughter relationships are explored in 
women’s performance and how combining this with Derrida’s Parergon acts on the 
distancing effect of the frame. The establishment of a maternal aesthetic is 
supported by primary interviews, presented as oral histories in the form of 
recordings, with artists Shirley Cameron, Evelyn Silver, Tracey Kershaw and Sam 
Rose. Finally, the third chapter considers maternal aesthetics, both as an art practice 
and a practice of care, to establish it as a radical approach that differs widely from 
traditional Western aesthetics. I draw on Jessica Benjamin’s intersubjective theory to 
demonstrate a relational approach to the maternal, and I emphasise the role of play 
as having nurturing qualities and, simultaneously, as material within my practice. 
This research has been crucial to the burgeoning area of maternal aesthetics 
because it makes work visible that has previously been absent in mainstream art 
criticism and canonisation. Original artworks have been produced, that interrogate 
the relationship between Derrida, Irigaray, the frame and the maternal. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a practice-based research project that has created original artworks 
through performance-to-camera, and it is situated in the field of live art practice. 
These performances are created in a photography studio in collaboration with 
photographer and lighting technician Alan Duncan. My choice of a sterile studio and 
collaboration with Duncan were both conscious decisions integral to the practice, 
because I wanted strong shadows and backdrops to convey staging, and artificial 
light to give the viewer a clear indication of the photographic space. In the first 
performance-to-camera I made in this way I carried the emotion of trying to re-
connect with my Nana whilst attempting to fit in her wedding gown which was far too 
small for me. I had, prior to this, experimented on my own with performance-to-
camera and manipulating and animating objects knowing that when captured by the 
camera they come to life and make fleeting objects in space1. I asked Duncan to 
shoot me attempting to wear my nana’s dress, with a fast frame rate camera, in 
order to capture the shapes the dress made as it filled with air. I hoped to convey a 
sense of haunting, of embodiment through objects, and to blur distinctions of subject/ 
object. When I approached Duncan to collaborate again, in 2011, I had a clear idea 
about how I wanted the studio to look and the need to capture with the camera at a 
fast rate, however, in regards to the performance I only knew I was going to travel 
through the space in search of the frame’s edge. I wanted to communicate 
something about women’s subjectivity and its relationship to, looking, acting, 
passivity and agency2. I had begun a conscious utilisation, as well as a personal 
development, of what, I will argue, is part of a wider maternal aesthetic in this thesis.   
 
The initial starting point for my research had been a consideration of the loss of aura 
in the artwork at the hands of mechanical reproduction, following Walter Benjamin’s 
1950s seminal text The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. I was 
interested in the subsequent impact, theoretically, on performance as digital 
                                                                 
1 I had made a companion piece called My Grandpa’s Ties (2005), where I had used my Grandpa’s 
ties to create wings and had then performed a shamanic ritual of my own design referencing his 
Ghanaian heritage. The performance ended with me creating a golem like figure from the ties. Please 
refer to image of My Grandpa’s Ties (2005) in the Appendix. 
2 How I ended up collaborating not only with Duncan but also my eldest daughter Matilda is explained 
in full in Chapter Two.   
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mediatisation became prevalent3. Through engaging with theorists Luce Irigaray4 
and Jacques Derrida5 I realised that my concern was not loss of aura per se, rather 
lack, specifically women’s representational lack. My subsequent research comprises 
of a critique of the reliance on binary oppositions that traditional Western fine art 
aesthetics has become trapped in. I make use of feminist philosophy and its analysis 
of phallocentrism, as the means to enforce women’s cultural invisibility, and combine 
this with a deconstruction exercise on the frame, via Derrida, called the parergon. 
Derrida’s deconstructionism evidences the instability of a framed artwork that claims 
to distinguish clearly between the world and aesthetic process. Through aligning my 
work with the parergon, the object or subject in an image or sculpture which is 
peripheral rather than integral, and Irigaray’s argument that women have been 
culturally repressed (phallocentrism), I demonstrate that staging a critique of 
traditional fine art aesthetics through performance-to-camera is not contradictory. 
Through the exploitation of the contradictions and the self-reflexivity of the work, it 
becomes apparent that to shore up binary oppositions places immense strain on the 
frame. From this initial position, I then consider how to be seen and heard. There is a 
                                                                 
3 This is discussed shortly on pp. 19-20 of this thesis, it is now referred to as the Liveness Debate. 
4 Irigaray is my primary source that evidences the existence of a phallocratic order, and the hierarchy 
placed upon gender, as well as women’s struggles to attain agency and subjectivity. She is a French 
psychoanalytical theorist and philosopher, who wrote her seminal work Speculum of the Other 
Woman in the 1970s. Irigaray was part of what is now called the second-wave feminist movement, 
she was heavily influenced by her desire to deconstruct psychoanalytical thinkers such as Freud as 
well as the trajectory of Western philosophical thought via Plato. She has been followed by theorists 
such as Elizabeth Grosz, who describe her methodology as corporeal feminism, and ascribe to a 
similar methodology exposing the philosophical over-reliance on metaphors that rely on women’s 
bodies, for example, Plato’s infamous cave aka the womb. Plato writes about the cave in his Republic 
first written in 380 B.C, Irigaray addresses the heavy over reliance on women’s bodies and their 
subjective experience as well as phallocentrism’s inability to acknowledge this in Speculum of the 
Other Woman’s section on Plato (Irigaray, 1985, pp. 243- 364). Since then she has been critiqued by 
theorists such as Judith Butler for being essentialist. There are many other feminists, for example, 
Rosi Braidotti who do not concur with such criticisms, arguing instead that women need some form of 
collective identity in order to mobilise and establish cultural identity. Irigaray uses the technique of 
mimicry in a two-fold sense, both on the inside and outside of other philosophers and analysts work, 
such as Sigmund Freud’s, at once both pretending to be Freud and Plato, and at the same time 
exposing their latent sexist presumptions and pre-suppositions through taking their claims to their 
logical conclusions, for example, women’s inherent passivity is exposed as a myth by questioning 
Freud’s motives.  
5 My deployment of Derrida within this thesis is specifically in regards to the section of The Truth in 
Painting (Derrida, 1987a) that deals with the parergon. More generally Derrida developed a form of 
semiotic analysis known as deconstructionism. I make much use of Derrida’s deconstruction exercise 
on the frame in this thesis and my practice based work, when thinking about the best way to critique 
traditional western aesthetics reliance on binaries I looked inside the frame and discovered that it 
implodes on itself as it works far too hard to uphold what is ultimately an impossible and false 
premise. That is the binary of internal/ external. The photograph is an ideal place to replicate this 
tension as that which is extraneous to the image always creeps in.  
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connection between binaries; which I have discovered are an inherent property of 
the photograph via the frame and aesthetics, and Irigaray’s notion of the 
indeterminate nature of women’s subjectivity; which is the root cause of her lack and 
therefore her invisibility. The link suggests that those who do not conform to the 
binary distinctions in phallocentric culture will be ignored or erased. My practice 
offers an aesthetic created in the indeterminate and unseen reverse or obscured 
place that women occupy, called, as previously mentioned, maternal aesthetics. This 
aesthetic is strongly associated with our being-in-the-world as foregrounded in the 
experiential and best expressed through Martin Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. 
Namely that we access the world through tools, acts of care and our experiences; in 
this instance the camera and mothering. I work from the exterior of what makes an 
image that is the equipment and the frame, towards aesthetics and process in order 
to discuss the interior or subject matter of my practice and thereby advance 
performance-to-camera as critical of phallocentrism. 
 
The focus on matrilineal connections, care, and play, ultimately create a new space 
which is not reliant on the binary nature of the art object/ experience. In other words 
the progression of an aesthetic that is not reliant on binaries allows for an 
intersubjective approach better suited to intergenerational collaborations and 
conversation. The shift in what is of value moves away from untouchable beauty and 
aura that we may encounter in more traditional fine art contexts, and becomes 
instead about process, mutual recognition and development.  
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1: Key Terms 
Feminism and the Maternal  
Under consideration are power and agency, embodiment, materiality, separation, 
representation, subjectivity and spectatorship, ethics and care. In this context the 
maternal is combined with aesthetics and thereby deployed here as a term which 
conceptually, figuratively and literally involves one’s children in artistic production. To 
include the maternal is more than just a pragmatic decision6; it is metaphysically 
challenging to notions of individualism, subjectivity and agency. In this way, the 
maternal is theorised by feminist philosophers, Adriana Cavarero, Alison Stone, 
Jessica Benjamin, Elizabeth Grosz, Bracha Ettinger, Sara Ruddick, Julia Kristeva, 
Andrea Liss and Luce Irigaray7, as both resistant to the residues of phallocentrism 
that are encountered within philosophy, culture and social contexts, and as 
something which can also render these structures irrelevant. Conversely, the over-
determination of the maternal and the feminine is also a phallocentric myth, where 
the woman is assigned as matter or material in her function as bearer of children. 
However, when maternal aesthetics is consciously deployed by women artists, that 
is, when an artist makes conscious use of the maternal in their work, it tends to act 
as a discursive tool which can expose this myth as a construct, such as in Mary 
                                                                 
6 In Chapter 2, I address maternal pragmatism in the practices of Lena Šimić, Shirley Cameron and 
Grace Surman. I compare some of the ethical dilemmas involved with the scandal that has 
surrounded the photographer’s Sally Mann and Tierney Gearon who have both very publicly exhibited 
their images of intimacy from their family life.  
7 My main evidence for this perspective is Irigaray’s argument for women’s propensity to exceed the 
body’s boundaries and confound phallocentric dualisms (Irigaray, 1985). However, more 
contemporary writing from Alison Stone (2012), Andrea Liss (eds. Chernick and Klein, 2011) and 
Adriana Cavarero (1995), for example, continues to support the view that maternal symbolism is both 
subversive, culturally repressed and also essential in a process that actively addresses phallocentric 
myths of masculinity. The maternal and repressed maternal symbolisms foreground everything from 
philosophy, to aesthetics and psychoanalytic theory, which is a point argued by Irigaray (1985), 
Elizabeth Grosz (1990) and Cavarero. Jessica Benjamin continues the critique of the phallocentric 
bias in psychoanalysis by challenging the standard viewpoint in developmental process that the 
mother and child separate (1990), which is particularly damaging for daughters who must renounce 
the feminine. Benjamin (1990) proposes following, instead, a theory of relation to the other. The 
significance of the relationship formed between infant and mother is also the focus of Alison Stone’s 
theorising on the maternal, and is the focus of my own practice, My Studio Performances with Matilda 
(2011-2012). Grosz and Bracha Ettinger are not the focus of this thesis but it is important to mention 
their contribution as they both emphasise in their writing the importance of corporeality and the womb. 
Kristeva’s Stabat Mata (1985) is another classic text that emphasises women’s centrality in Western 
philosophical conception and their suppression and veneration through religion. Kristeva’s argument 
that the matricide is dominant in Western culture is also challenged by Benjamin and Stone’s writing 
on the maternal, where the mother is not consumed or violently forced out during the child’s 
separation from the mother, but rather their relationship endures in the form of mutual recognition 
(Benjamin, 1990, p.30).  
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Kelly’s Post-Partum Document (1976), where the mother-child relationship is 
aestheticised, conceptualised and theorised, simultaneously. 
    
The Camera 
The practice-based elements of this thesis use the camera as the medium through 
which to materialise my practice in the form of performance-to-camera. Using the 
camera, in this way, within a feminist framework, is inherently problematic because it 
has a distancing effect. The camera looks and records, and therefore, by 
association, the camera also functions as symbolic of the impulse to frame, to insert 
itself, and to set oppositions in place between, such elements as proximity and 
distance, and absence and presence. The camera is invasive and seeks to 
penetrate. Good examples of where it can be found include the paparazzi, 
voyeurism, CCTV, selfies, pornography, ultrasound and medical cameras8. However, 
in its application in performance-to-camera, I argue that the camera can also 
deconstruct all of the above. The more subtle processes of othering and forming 
subjectivities are apparent in the early performances-to-camera. Artists such as Ana 
Mendieta9 (artworks produced 1972-1985), discussed in Chapter One, were aware 
from the on-set of their artistic careers of the power afforded them in staging their 
performances through the camera and siting them in the photographic space.  
Carolee Schneemann’s Interior Scroll (1975) is a seminal work because it 
exemplifies the dualistic thinking behind aesthetics, and brings the inside into the 
image and, literally, out of the performer’s body. Performance–to-camera can also 
respond to latent displays of phallic symbolism as critiqued by feminist artists, for 
                                                                 
8 I looked extensively at Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1991), as well as Jeremy Bentham’s 
theory formulated in the 18th century on the panopticon, which is a type of institutional building as well 
as a system of control. There is also a breadth of literature on the male gaze, Laura Mulvey’s essay 
on Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1975) is one of the more well-known examples, as well as 
Kaja Silverman’s writing, and artworks such as Mona Hatoum’s Corps Etranger where we can enter 
the inside of the body via the cameras view of the interior of her body as it travels down her throat.  
9 Mendieta was a Cuban artist living and working in America, she was one of the earlier proponents of 
body art, or body performance. Mendieta also directed work towards the camera. She died 
prematurely in 1985 under, what were later deemed, somewhat suspicious circumstances, there are 
still many that believe her death may have been the result of domestic abuse at the hands of her 
boyfriend. Her untimely demise sparked the process ‘Where is Ana Mendieta?’ a protest in 1992 
outside the Guggenheim Museum. 
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example, Stehli’s Table (1998) responds to Allen Jones’s fetish images10 that both 
reassure and shore-up masculinities. My use of the camera can be defined as part of 
a performance-to-camera method because it is inherently self-reflexive and 
interrogates the nature of the camera’s deployment and its mechanistic and specular 
nature.  
 
Performance 
In this context, performance is another means with which to investigate philosophical 
material through the body, namely as a tool used to create meaning. Performance is 
not only the rehearsed and the staged, it is also immediate and subjective. 
Performance is a mode of knowledge production, reliant on direct experience and, 
most importantly, derived from emotional response. In this context, it is deemed an 
act of agency within fine art aesthetics, and it follows a live art practice 
methodology 11  where it is informed by the everyday. I am concerned with 
performance that is born out of direct engagement with life experience, and where 
the process is emphasised as more important than the result. Performance implies 
                                                                 
10 Chair by Allen Jones (1969), is an example of the woman’s body appropriated by male artists as a 
fetishized and sensationalised object.  
11 In the words of the Live Art Development Agency: 
The term Live Art is not a description of an art-form or discipline, but a cultural strategy to 
include experimental processes and experiential practices that might otherwise be excluded 
from established curatorial, cultural and critical frameworks. Live Art is a framing device for a 
catalogue of approaches to the possibilities of liveness by artists who chose to work across, in 
between, and at the edges of more traditional artistic forms. 
Live Art has generated what Joshua Sofaer has referred to as ‘an explosion of conventional 
aesthetics’, as a gene pool of artists, whose work is rooted in a broad church of disciplines, 
have crossed each other’s paths, blurred each other’s edges and, in the process, opened up 
new creative forms. 
To talk about Live Art is to talk about art that invests in ideas of process, presence and 
experience as much as the production of objects or things; art that wants to test the limits of 
the possible and the permissible; and art that seeks to be alert and responsive to its contexts, 
sites and audiences. 
Live Art offers a space in which artists can take formal and conceptual risks, create a context 
to look at different mediums of expression, explore ideas of process, presence and 
endurance, and investigate relationships with an audience. 
For many artists, Live Art is a generative force: to destroy pretence, to create sensory 
immersion, to shock, to break apart traditions of representation, to open different kinds of 
engagement with meaning. 
Live Art practices have constructed new strategies for the expression of identities, and for 
many women, gay, culturally diverse and disabled artists, Live Art has proved to be a potent 
site, where the disenfranchised and disembodied become visible, and where the politics of 
difference are contested (LADA, nd).  
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collective experience, audience engagement, the body, risk and spontaneity. 
Performance also promises new or alternative languages and forms of expression.  
 
Performance-to-Camera  
In my practice, the camera is used to invert specular processes where it immerses 
itself in that which is deeply personal and becomes the in-between space of the 
Derridean parergon (Derrida, 1987a). The camera is cast in a role, not as inflictor or 
aggressor, but as facilitator. My process differs from earlier performance-to-camera 
work because I am not concerned with representing a space of conflict between the 
subject and the device, such as in the way Ana Mendieta has done in Untitled Rape 
Scene (1973). Rather, for me the camera facilitates and grants the space to explore, 
play and experiment with my daughter. The camera is not simply the means to 
intervene it is a process that allows and facilitates the development of the emerging 
subjectivity of myself and my daughter. In postmodernity, the camera has been 
exposed as subjective in the writing of Roland Barthes (1981), Susan Sontag (1977), 
John Berger (1972), and Fredric Jameson 12  who theorises on the intentional 
breakdown of the concept of subjective and objective shots in cinema (Jameson, 
2015, pp. 177-178). The camera has lost the authority to frame reality and keep 
things apart, such as the inside and the outside; we can interact with it in different 
ways and with different attitudes, either with hostility or through collaboration.  
2: Key Themes 
I will briefly discuss the key themes of the thesis and present the guiding problem, 
the approach I will be taking, the research questions and the broader context of the 
research. I will then discuss the rationale for the methodology and theoretical 
framework that I have chosen, before discussing the relevant and critical literature 
and theorists in the field, and will explain how this has informed my focus within my 
research by practice. 
 
My thesis is concerned with the inter-generational connections between women, 
communicated by my use of matrilineal symbolisms, such as the relationship 
                                                                 
12 Fredric Jameson is a Marxist cultural theorist best known for his writing on post-modernity and 
capitalism in the early 1990s.  
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between myself and one of my daughters, and my relationship with my deceased 
grandmother. Through objects such as my grandmother’s wedding gown and the 
camera’s mechanism namely its ability to frame. I aim to establish the limits of 
performance-to-camera as a critique of the representation of women and their 
experience. This research has been undertaken in the field of live art within a fine art 
practice context, and within the theoretical relationship between performance 
practice and feminist critique. In the intersections between feminist theory and 
performance practice that follow a critical mode, I form part of the current resurgence 
in emphasis on the maternal experience13. 
 
I concentrate on performance from the 1960s to the present day, performance that 
has occurred within feminist frameworks and that tends to use the camera as a 
metaphor, as a symbol, or as an executor of phallocentrism, a term devised by 
Irigaray14. My focus is performance that is contextualised as fine art practice and 
which concerns itself with dismantling aesthetic binaries, the gaze, or objectification 
through the look, defined here as interventionist within the broader scope of feminist 
activism and avant-garde theatre. I am particularly concerned with performance as a 
means to play out the antagonisms and collaborations that women have had with the 
camera. I am working from the perspective proposed by Irigaray (1985) that women 
are, and have been historically, subjected to objectification and repression in a 
system that is often described as patriarchy by more radical second wave feminist 
theorists and activists such as Shulamith Firestone in the 1970s, namely a system 
whereby certain sections of society, such as white middle class men, benefit more 
readily than others, and that visual representations in culture can aid these 
processes. 
 
                                                                 
13 Seminal books on the topic have been published in the last decade, and organisations such as 
Mamsie (Mapping Maternal Subjectivities, Identities and Ethics), based at Birkbeck in the USA. In the 
UK, LADA has recognised maternal performance as a focused practice and has collected and 
collated relevant work, courtesy of Lena Šimić and Emily Underwood-Lee. Alison Stone and Sara 
Ruddick have both emphasised the politically charged nature of invoking the maternal. In London, 
initiatives such as the Mother Art House continue to support and champion mother artists and their 
practice. 
14 Speculum of the Other Woman (first published in 1974) directly addresses notions of phallocentrism 
and the role that the visual plays in reinforcing power imbalances. 
14 
 
 The use of visual representations of women interacting with daughters, mothers and 
grandmothers, which is part of a maternal aesthetics15. I will argue that my personal 
discovery of maternal symbolisms and processes has provided a methodology that 
progresses a critique of subjectivity in this context. Therefore, I argue that the 
realisation of the potency of working within maternal aesthetics and matrilineal 
connections is a radical move in the context of our phallocentric culture. The feminist 
framework at which I will be looking comprises Irigaray’s work in the 1970s theorising 
women’s subjective lack, particularly her use of the term phallocentrism to describe 
the domination of phallic symbolism in aesthetics, theory, psychoanalysis and 
philosophy (Irigaray, 1985). I bring together Irigaray’s theorising on women’s 
subjective lack with Derrida’s16 blurring of binaries, here I focus on the parergon 
section in his essay written in the 1980s, The Truth in Painting (1987a). I utilise 
Derrida’s sustained deconstruction of binaries (ibid), coupled with Irigaray’s 
deployment of the Speculum (Irigaray, 1985, pp. 133- 364) as the symbolic 
instrument of women’s repression and containment. In my practice the underside or 
reverse for Irigaray (ibid), and the in-between or parergon a place or object not 
intrinsic or extrinsic for Derrida (Derrida, 1987a, pp. 69- 82), are the spaces of my 
maternal aesthetics. Here the camera symbolises containment through the specular, 
however, my aim in deploying Derrida’s deconstruction of the frame is to 
demonstrate that performance-to-camera can be incredibly destabilising. The 
practice and the aesthetic process I employ are tasked with creating this space, 
which then enables or suggests non-phallocentric possibilities.  
                                                                 
15 I first began to use this term to describe my practice, which was informed by my physical experience 
and the everyday reality of caring for an infant. I first heard the term when I attended a symposium 
and practice sharing session at the Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at Home (2016). 
Before this, I struggled to fully make sense of the radical nature of my acts, and meeting other 
mother-artists crystallized the potency of our practice for me. In theoretical terms, in the US since the 
early 2000s, Andrea Liss has been describing mother artists’ practice in this way as a maternal 
aesthetic. In 2013 the Studies in the Maternal, on-line journal, guest curated by Liss, was titled 
Maternal Aesthetics: The Surprise of the Real. It was certainly at this point that I became aware of the 
resurgent interest in the mother in art and feminism. 
16 Derrida reminds us that what is perceived as fixed is actually indeterminate, and that the effort of 
imposing, establishing and maintaining binaries is a massive strain that constantly causes itself to 
collapse, which is essential to my analysis of the latent radical potential of performance-to-camera 
and the maternal. I do not intend or imply to conflate these two things, and in many ways they are 
polar opposites. The camera insists on the aforementioned binaries and therefore struggles to 
maintain these boundaries, particularly in a digitised world. The maternal, however, inherently 
threatens boundaries as it transgresses the interior and the exterior in its flows (of blood and milk) and 
metamorphoses (where one becomes two).  
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The consequence of the ideological, representational, verbal and physical repression 
of women is arguably the hysteric, irrational or incomprehensible woman: 
And anyway why would she not be “hysterical”? Since hysteria holds in 
reserve, in suspension/ suffering, something in common with the mime [...] the 
problem is that the ludic mimicry, the fiction, the “make believe,” the “let’s 
pretend” [...] are stopped short, impeded, controlled by a master-signifier, the 
phallus. [...] (ibid). 
 
This hysteria is stigmatised ‘as a place where fantasies, ghosts, and shadows fester 
and must be unmasked, interpreted’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 60). In response to this, 
Elizabeth Grosz 17  argues that Irigaray proposes a counter-strategy to women’s 
containment ‘within an image and a logic that renders them mute and hysterical’ 
(Grosz, 1990, p. 174). Elizabeth Grosz argues that one counter-strategy is to mime, 
thus displacing ‘the real with simulacrum’ (ibid, p. 174), thus exceeding the 
‘patriarchal requirements of femininity’ (ibid). In this thesis, the work I propose and 
theorise is to some degree defined by this premise; the idea that performance-to-
camera is to mime and displace the real and that performance-to-camera with a 
maternal aesthetic exceeds the ‘patriarchal requirements of femininity’ (ibid).  
I will focus on feminist critique of psychoanalytic theory, particularly developmental 
theories and theories on the maternal. Of particular interest is Alison Stone, whose 
theories on the maternal and especially mother-daughter relationships have 
influenced my understanding of my practice (Stone, 2012). Stone argues that ‘the 
object-relations and Freudian-Lacanian traditions unite in regarding the mother as 
mere background to the child-as-self’ (Stone, 2012, p. 31). Stone’s criticism of 
Irigaray’s analysis is that it over-identifies with the figure of the daughter, Stone 
claims that this renders the mother a reproduction ‘the background to someone 
else’s narrative - this time [though] the daughter not the son’ (Stone, 2012, p. 60). To 
be a background is arguably a continuation of a phallocentric perspective, however, 
in this thesis the critique of phallocentrism and the deployment of maternal 
aesthetics are in order to develop a subject position for the mother. I have also 
looked at matrilineal connections, such as my relationship with my grandmother and 
my mother, and women performing with their sons. However, in the practice I have 
                                                                 
17 Elizabeth Grosz is part of the 1990s Australian school of Corporeal Feminism that includes Rosi 
Braidotti. 
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produced, my main focus has been my relationship with my deceased grandmother 
and my first-born daughter. 
 
The work submitted with this thesis is centred on two performance-to-camera pieces, 
both in a locked studio environment and photographed by Duncan in 2010, and 
2011-201218. These performances span different concerns elicited by the maternal; 
the first, My Nana’s Wedding (Gown) (2010) (MNWG) is concerned with matrilineage 
and is inter-generational in its approach and subject-matter, while the second series, 
My Studio Performances with Matilda19 (2011-12) (MSP with Matilda), charts the 
developing relationship and subjectivities and inter-subjectivities20 between myself 
and my eldest daughter. In both performances, the notion of interiority and 
exteriority, both set up (as we shall see via Derrida’s parergon, 1987a) and collapsed 
through the frame, is addressed through invoking the maternal, which both mutates 
and evolves. Perceptions of the body and subjectivity as isolated entities are upset in 
pregnancy, and in interactions with infant children, while perceptions of time and 
space as distinct linear moments from each other are upset in the exchanges across 
generations that occur in a maternal aesthetic. By invoking the maternal, I am part of 
the resurgent maternal aesthetic that proposes time as conceived around births 
rather than deaths, and I choose to recognise the links we have across time through 
our mothers, and our grandmothers.  
 
My research has been important in a number of ways: my case studies discuss the 
work of Shirley Cameron and Evelyn Silver, work that has been absent both from 
mainstream art criticism and canonisation in any sustained feminist theorisations. 
Simultaneously, through my commitment to a practice-based approach, I have been 
able to explore the camera and the maternal through acts of performance and 
notions of spectating. The turn to the maternal aesthetic as a means through which 
to analyse and contextualise these artists practices, and relate these works to other 
contemporary performers who operate in a maternal aesthetic, such as Šimić, 
                                                                 
18 First exhibited as an animation in Chongqing Cyberspace and the Myth of Gender (2010), now in 
the publication; Cyberspace and the Myth of Gender, Turner (2010). 
19 Included in the ProCreate Archive housed at the Women’s Art Library 2015. 
20 Discussed in Chapter Three through Jessica Benjamin’s intersubjective developmental theory. 
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Tracey Kershaw 21  and myself, is not to re-instate biological determinism or 
essentialist feminist practices, I address this in Chapter Two. 
 
3: Literature Review 
Photography and Reality and the Liveness Debate 
In 1983, Czech born philosopher Vilem Flusser, who was heavily influenced by the 
strand of phenomenology developed by Martin Heidegger that focuses on the 
ontology of being apprehended through tools, argued that we ‘are all inhabitants of 
the photographic universe [because] we have become accustomed [or naturalised] 
to photographs’ (Flusser, p. 65, 2000). In Flusser’s reading of photography, it is 
possible to observe his deployment of the principle of enframing, theorised by Martin 
Heidegger (1977). Heidegger’s notion of enframing is apparent in Flusser’s argument 
when he describes the clash of intention between humanity and technology, 
although it is not something to which he refers specifically.  
 
Heidegger defines the intention of modern technology as an ‘unreasonable demand’ 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 14), in the sense that everything in nature is perceived as of 
use and disposable to man. Interestingly, this technological intention is a ‘setting-
upon’ (ibid, p. 15) the thing which, Heidegger contends, is an acceleration ‘in that it 
unlocks and exposes’ (ibid). I want to relate this notion of unlocking and exposing 
directly to the camera’s ability to hasten the process of revealing. However, there is a 
deeper level of revealing which Heidegger names ‘primally granted revealing’ 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 34), which refers to a period in ancient Greece when ‘it was not 
just technology alone that bore the name techne’ (ibid). Photography, when seen as 
enframing, is not empowering but rather in its ability to expose or reveal can leave us 
vulnerable, and therefore, if used in the wrong hands or for the wrong purpose, it 
becomes a tool of control or power. These examples of photographic demonstrate 
the importance of the photographer’s intention when creating an image, as well as 
                                                                 
21 Šimić works across the disciplines of theatre and fine art. She began making work more specifically 
in the maternal vein whilst pregnant with her first son. Šimić now has four sons, and is co-founder of 
The Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at Home, with her children and Gary Anderson. Tracy 
Kershaw is a Nottingham-based artist who has a son and who works in the maternal aesthetic, she is 
an obsessive collector and hoarder and collects her material from the everyday, from the detritus of 
domesticity and childcare. 
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the inherent power in the photograph and the camera. Later, in the same essay, The 
Question Concerning Technology (1977), Heidegger describes this new 
technological perception (which he calls enframing) as transforming what it has 
unlocked, then storing it up, then distributing it and then switching it ‘about ever 
anew’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16).  
  
The camera can be used in a way that completely dismantles Flusser’s analysis of 
its function, heavily reliant as it is with the binary between ‘nature’ and ‘machine’. 
There are many theories and practices to support this view, and Heidegger argues 
that ‘essential reflection on technology’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 35) and crucially, a 
‘decisive confrontation with it’ (ibid), must occur in a realm that is akin to technology 
whilst separate from it. There are many examples that are, arguably, striving for this, 
from Canadian photographer Jeff Wall, discussed by Michael Fried in Why 
Photography Matters in Art as Never Before (Fried, 2008) to the Canadian dancer 
Susan Kozel’s (Kozel, 2010) work with digital images and devices in her 
performances (in the early 2000s) and her working methodologies grounded in 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 22  and Heidegger’s reminder of the time when art was 
techne23 (Heidegger, 1977, p. 34).  
 
The premise of the Liveness debate in the 1990s was that the digital had usurped 
the live moment and it marked a second instance of the loss of aura, with the first 
crisis being loss of aura for the art object in the advent of mechanical reproduction24. 
In a similar way the latter crisis being for the embodied act as auratic rather than the 
aura of an object. However, Samuel Weber25 (1996) argued the distancing effect of 
                                                                 
22 Merleau-Ponty was a French philosopher influenced by Heidegger and Husserl, he philosophised 
about how meaning is arrived at through experience. 
23 Techne is meant to express not just a sense of craftsmanship, but rather in its essence it is a way of 
knowing. Techne from which the word technology is derived was also, in ancient Greek a term which 
encompassed poetry and the arts. Therefore it implies a deeper form of knowing the world. 
24 Walter Benjamin’s 1950s seminal essay The Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
(Benjamin, 1999). 
25 Weber is a contemporary philosopher who provides good counter arguments to Walter Benjamin’s 
(1999) assertions that reproduction and dissipation through media lessen aura (1996). Benjamin had 
previously found film lacking because of, interestingly, its estrangement from a live audience 
(Benjamin, 1999, p. 224). With regard to a methodology of the digital, Steve Dixon (2006) reviews 
digital performance as a new medium, thereby implying it as an addition to existing creative 
experimentation and culture as opposed to a lessening of the same. Meanwhile, Susan Broadhurst’s 
work with avatars in the theatre, and her theorising about liminality and indeterminate spaces (1999, 
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media also creates aura, because an artwork or object, and additionally an art 
performance or experience, are reliant on a degree of untouchability. In actual fact 
the untouchability is part of the aesthetic premise that many deem necessary for a 
work to be classified as fine art. Weber uses film as evidence of the phenomenon of 
auratic media (Weber, 1996, pp. 101-107) in terms of idolising film stars and so on. 
Therefore, as it had emerged that aura was not the sole property of presence, or 
even the sole property of fine art aesthetics, it would be incorrect to claim its loss at 
the hands of technological mediation or mass media. Weber echoes Heidegger’s 
ideas of oscillations as paradoxical, where he describes a movement between 
distance and closeness as ‘a distance that takes up and moves the beholder towards 
that which, though remote, is also closest-at-hand’ (Weber, 1996, p. 107).  
 
The Liveness debate then led me to consider the idea of a loss of presence. Philip 
Auslander has written extensively on performance and technology from the 1990s 
onwards, and he argues that digital media serves to highlight what has always been 
true, which is that the world is highly mediatised, and this was so prior to the influx of 
digital media, which has only served to bring this into sharper relief (Auslander, 
1999, p. 53). Derrida has also contributed to the theorisation of presence and media, 
discussing the phantom or ghost to demonstrate that the distinction between 
absence and presence is not clear-cut, if it can be claimed to exist at all. Are we not, 
in fact, continually in the act of coming into presence? (Derrida, 1981, p. 215). 
Performance embodies this transience, whether live or on film. 
  
The notion of embodiment, and seeing the body as reconfigured through technology, 
rather than removed or marginalised also counters postmodern conceptions of the 
absence of the body. Feminist inquiry has been active in this area, in particular, 
ideas of hybridity and cyber-Goddesses as theorised by Donna Haraway26 (1991, p. 
150), and notions of the body as fully present in technology and culture. Haraway’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2006) is an example of the trend towards viewing the camera and digital techniques as fully present 
often through using technology in a very immersive way. 
26 Donna Haraway is part of the techno-embodied branch of feminism that was utopian in nature and 
prevalent in the 1990s, her work intersects with theorists such as Sadie Plant (1997). They both 
argued that the internet was very liberating for women, and that women’s involvement in and use of 
technology is culturally played down. 
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ideas have been key in the ongoing relevance of a feminist aesthetic, which 
embraces the technological whilst concurrently placing the body as critical and 
central to any engagement with culture. It is clear that technology is not a form of 
loss because, as Heidegger argues, technology is in essence a mode of accessing 
the world, and it is through tools that we experience. This assertion that technology 
is not a form of loss is also evidenced by Weber’s work (1996), in which he examines 
how aura operates in works of art to show, for example, the auratic properties of film. 
 
4: The Gaze, Feminist Theory and Essentialism 
Flusser’s analysis is dated, partly because it predates the digital, which in many 
ways upsets further the rigid notion of the frame and binary distinctions. However, 
what is less destabilised from the move from analogue to digital is the function of the 
specular device and its deployment as a tool to enforce conformity, and this is 
another frame. It is in this internal frame, the space where images are conceptually 
and symbolically constructed, that those artists who declare their feminist politics or 
have been defined as such by others, have employed irony and satire, mimicry and 
hysteria to exploit the ambiguous nature of the photograph and its implicit 
destabilisations of the real. 
The nature of spectatorship, particularly the in-built culturally-primed capacity in the 
West to distance oneself as a spectator, becomes a central concern. Working solely 
within the photographic space cannot unravel the relationship of gaze and 
photography and their function within representation. For Lacanian feminist theorist, 
Kaja Silverman (writing in the 1990s), the camera conflates or interchanges with the 
male gaze. Indeed, she argues that camera and gaze are one and the same in 
Lacan’s theorisation (Silverman, 1996, pp. 132-133). This, I would argue, constitutes 
an internal failure in performance-to-camera as an effective critique of the 
objectification that the camera helps to facilitate. Nevertheless, it is this very 
impossibility that has created such interesting processes as in Stehli’s performance, 
Friends with Benefits (2000)27. The link between camera and gaze has now become 
over-determined and it is difficult to structure a feminist critique of representation that 
does not include this or allude to its capacity to create and maintain alterity.  
                                                                 
27 Which I will discuss in Chapter One 
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Silverman argues that with the advent of the camera, the eye is no longer perceived 
as accurate. Rather, it is seen to be housed in the body and thereby subject to error, 
fatigue, misperception, interpretation, and so on28. Silverman then links this emphatic 
insistence ‘on the disjunction of camera and eye’ (Silverman, 1996, p. 131) with 
Lacan’s positing in The Four Fundamental Concepts (1977a) that the camera 
signifies the gaze (ibid). Elizabeth Grosz concurs with Silverman’s view that Lacan 
clearly aligns camera and gaze, while Grosz states that for Lacan: 
 [...] the possibility of being observed is always primary. To occupy a place in 
the scopic field is to be able to see, but more significantly, to be seen. The 
gaze is what ensures that when I see, at the same time, “I am photo-graphed” 
(Lacan, 1977a, p. 106). 
 
The ramifications of the gaze being linked to the camera are that the inherent 
potential for control can easily be taken away, witnessed in the desire to be seen and 
shown, as well as to see, which, according to Lacan, is required for a fully-fledged 
subjectivity and is provided via the camera. The authority of owning or operating the 
device is evidenced in the following recollection, made by bell hooks29 (Wells, 2003, 
p. 391), that it was her father who was the only one with access to the equipment 
when she was growing up, and as hooks explains, ‘he exerted control over our 
image’ (Wells, 2003, p. 391). Her father would line them all up, and as hooks 
remembers, ‘I hated it. I hated posing. I hated cameras. I hated the images they 
produced’ (Wells, 2003, p. 392). For hooks, patriarchy and ‘picture takin [sic]’ (Wells, 
2003, p. 391) were always inherently linked from her childhood onwards.  
 
                                                                 
28 The camera has been linked to the progression that began in the 18th century with the advent of the 
stereoscope, where a ‘dramatic disjunction of eye and optical apparatus’ occurs (Silverman, 1996, p. 
129). Further to this Silverman argues that the stereoscope ‘calls into question the very distinction [...] 
between the look and the object’ (ibid). 
29 bell hooks is a contemporary black American feminist cultural theorist and campaigner. She argues 
many points, including that patriarchy damages men and boys as much as women, and that visual 
culture is constantly assaulting feminism. Refer to, for example, Beyoncé is a Terrorist (hooks, 2014). 
 
22 
 
When women photograph their children, there is often a negative reception from the 
conservative elements in wider society. Sally Mann and Tierney Gearon30, as well as 
Shirley Cameron and Grace Surman are all used to examine and provide evidence 
of this phenomenon. John Berger’s31  argument still resonates, which is that the 
‘essential way of seeing women’ (Berger, 2008, p. 64), and ‘the essential use to 
which their images are put’ (ibid), has not changed, and I would add cannot change, 
because ‘the ideal spectator is always assumed to be male’ (ibid). This goes some 
way towards explaining why online networking/ dating and selfie culture can be so 
disempowering, even if that assertion is at odds with the myth that we are all freer on 
the Internet. Further to this, Lutz and Collins32 argue that the ‘photographer’s gaze 
[...] leaves its clear mark on the structure and content of the photograph’ (Lutz and 
Collins, 1993, p. 355). In this instance, there is a desperate need to be seen, or an 
overwhelming desire for control, which is arguably the subtext for many 
representations. With these concerns in mind, and my need to satirise the perceived 
desperation of women to be seen and approved of, I constructed the performance-
to-camera MNWG (2010) in such a way as to restrict the photographer’s control, 
whilst presenting to the spectator a ‘hysterical woman’. The photographer chooses 
when to activate the shutter, thus mirroring his gaze back to us, similarly to Lutz and 
Collins argument that the photographer always does almost in spite of himself. The 
photographer reveals himself through his choices of when to press the shutter and 
that exposes them. I did not discuss this with Duncan, nor did he know prior to the 
                                                                 
30 Mann and Gearon are both photographers who work with their families to create images that are 
often taboo or aim to challenge myths about family life, they are both contemporary although better 
known in the late 1990s early 2000s. 
31 Berger is responsible for the, what is now, deemed seminal book on the relationship between 
gender, hierarchy, power and visual culture. It began as a series of television programmes in the late 
1970s broadcast on the BBC and was subsequently published in print. 
32 Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins, both associate professors in visual anthropology, actually theorise 
there are 7 ways of looking associated with photography they theorise the photograph as an 
intersection of gazes (Lutz and Collins, 1993, p. 354) and make the claim that 'all photographs tell 
stories about looking' (ibid). These gazes are: 
1. The photographer's gaze 
2. The institutional, magazine gaze 
3. The readers' gaze 
4. The non-Western subjects' gaze 
5. The explicit looking done by Westerners who are often framed together with locals in the picture 
6. The gaze returned or refracted by the mirrors or cameras that are shown, in a surprising number of 
photographs, in local hands 
7. Our own, academic gaze.  
They argue that the camera mirrors the gaze of the photographer and returns it to the viewer (Lutz 
and Collins, 1993). 
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‘shoot’ what I was going to do. He was simply instructed not to move the camera 
from the position we had first agreed, and in this way, at the time, I thought that the 
gaze could be disrupted. However, by operating a stills camera, rather than a video 
camera, Duncan retained control over which moment to release the shutter and 
thereby imprinted his gaze upon the work. Irigaray discusses women’s containment 
and this reverberates around in this work, she explains it thus, woman is ‘[...] a mirror 
in which the “subject” sees himself and reproduces himself in his reflection, a shutter 
set up to allow the eye to frame its view’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 240). 
  
Therefore, I would argue, that Duncan’s collaboration in the creation of these images 
is symbolic as well as practical; he not only symbolises the reality of phallocentric 
dominance over representation, he also, in a literal sense is the man who takes the 
pictures. There are similarities, here, between my performance and Stehli’s process 
in Friends with Benefits (2000). The act of releasing the shutter is part of the work 
and renders the photographer vulnerable. Stehli takes this to its extreme by making 
the photographer literally the subject. 
 
 Performance-to-camera is influenced by the perceptual shift that enabled the 
photographic image to be revealed as a construct, we tend to ‘speak of taking 
photographs rather than making them’ (Wells, 1996, p. 95). Women’s performance-
to-camera is often at pains to reveal the photograph as a construct to highlight 
phallocentrism,33 and, simultaneously, this type of performance is also interested in 
the camera’s ability to act as a tool for fantasy and make-believe. However critical or 
playful these performances may be, they tend to be explicitly made rather than 
simply taken34.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
33 Artist such as Valie Export, Ana Mendieta, Judy Chicago, Rose English, Monica Ross, Shirley 
Cameron, Evelyn Silver, Dawn Woods, Amalia Ulman, Francesca Woodman. 
34 In Chapter’s Two and Three, I argue that maternal aesthetics overcomes these difficulties by 
situating itself firmly in the experiential and the maternal, and in this way, the camera is restructured 
as a space for autonomy and intersubjectivity; rather than as a symbolic stand-in for patriarchal 
oppression. 
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5: The Artists, Shirley Cameron and Lena Šimić, and my own maternal practice 
and performance-to-camera methodology 
In 1974, sculptor and performance artist, Shirley Cameron gave birth to twin 
daughters Lois and Colette. She began to perform again three weeks after their birth, 
as she was on tour, with a performance called Rabbits (1974), performed with 
husband Roland Miller at agricultural shows. Cameron had conceived of this 
performance as preparation for having a baby and performed inside a house/hutch 
with live rabbits. Similar to most first-time mothers, Cameron hoped that the baby 
would fit into her life, which in this instance was her lifestyle of touring with Miller, 
and that its arrival would not alter things too significantly. However, this was not to be 
as, unbeknownst to her, she was carrying twins. Central to the maternal aesthetic is 
how radically babies and children change us and our lives, while the art is not a by-
product of having children. Mother-artists practicing maternal aesthetics are often 
exploring the metaphysics of the radical changes that have occurred in their lives. 
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Cameron continued to collaborate with 
Miller, with her daughters, with Evelyn Silver, and with other artists, such as Angela 
Carter, and she has been a very prolific performer. 
 
The link between mimesis and irony as a radical act, which I have cited as a 
common thread in feminist performance, is clear in Cameron and Carter’s 
performance with Cameron’s daughters Washing the Twins (1977), in which Carter 
washed a bronze statue of a pair of twins while Cameron washed her own girls in a 
bowl in front of the sculpture. When I recorded Cameron (who is now in her 
seventies) for my Oral Histories35, she explained how such an act was deemed 
irreverent to art at the time it was performed. This irreverence, or de-legitimisation of 
authority through the act of mimesis, is also apparent in Cameron and Silver’s other 
collaborations, both in their interventions in the everyday and their treatment of 
avant-garde performance. For example, in their performance The Swinging Sixties: 
                                                                 
35 Available in the Appendix to this thesis as oral recordings, rather than as transcribed interviews, as 
they follow the format of a facilitated conversation rather than a formal interview. Through existing as 
recordings, the presence of the artists is emphasised and reference made to non-academic forms of 
intergeneration, and specifically to matrilineal knowledge transfer. A useful reference for the use of 
facilitation in conversation is Lois Weaver’s Long Table Discussions (ongoing). I recently participated 
in one of these discussions on the topic of the family at Tate Modern’s Fierce Play family festival 
(2018). 
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We Were There (1993), they positively reclaim the Yves Klein style bodies and paint 
performances of the 1960s36. Cameron and Silver also parodied the British royal 
family and religion, in particular the iconic figures of Princess Diana and the Virgin 
Mary, as well as certain conceptions of femininity. For example, they were inspired 
by the Victorian era paintings of women in corsets and long gowns climbing 
mountains. Their works succeeded as radical and transformative because they were 
always enacted in community settings, such as parks, public houses, on the street, 
public squares, monuments, factory doors, schools, community centres, and so on, 
and this commitment to reach audiences of women who would not necessarily be ‘art 
aware’ was to further feminist goals of empowerment and raise consciousness, as 
well as being non-elitist. If members of the audience asked them what was 
happening, or why they were there, they would answer to the best of their ability, as 
their aim was to communicate and not be overly abstract. Through humour, they 
sought to highlight some of the absurdities of phallocentrism. This is never more 
apparent than in Brides Against the Bomb (1982-1985 Fig. 1), which was performed 
at a variety of locations including the Glastonbury festival. 
 
Fig. 1. Brides Against The Bomb, Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron, (1982- 1985). 
                                                                 
36 This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Two. 
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Their ambivalence towards the institution of marriage is clear in the act of wearing 
wedding dresses while demonstrating for nuclear disarmament. Posing as figures of 
a phallocratic establishment, and protesting with a wedding cake in a pram, 
communicates an image of mothers who, we can assume, want a safe(r) world for 
their children. Essentially, the wedding dresses evoke a normative femininity as a 
parody, similar to that which I invoke when performing with my Nana’s dress. This is 
an aesthetic that inevitably clashes with phallocentric logic, because it presents a 
different set of ethical concerns. My work contrasts, because I have no clear 
message, but rather I present an abstraction of loss that is partly the lack of a clear 
cause. Cameron and Silver are happily, albeit ironically, wearing the dresses to 
perform what becomes a radical gesture in the clash between the patriarchal 
establishment and the maternal, presented in the form of wives and mothers who 
also want peace. My dress, on the other hand, is mysterious and 
unknown/unknowable, but it entices and leads to jouissance. Silver and Cameron re-
appropriate the wedding dress and the wedding ritual as an empowering symbol of 
women’s political activism, whereas in my performance, MNWG (2010), I cannot 
even fit into the dress my Nana wore as if women have altered so radically in the 
intervening time. It was these reflections on the historic performance of Cameron 
and Silver and their use of wedding dresses (Fig. 1) which led me to understand that, 
when maternal performance occurs, it tends to be interventionist and reflexive upon 
existing institutions and, what I describe as phallocentrism, following after Irigaray 
(1974), Kristeva (1984) and Cavarero (1995). In making the link between myself and 
Cameron as sharing a maternal aesthetic in our performing with our daughters, this 
thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge because there exists only a 
minimal amount of research into women’s performance with their daughters, and 
Cameron’s work has never been analysed in this way. In addition, Silver appeared in 
performances with Cameron and her daughters, and also invoked maternal 
aesthetics through the matrilineal in her own work. 
 
 I recently attended symposium on the topic of ‘motherhood and live art’37, at which I 
presented MSP with Matilda (2011-12). There was discussion around what 
                                                                 
37 LADA, Study Room in Exile (2016) hosted by The Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at 
Home, Lena Šimić.  
27 
 
constitutes a maternal aesthetic. During the course of the discussion at the Institute 
the mother artist manifesto by Mierle Laderman Ukeles made in 1969 emerged as 
important to all of the artists gathered there. The manifesto is concerned with what 
constitutes work and what is of cultural value in Western capitalist culture, and there 
were many other important connections, such as isolation, time constraints, 
ambivalence, and questioning of the role of the mother. In Šimić and Emily 
Underwood-Lee’s38 study guide on live art and motherhood for their LADA archive, 
where my performance-to-camera MNWG (2010) is now held, they pinpoint many 
themes connected to the maternal. These include: resistance as well as conformity, 
eroticism, time, play, ethics and generations (Šimić & Underwood-Lee, 2016).  
 
Lena Šimić’s practice differs from Cameron’s because, apart from the historical 
context differing, Šimić takes the outsider position in her status as a non-British 
mother. The outsider position enables her to destabilise conceptions about her 
identity as a mother, as a woman and as an artist. Šimić’s practice also differs from 
Cameron’s maternal practice, because it is consciously interventionist in its nature 
(Cameron went on to produce interventionist work when her twins were older and 
she collaborated with Silver). When Šimić described the early days with a baby or 
infant and trying to make art at the Live Art and Motherhood Symposium (2016)39, 
Cameron and Šimić sound very similar in their pragmatic attitude towards their 
child’s presence in their work. From my own experience, I know that there have been 
times when considering the presence of my children has directly affected the work. 
For both Cameron 40  and Šimić, and for myself, this has resulted in creative 
responses and interesting collaborations. For example, Šimić has continued to work 
with her four sons at different points and on different projects over the years, 
including: mother & son: ‘that just sounds really sad’ artist residency and 
performance with Neal Anderson (2011), Friday Records: A Document of Maternity 
Leave blog (with baby James, 2014) and Sid Jonah Anderson by Lena Šimić (2008). 
    
                                                                 
38 Underwood-Lee is a maternal artist and collaborates with Šimić on theorising the maternal 
aesthetic.  
39 Documentation can be viewed on The Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at Home’s 
website. 
40 Cameron produced over twenty performances with her daughters. 
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6: From Motherhood to the Maternal 
I am working within the framework of a maternal aesthetics, which is, I argue, in 
concurrence with current feminist theory, and which is a state described by Emily 
Jeremiah41 as one that involves ‘change and exchange’ (Jeremiah, 2006, p. 23). She 
further argues that the shift in feminist theory towards discussing the role of 
‘mothering’ rather than ‘the mother’ (Jeremiah, 2006, p. 21) is parallel to the shift 
from ‘essentialism to poststructuralism’ that feminism, more broadly, has 
experienced (ibid). Jessica Benjamin42 (1990) argues that mothering is relational, 
Benjamin’s analysis, according to Jeremiah, is based on the assumption that women 
know innately how to care, and this is therefore an essentialist viewpoint (Jeremiah, 
2006). Instead, Jeremiah chooses, to theorise the maternal as ‘performative’ 
(Jeremiah, 2006, p. 21). In a similar vein, Šimić and Underwood-Lee distinguish 
between motherhood as direct experience and the maternal as the theoretical and 
aesthetic dimensions (Šimić and Underwood-Lee, 2017).  
  
I do not concur with Jeremiah that Benjamin’s theory is essentialist in nature, 
because her theory of the maternal stems from the notion of the relational, an 
exchange between others that can be nothing other than performative. Therefore, 
how can it be claimed that she implies a static, fixed, or essentialised subject? 
Benjamin proposes that to be a mother is to improvise and always be actively 
creative, to take the time to recognise the other and help them to recognise you and 
find ‘the joy in the [...] recognition of shared reality’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 41). To 
suggest that women can mother instinctively does sound alarmingly essentialist, 
however, I interpret Benjamin’s argument as being that the instinct is to improvise, 
and this is not necessarily gendered. The conception of what the mother is and what 
her role is hinges on the developmental theory to which you ascribe. For Benjamin 
‘internalisation theory and intersubjective theory are not mutually exclusive’ 
(Benjamin, 1990, p. 45) I discuss Benjamin’s theory in relation to MSP with Matilda 
(2011-2012) in more depth in Chapters’ Two and Three. 
                                                                 
41 Jeremiah, who is Professor of Contemporary Literature and Gender Studies at Royal Holloway, 
University of London, is critical of essentialism in feminist theory. 
42 Benjamin is one of the leading psychoanalysts currently working in the field, and is the founder of 
relational theory. She practices in New York. I make use of her theory on intersubjectivity later in this 
thesis to better understand the dynamics at play between myself and Matilda in our studio 
performances MSP with Matilda (2011-2012). 
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The notion of the role of mothering empowering and developing the other’s agency is 
radically different to the concept of the mother as becoming an internalised mental 
structure for the child, and recognising the mother as a subject is not the same as 
internalising an image of the mother as an object (Benjamin, 2006, p. 3). The 
ground-breaking work of child developmental psychologist Donald Winnicott in the 
1970s, broke with the view of the mother as passive and consumable. Benjamin 
argues that, in Playing and Reality (1971) Winnicott appears to lay the foundations 
for her relational model by using such terms as “the holding environment” and the 
“facilitating environment” (Benjamin quoting Winnicott, 1990, p.44). Jeremiah 
however, is not alone in taking issue with the term ‘motherhood.’ Many feminist 
thinkers, from Irigaray to Kristeva and Stone, share her caution. When motherhood 
refers to a phallocentric idealisation of femininity, and further to this, proposes a rigid 
conception of what each gender is capable of and assigned to do it becomes 
problematic.  
 
I think to clarify my position, and the methodology I have employed, it is important to 
look to the feminist philosophy of Stone (2012) and Sara Ruddick (1990). In what 
Jeremiah would probably describe as a poststructuralist move, (although she cites 
neither Ruddick nor Stone). Stone writes about ‘maternal experience’ (Stone, 2012, 
pp. 20-30), and Ruddick about ‘maternal practice’, ‘maternal thinking’ and ‘maternal 
work’ (Ruddick, 1990, pp. 17-29). These ways of discussing mothering can 
overcome the difficulties of biologically derived pigeonholing and generalisations 
about gender identity, as well as counter criticisms about definitions of motherhood 
that exclude all those who have not carried and given birth to a child. Maternal 
aesthetics can also be added to the above as a way of thinking about motherhood 
and mothering in a way that does not seek to essentialise or biologically dictate its 
role or experience.  
 
 I would argue that one of the ways that women’s performance-to-camera becomes 
vital once more is when a maternal aesthetic is utilised, because in this context a 
woman’s subjective position has been both threatened and renegotiated (Stone, 
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2012, pp. 21-33). Stone is unapologetic in her discussion of mothering and how the 
experience of being a daughter or a mother (or both) intersect with feminine 
subjectivity. Even in the 1990s, when Ruddick was discussing maternal work as 
opposed to mothers, she stresses the importance of honouring the maternal work 
(and by that she means child-bearing and the bulk of the childcare) that women have 
done throughout history (Ruddick, 1990, p. 44), and distinguishes birth work (labour) 
as distinct and, significantly, performed by women exclusively. On birth, Ruddick 
argues that as ‘long as we fear and deny the distinctly female character of birth, we 
risk losing the symbolic, emotional, and ultimately political significance of birth’ (ibid, 
p. 49). In accordance with Jessica Benjamin, in Chapter Three, I argue, for the 
mother as initiating an intersubjective process. The maternal, in my practice, has 
become a means through which to challenge notions of lack, excess and separation, 
and it is also concerned with questioning binaries. It moves through time both inter-
generationally and cyclically, and apprehends being through the intersubjective. 
Here, the interaction of mother and child in frames will be considered alongside 
argumentation for the maternal as a resistant strategy when deployed aesthetically.  
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7: Research Questions and Thesis Structure 
The thesis examines historic performance-to-camera, juxtaposing this with the lesser 
theoretically articulated practice of British performance, with the artists Shirley 
Cameron and Evelyn Silver, and with the contemporary practices of academic and 
artist/activist Lena Šimić, and my own practice in the maternal. My aim is to assign 
new significance to these practices, often confined within the context of community 
arts, or women’s peace or feminist movements, by placing them within the emerging 
field of maternal aesthetics. For this thesis I am submitting personal practice, made 
within the last six years, addressing inter-generational and maternal themes 
performed solely within the photograph.  
The research reviews and utilises some of the theories and philosophies of feminist 
theorists, including Luce Irigaray, Alison Stone, Jessica Benjamin and Jacques 
Derrida. Artworks include work produced by Lena Šimić, Evelyn Silver, Shirley 
Cameron, Lindsey Page and Jemima Stehli. The first-hand research material also 
includes oral history recordings of Evelyn Silver, Shirley Cameron, Tracey Kershaw 
and Sam Rose, made in 2015 and 2016. My practice submissions, MNWG (2010), 
and MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), explore notions of agency and the frame through 
performance in a photographic studio where the only other players are the 
cameraman played by Alan Duncan, and in the latter, my daughter and Duncan and 
myself. I draw parallels between my process and the wider context of feminist 
concerns with participation and spectatorship, which can be used to expose the male 
gaze, explore feminine subjectivity and expose the constructed nature of gender 
binaries. Stehli’s Friends with Benefits (2000) is a good example of this deployment 
of performance-to-camera as a critique of the camera’s role in objectification.  
I argue that there is a relationship between Derrida’s assertion (Derrida, 1987a, p. 
75) that the frame destabilises itself and feminist experimentation with performance-
to-camera, which I maintain is implicitly critical of the implied passivity of the 
represented subject through the destabilisation of the camera’s omnipresence. 
However, this issue of agency and autonomy is troubled within the maternal, where 
the infant child is not able to consent. I explore this through discussion of Cameron’s 
caged performances(1974-77) with her twin daughters, and through Lena Šimić’s 
performance with her son, Sid Jonah Anderson (2008), and my own performances 
with Matilda (2011-ongoing, and now including Agnes).  
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Does photography empower the subject, and, furthermore, are feminist interventions 
in photography, subsequently described in this thesis as performance-to-camera, a 
failed critique?  
In Chapter One, I argue that the many feminist interventions that have occurred 
within avant-garde performance and live art practices are ultimately unsuccessful as 
gestures that endure over time, because the camera and the fine art context in which 
they are placed enforce, or take the image back into, a phallocentric frame. That is 
one where the subject-matter is heavily aestheticised and over formed, rendering it a 
distant detached object rather than one which is more chaotic or emotional.  
 
My aim is to explore performance-to-camera within the context of feminist theory, 
particularly the hostile relationship that women have had with the camera and the 
subsequent therapeutic nature of performance brought to bear on the photographic 
space. In this chapter, I will contextualise the complications and discrepancies that 
arise within feminist performance and theory that specifically seeks to destabilise 
binary thought, particularly the loss or lack of agency and essentialist feminist 
viewpoints. This chapter also provides more of an overview of feminist critiques of 
representation, and women’s attempts to ‘break in’ to the art world, which is directly 
related to the broader project of visibility and autonomy, as well as agency, which 
has concerned, and continues to, concern feminism, both theoretically and 
practically. I am curious as to why so many feminist performers have decided to use 
a camera if the gaze is so problematic? 
 
I will establish links between the camera and theorisations of the gaze, and power 
and control, through looking and objectification, while also presenting the conflicting 
nature of the camera, which on the one hand opens communication channels and 
facilitates inter-subjectivity within fine art performance while, on the other hand, 
controls, scrutinises and oppresses. In this chapter I will also begin to juxtapose my 
practice with others who have worked in front of the camera, and with ideas about 
what the camera does to subjectivity. The performances I submit explore levels of 
control and access which the camera both allows and denies, and I discuss this 
interplay in relation to broader aspects of feminist critique.  
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How can representing mother-daughter relationships re-invigorate women’s 
performance-to-camera in the light of the failure of historical feminist interventions to 
successfully oppose the maintenance of dualistic thought?  
What relationship does Irigaray’s conception of the blind spot or reverse of the image 
and women’s excess have to performance-to-camera and Derrida’s parergon? 
 
In Chapter Two, I discuss the potency of mother-daughter relationships as a radical 
re-think of prevalent Western aesthetics. The emphasis on mothering, encompasses 
its transitional nature and culminates in representations of an intersubjective quality, 
which are used to employ, and to reflect and comment on, the experience of mother-
daughter relationships and their effect on destabilising traditional aesthetics and 
representation. My aim is to converge the maternal with the camera, to explore 
subjectivity in the context of phallocentrism. Of interest are the binaries of 
active/passive and looker and looked upon, and the role of performer and spectator 
within that ideological duality. In for example, Cameron’s series of caged 
performances (Enmeshed, 1974 and Cages, 1977) performed with her daughters, 
she is able to literalise and exemplify the violence of the act of framing and the 
vulnerability of the feminine subject when objectified through the motif of the cage.  
 
I am concerned with what occurs at that moment when the frame finishes, before 
that (which we call reality, thought of here ironically as un-aestheticised matter) has 
yet to happen, theorised through Derrida’s parergon and the subsequent collapse of 
binary distinctions. I argue that the role of the camera operator, the maintenance of a 
separation between subject(s) and spectator(s) presents a microcosm of oppressive 
systems that internally deconstructs itself through the sheer amount of effort taken to 
uphold the boundary. Woman, particularly the maternal body, but also the body that 
bleeds, the body that excretes, also exceeds boundaries; in this instance, the 
boundary of the interior/exterior of the body. This excess cannot be tamed by the 
frame alone because of its internal instability and also because of ideas of seepage 
and overflow elicited in the symbolic penetration of the female form. The notion of a 
reverse or underbelly and the collapse of an interior and exterior space between 
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mother and infant all conjure up the Irigarian inverted specular dimension, where 
arguably femininity resides, if such a thing exists.  
  
Can performance-to-camera be a relational process that facilitates subjectivity when 
maternal aesthetics is invoked? Does this emphasis on inter-subjective process 
create a maternal space where performance and art-making can be acts of care? 
In Chapter Three, I consider how far it can be claimed that the maternal overturns or 
disrupts thousands of years of phallocentric ideology. I look at the role of care and 
the ethical frameworks where children have collaborated, or have been co-opted, in 
performance with their mothers. Maternal aesthetics is deployed as a term which 
conceptually, figuratively and literally involves one’s children in artistic production. It 
is more than just a pragmatic decision, it is metaphysically challenging to notions of 
individualism and agency, and in this way the maternal is theorised by feminist 
philosophers as not merely resistant to the residues of phallocentrism that we may 
encounter within philosophy. Indeed, culture or social contexts render these 
structures irrelevant. Conversely, the over-determination of the maternal and the 
feminine is also a phallocentric myth, where woman is assigned as matter or material 
in her function as bearer of children. However, when maternal aesthetics is deployed 
consciously, it tends to act as a discursive tool which can expose this myth as a 
construct, a good example of which is Mary Kelly’s Post-Partum Document (1976), 
where the mother-child relationship is aestheticised and conceptualised to render it 
elevated from the everyday, thus emphasising its importance.    
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8: Methodology and Outline of my Practice 
My methodology is a reciprocal critical engagement where the practice tests the 
theory and the theory tests the practice. To answer my research questions, my 
methodology combines performance-to-camera with maternal aesthetics, which, I 
argue, in the first instance, is a continuation of the feminist critique of women’s 
representational lack through what Irigaray, Kristeva and Stone have identified as a 
matricidal urge in our culture.  
  
Irigaray has argued that women’s erasure and repression is a by-product of our 
Western phallocratic order, but Irigaray’s use of the term ‘phallocentrism’ is not 
simply to describe the psychoanalytic ‘over-valuation of the male sex organ’ (Grosz, 
1990, p. 174); it is also describing the ‘submersion of women’s autonomy’ (ibid). In 
Irigaray’s theorisation, phallocentrism occurs when difference is suppressed, when 
‘sexual symmetries are represented by one’43 (Grosz, ibid). Similar to classifications 
of gender and maternalism, the history of representation and aesthetics and the 
material use to which women’s bodies have been put in art, such as Yves Klein’s 
rendering of the female body; discussed in Chapter Two, can be seen as part of a 
broader oppressive trend that ‘submerges women’s autonomy’ (Grosz, ibid). 
 
 Stone radicalises the field of maternal aesthetics through theorising, in particular, on 
mother-daughter relations, discussed further in Chapter Two. Whilst Benjamin 
provides an ethical framework for my maternal practice. The aim is to take a non-
dominant approach guided by the proposition that a space can be opened up where 
intersubjectivity can occur. Irigaray, meanwhile, offers the overarching view of why 
performance in the maternal is vital and radical, and Sara Ruddick can address 
concerns with regard to the dangers of over-gendering roles (for example the mother 
as a solely feminine position). My practice is a challenge to essentialism through its 
specificity; I represent myself and my daughter and I do not speak for other mothers. 
In the first piece I have submitted, MNWG (2010), I purposely fail in my attempt to 
                                                                 
43 Overly gendering the maternal or confining it as the sole property of women can therefore also be 
construed as repressive. Women may not want to perform those roles and, concurrently, mothering 
may be performed by a man or an individual who is either moving between genders (transgender) or 
gender non-specific (non-binary). The very act of defining and confining gender in a binary way is 
arguably itself an act of phallocentrism. 
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present a universal femininity; that is the notion that women have a collective 
identity44.  
 
I am not discussing femininity or gender specifically here, but rather the encounter of 
the maternal as mythology, aesthetic, structure, institution, role and performance, 
and how this impacts on mine and my daughter’s subjectivity. I address this problem 
through the use of irony and stereotype, in this instance playing the hysterical bride 
as discussed in Chapter One. I want to move forward from the initial performance-to-
camera critiques of the camera as ‘inflictor of the male gaze’ and oppressor, such as 
in earlier works, for example, by Cuban artist Mendieta in the 1970s.  
 
In Chapter Two, this thesis will focus on the frame and Derrida’s deconstructive 
exercise on aesthetics through deploying the parergon, and how this interplays with 
feminist performances-to-camera as challenging to binary and aesthetic distinctions. 
The maternal proposes a subjective position that is reliant on inter-subjectivity rather 
than dominance, where self and other interact through play, and this is posited as a 
direct challenge to the artist as expert or observer, or the performer as storyteller or 
as a characterisation to a passive viewer.  
  
MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) was made with my daughter Matilda, and to me she 
symbolises, in part, the encroachment of the everyday into aesthetics. My bare legs 
and red shoes are seen against the black drapes of the studio and I am falling back 
against the fabric, which makes a sensuous image because I am seducing the 
viewer lying back and opening my legs. Then, a baby crawls into the frame, and I 
would argue that this disrupts the process whereby the spectator consumes the 
image uncritically, thus offering an alternative commentary on phallocentric 
objectification. The mother, whilst providing care for a child, is not available to 
‘service every need’ of the viewer, and to pursue this metaphor of need and caring, 
                                                                 
44 Kristeva connects ideas of essentialism and conforming to the patriarchal impulse to maintain 
female heterosexuality. Indeed, Stone argues that Kristeva’s theoretical framework is centred on how 
patriarchy fosters female heterosexuality (Stone, 2012, p. 96) and this is Judith Butler’s assertion, that 
the term woman is too normative, as is the term mother.  
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the images remain in some ways impenetrable because mother and child are 
absorbed in each other and, therefore, appear to care little for cameraman or viewer. 
I have heard the comment ‘nice image, shame about the baby in the corner’ from a 
spectator (a woman in this instance), whilst other viewers have said that ‘Matilda 
steals the show.’ Here I am either performing motherhood badly or performing the 
subject of the photograph badly; probably both. Conceptually, there is an awareness 
on my part of the potential reaction of a gendered viewer, and a desire on my part to 
subvert any pleasure that might be derived from consuming me as an object. The 
baby in this composition also serves the purpose of drawing the viewer back to the 
frame’s existence because often my daughter is crawling in or out. These 
performances are configured around the aspect of play, which is one interpretation of 
how ‘givens’ can be utilised in the maternal aesthetic as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Even more interesting and compelling in this context, is Marianne Hirsch’s 45 
argument that the camera could become an instrument of play and symbolisation 
(Hirsch, 1997, 1999). From re-thinking the camera as playful46, rather than coldly 
mechanical and controlling, led me to associate my practice with the idea of a 
therapeutic application for photography47. However, my focus is the disruption that 
matrilineal representations create within a phallocentric logic, and in this incarnation 
the camera becomes an aid and an amplifier to this critique and exploration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
45 Hirsch is a professor of literature at Columbia University in America. She was born in Romania and 
then immigrated to America in her early teens. In the early nineteen nineties, she introduced the term 
post-memory, which theorises the collective experience of pain passed on intergenerationally and 
affecting those who didn’t live through the initial trauma.    
46 Vito Acconci’s Conversions, (1971) takes advantage of camera angles to play a game with the 
viewer and challenge their perception about Acconci’s gender. This performance-to-camera remains 
troubling as the woman whose mouth concealed his penis from the viewer, only half visible as she 
remains on all fours behind him, has never been granted a subject position in this work. It is still 
unclear who she actually was as her identity was never revealed. Is this another example of a woman 
being callously used as material in a male aesthetic process? Or is Acconci making a brutally honest 
commentary on the ethical problem of being a male artist who encounters the world as mere material 
to form? 
47 Where Jo Spence’s Phototherapy in the 1980s sets the precedent. 
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9: Instructions to Reader 
I ask that you now view the submitted practice and listen to the oral history 
recordings before reading any further, these can be accessed via a memory stick 
held at Loughborough University library. The performance-to-camera pieces are 
comprised of hundreds of images because of the nature of their production with a 
high shutter speed rate camera. In addition, I have taken a stop frame animation 
approach with several of the sequences to better explore the interactions between 
frames. The oral histories are audio recordings where I am in conversation with 
artists Cameron, Silver, Kershaw and Rose, and they provide invaluable context to 
my thesis; there are three in total and I ask that you listen to them in full.  
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Chapter 1: Women’s Performance-to-Camera and its Deactivation 
as Feminist Critique of the Male Gaze 
1:1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter, is, firstly, to foreground my own practice within the context of 
feminist theory and, secondly, to explore its connection to the camera and the 
photograph as ways of seeing and presenting the self. In this chapter I am 
addressing the research question; does photography empower the subject, or 
conversely, are feminist interventions in photography, subsequently described in this 
thesis as performance-to-camera, a failed critique? On the one hand, within feminist 
critique that ranges from the 1970s to the present day, the camera and photographic 
image are viewed as inherently problematic, owing to their construction and 
maintenance of a mode of looking that has been aligned with patriarchal dominance 
(Laura Mulvey, 1975, Susan Sontag, 1977, Kaja Silverman, 1996, Vivien Sobchack, 
2004). On the other hand, the camera presents the promise of visibility and 
autonomy to women artists, more specifically, it grants a space that women can 
occupy and can enable representational agency.  
This chapter will explore some of the issues and contradictions that arise out of 
women’s performance-to-camera when they are considered as a critique of 
phallocentric representation. This type of critique I assert ranges from the 
photography of Hannah Cullwick, a domestic servant from the 18th century, to self-
proclaimed feminist Stehli’s performance in the 2000s. Cullwick staged ‘self-
portraits,’ whereby she re-imagined herself in other roles and subjectivities, such as 
a chimney sweep, while Stehli is critical of the representation of a passive feminine 
subject, as can be seen, for example, in Stehli’s mimetic performances of Allen 
Jones’s sculptures 48 . In between these artists is a rich and diverse history of 
                                                                 
48 RA Allen Jones Exhibition, (2014-15), was advertised as a major appraisal of his artistic career that 
spans over fifty years (he was born in 1937). Art critic Martin Gayford interviewed Jones at the time 
(2014) of the ‘appraisal,’ in that interview Jones explains that his aim was to ‘shock the art world’ 
(Gayford, 2014) and, talking specifically about the Chair sculpture (1969), which is now part of the 
permanent Pop Art Collection at Tate Britain that the fact it became a great image for feminism 
(Gayford, 2014) was incidental. In this article, that is part of the Royal Academies website, Gayford 
explains that Jones draws on a vein of 1960s fashion dubbed kinky when creating his sculptures of 
women (ibid). Many critics have critiqued Jones’ work as ‘glorifying the objectification of women’ 
(Gayford, 2014). However, critic Jonathan Jones has argued the opposite, claiming instead that the 
Chair and Hat Stand  sculptures are cynical jokes about the power of sexual desire aimed at 
rendering the sexual freedoms of the late 1960s as absurd (Gayford, 2014). The power of whose 
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intervention, which includes the 1970s period, where artists such as Joan Jonas’s 
work with mirrors replicates similar concerns of power through looking for example, 
in Mirror Piece I (1969). The presence of the shadowy figure of the photographer in 
Jonas’s Organic Honey Vertical Roll (1973) that renders observer observed, pre-
dates Stehli’s use of the displacement of power in the representation of the 
photographer within the image I will discuss this further below.  
Ana Mendieta’s 1970s performances-to-camera, particularly her transformations into 
a masculine subject in, for example, Facial Hair Transplant (1972), are also 
arguably, connected to a wider phallocentric critique. This work is full of ambiguity 
about gender and thereby it potentially destabilises phallocentrism’s binary 
distinctions between masculine and feminine. Mendieta’s Rape Scene (1972) 
provides commentary on both violence against women and the role of the gaze, and 
the camera in objectification when taken to its logical conclusion, renders ‘woman’ 
powerless. However, this assertion and Mendieta’s later work, are open to readings 
of essentialism, by making overt links between biology, gender and experience, 
woman as oppressed, and the female form’s proximity to nature, we fall back on 
essentialism. For example, in her Tree of Life series (1977) Mendieta, covered in 
mud, blends with the tree onto which she presses herself, thereby suggesting that 
‘woman’ and tree are one and the same. Jane Blocker is an American feminist art 
historian who argues that Mendieta is obsessed with beginnings and with ‘nature as 
the source of essentialism’s power’ (Blocker, 1999, p. 43). Although on one level it is 
a literal connection between women and their potential to give birth, the 
representation of the earth and woman as the “beginnings,” is explored in the 1970s 
through the abstraction of the Goddess as a counter-site to patriarchal domination.  It 
was felt to be extremely important for second wave feminists (ibid) to assert a 
mythology that countered the prevailing one at the time, and as Blocker argues, this 
Goddess symbolism provided a pre-patriarchal theology (ibid). In the performance 
and subsequent photographic documentation of Mendieta, her body is ‘universal’ 
(Blocker, 1999, p. 55) and represents the link between female and earth49 as a 
transcendental phenomenon and a form of knowledge. The notion of the Goddess 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
desire exactly? They are correct to relate the work back to power, as feminism has tended to be 
preoccupied with women’s lack of power and these works illustrate that lack perfectly.  
49 See, for example, Mendieta’s First Silueta (1973).  
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differs from the notions of woman as unformed matter that have been recurring in 
traditional fine art aesthetics. I will discuss this in relation to Yves Klein’s work below. 
“Instagram Artist” Amalia Ulman’s photography (2016), as well as the contemporary 
photographic performance of artists such as Dawn Woods, are not a continuation of 
1970s performance-to-camera. Rather, they follow artists such as Laurie Anderson50 
and her cyborg performances, and Catherine Opie’s photography in, for example, 
Jenny (Bed) (2009). Woods and Ulman are symptomatic of a move away from 
representing a commonality in feminine experience, choosing instead to examine 
their everyday subjectivity as an isolated occurrence. Their work is also an evolution 
in its more explicit presentations of the photographic digital space as the 
performance site. Both Ulman’s and Woods’s work is critical of the othering nature of 
the Internet and the false need it creates for approval51.  
                                                                 
50 Laurie Anderson is one of a group of artists working in the late 1980s who created live 
performances that were completely integrated with new digital technology. This movement was, in 
part, responsible for the belief in the utopian possibilities of technology to change our culture that 
were embraced by theorists such as Donna Haraway. Whilst simultaneously the apparent seamless 
fusions between live presence and new media elicited anxiety expressed in the form of the liveness 
debate of the 1990s see Auslander. Anderson consciously used imagery of hybridity and cyborgs 
appearing as an androgynous figure in her work, building and performing with digitised instruments. 
Anderson works with dance, film, projections and soundscapes. In her concert Home of the Brave 
(1984), for example, she discusses binary code and the importance of moving away from duality 
whilst she performs as a cyborg her face concealed with her voice, at times, electronically distorted. 
51 Kaitlyn Maria’s Instagram comment on Ulman’s page, September 16th 2016, reads ‘She buys 
expensive clothing that she can't afford for photo shoots and then returns it all. Also, it has been 
proven as a fact that she has created 90,000 ghost followers through some app.’ Is this performative 
or internalisation of the gaze? There is a direct correlation between the taking of images, then the 
publicly posting of them as acts that seek approval in the form of ‘likes’. This motivates the production 
of images in a narcissistic manor, however Ulman’s ‘ghost followers’ comment on the instability and 
lack of authenticity of digital representation.  
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Fig. 2. Slut Bucket, Dawn Woods, (2015). 
 
The examples I have mentioned all share the aim that the camera, the photograph, 
and the screen can be utilised as sites to intentionally occupy in order to take 
representations outside, and also beyond, a long history of phallocentrism. In Slut 
Bucket (2015) (Fig. 2), Woods performs a parody or re-appropriation of the ‘Queen 
of Selfies’ (Rogers, 2016), celebrity personality and model Kim Kardashian’s poses 
from her book Selfish (2015). This is then juxtaposed with some of the trolling – 
Internet stalking and abuse from anonymous people that Kardashian has 
experienced in response to her selfies - to form Woods’s work Fat Shrek Cunt (Fig. 2 
and Fig. 3). Woods (a single mother) restages Kardashian’s selfies in her suburban 
bedroom. Woods said of the process that it was impossible to perform some of 
Kardashian’s poses while holding her phone to photograph herself, and this 
prompted her to reflect that a proportion of Kardashian’s selfies had been faked. 
Rather than being natural and spontaneous, many are highly contrived and awkward 
to achieve. The titles of Woods’s selfies are taken from online abuse Kardashian has 
received as a result of posting images of herself online, in the presentation of herself 
as somewhat desperate to conform to this model of feminine sexuality, and in this 
juxtaposition of the abuse Woods presents a subject that is very far from being 
empowered by the camera.  
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Fig 3. Fat Fucking Shrek Cunt, Dawn Woods, (2015). 
 
Although, as can be seen through Woods’s practice, the camera and the practice of 
contemporary self-portraiture in the form of the selfie can be very disempowering for 
the subject through the negative reaction that pictures can generate as well as the 
inherent vanity of the act itself. The contradiction in Wood’s practice is that of 
emerging subject-hood and the retention of emptiness created in what Sobchack has 
described as epidermalisation (2004) 52 , at the mercy of the media for others 
projections, creates tension and instability. Conversely, the camera acts as a vehicle 
for fantasy and escapism, particularly the ability for a subject to be simultaneously 
herself and not herself which, Blocker argues, is channelled by the performative part 
of performance-to-camera. This is clearly evident in Celeste Barber’s Instagram 
feed, where she inserts herself virtually next to celebrities, or splices herself into their 
videos. This is all connected to artifice, and in this way it breaks from the 1970s’ 
feminist work as there is nothing natural and no stability claimed in the 
representations. However, this should not be interpreted solely as destructive or 
dysfunctional, where performance converges with the camera. The enhancement 
through the digital enables women to exploit this fluidity and promises a new 
                                                                
52 The self is literally scraped out, emptied out. 
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subjectivity, however fleetingly. There is a different feeling to Jo Spence’s work in the 
1980s. Spence, in the performance-to-camera Remodelling Photohistory 
(Colonization) (1982) appears to derive agency and empowerment via the camera’s 
frame because she specifically works with its unflinching gaze to document pain and 
difference, whereas Woods, Ulman and Barber encounter artifice and vulnerability in 
the slippery nature of their self-representations. 
   
1:2 The Frame of Feminism and the Situation of Spectating 
As a feminist critique of photographic space shows, the performance directed to 
camera remains viable when re-appropriated by the subject.  However, in the post 
political and re-emergent feminist period we are increasingly witnessing the 
expression of disempowerment afforded in the photograph. London-based 
contemporary artist Stehli’s Friends with Benefits (2000), was performed to male art 
critics and curators. Critic Adrian Searle was invited to watch, but during the 
performance Stehli asked him to take ten photographs of her performance. In the 
following quotation, written for The Guardian under the title Why Do I Feel Naked? 
Searle describes the situation of spectating within Stehli’s performance: 
[...] In my hand is the trigger, the cable snaking away to the camera that faces 
me. Also facing me, and between me and the camera, is the artist. She 
begins to undress. I've got 10 shots. I can fire when I like. I squeeze the bulb 
that drives the shutter. Everything about this situation feels loaded, and I'm 
extremely self-conscious (Searle, 2000).  
 
Searle defines Stehli in a gender neutral way as ‘the artist’, and reflects on his desire 
to wrest back some control through the camera’s mechanisms as that of the subject 
desiring to control his own image.  He is intent on recovering his composure by 
depicting Stehli’s vulnerability, thus making this work a microcosm of the camera’s 
ability to grant power. Searle, similar to Alan Duncan, the cameraman for My Nana’s 
Wedding (Gown) (2010), is the man who presses the button and whose gaze 
controls the image in a symbolic sense, conversely, because I have framed the 
image and Duncan has been instructed on how to take the images and not to move 
the camera I retain control of the frame and the gaze. The level of instruction he has 
received prior to the ‘shoot’ means it is only a collaboration in terms of the execution 
of the images, because I have framed it I retain authorship. It is true however, that 
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there is an element of struggle over who retains control as he chooses when to press 
the button, my antidote to this is to work in excess – the opposite to Stehli’s 
approach of limiting the number of images to ten. Where Stehli is overt in creating 
discomfort through a gaze cast directly on the cameraman, both by her and by the 
viewer, I leave that interpretation more open as Duncan’s presence remains implicit 
in my performance rather than explicit. Like Stehli, I have begun to undress and I 
have asked Duncan to press the button when the impulse strikes him. Duncan’s fast 
frame rate camera however, at six frames per second, means that once the button is 
pressed there are 5 extra pictures created each time outside of his gaze if I move 
very quickly that is.  
 
Is critic Searle’s use of language such as “fire” and “loaded” incidental, or does he 
intentionally allude to the convergence of photographic and ejaculatory metaphors? 
Is he aware that contemporary mainstream pornography is full of similar 
terminology? Mine and Stehli’s performances are both critiques of spectating in a 
twofold sense; the sense that the spectator both retains and loses control, because 
the man cast in the role of the gazer as a social construct is exposed, thereby the 
work proposes an unwilling spectator in the guise of the cameraman. This begs a 
reconsideration of spectatorship, since it is not necessarily a desired position or even 
a pleasurable function for the male, or any subject. Certainly interventions such as 
my own and Stehli’s provide commentary on the over-emphasised masculinity of the 
spectator. John Berger’s and Laura Mulvey’s accounts of the gaze, both written in 
the 1970s, later come under scrutiny when gender, itself, is destabilised in the 
1990s. These debates have meant that within the feminist movement there has been 
much critique that centres on earlier assumptions of gender stability, and on over-
reliance on the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female.’ Suffice to say, these have yet to 
find a resolution. Critiques of Kristeva and Irigaray as ‘essentialist’ and over-
determining the category ‘woman’ (Judith Butler, 1990), have been countered by 
theorisation of the significance of an embodied female position, such as those by 
Mira Schor (1997) and Rosi Braidotti (1994). This over-determination between the 
concept of the gaze and camera, and ‘gazer’ as male and ‘gazed-at’ as female, 
prompted feminist thinker Elin Diamond to coin the term, ‘looking-at-being-looked-at-
ness’ (Diamond, 1988, p. 129). Diamond’s contention is that the ‘problem of the 
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gaze’ has been attended to far more than ‘interventions that dismantle that gaze’ 
(ibid). She argues that what is needed is ‘a female body in representation that resists 
fetishization [and presents] a viable position for the female spectator’ (Diamond, 
1988, p. 83). In direct response to this, Stehli’s work can certainly be considered to 
be contributing to a wider feminist critique, as she makes a puppet of the spectator, 
and it is this inversion of the binary process of looking that renders male subjectivity 
both vulnerable and uncomfortable.  
In Stehli’s performance Friends with Benefits, also known as The Strip Series (1999-
2000), the self-awareness and exposure experienced by the viewer becomes the 
focus of the drama; the performance documents that remain render the viewer the 
subject. When in turn we spectate, the process of looking becomes reflexive, and in 
this way, Stehli is able to apprehend the gaze, and invert its mechanics. In an 
interview for Musée Magazine by Cory Rice, Stehli is dismissive of the idea that 
there is any meaning to be gained from discussing this work in relation to the gaze, 
stating that this is an overly familiar and dated way to describe things of which she is 
tired (Stehli, 2015). However, in the same interview Stehli describes how powerful 
and full of desire and pleasure looking is as an act (ibid), and she also describes how 
the performance did not work when she performed it with another woman. 
 
To both gender the look and also render it heterosexual, while ascribing pleasure 
and desire to the terms of observing/consuming appears to contradict her 
dismissiveness towards the gaze.  She sees this as an outmoded theorisation of her 
photography and her performance methodology, which arguably, utterly embodies 
the male gaze. This is a continuation of what Karen Horney, a feminist 
psychoanalyst who was critical of Freud’s theory of penis envy, described in 1932 as 
“the dread of woman” (Horney quoted in Benjamin, 1995, p. 81), which, in short, is 
that man’s desire for woman is coupled with dread (ibid). Horney quotes from 
Friedrich Schiller’s The Diver (1797), in which the young man survives diving in the 
ocean only to drown when he throws himself back into the sea again to prove himself 
worthy of a woman. Benjamin argues that this longing for woman, and the fear it 
creates is concealed by either adoration or contempt. Irigaray, working from the 
same analogy of the sea as allegorical of the dread of femininity, this so-called sea 
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that overwhelms man argues that because of feeling overwhelmed he must dissect 
femininity in order to control it this happens through the gaze (Irigaray, 1985).   
 
The trick in Stehli’s work is that it appears to disclose the ‘subject who looks’, only for 
the realisation to dawn as we look that it is not showing us ourselves, because we 
are really the looking subject. The one captured viewing is now the subject, whereas 
we, the viewers, remain hidden. If we position Stehli’s work as feminist critique, then 
it is certainly a mimesis of the process in Western art history which renders the 
singular perception as central and the viewpoint that is shored up ‘through the 
experience of its loss [...] the looking eye sees itself as a vanishing emptiness, as a 
blank’ (Phelan,1993, p. 25). In other words, the man/the camera operator in Stehli’s 
performance, performs for us, the viewer, that which we are experiencing. Our look 
is upon that which we can never possess (the other) even when stripped, remains a 
mystery and a threat, where the act of looking is alienating. 
 
That part of feminism’s goals that reside in the alteration of the field of representation 
has been discussed since the early 1970s, and women making art imply political 
undertones because of the historic difficulties women have encountered with 
breaking into the academy. Griselda Pollock argues that hostility towards the 
feminine, feminists, and feminism is due to the fact that feminist art production is not 
simply another addition to a post-modern plurality (Pollock, 1988), but that it is a 
revolutionary force for radical social change (ibid). As such, feminism meets not 
simply polite disdain (although there is plenty of that), it meets resistance, hostility, 
repression, censorship and ridicule (ibid). This atmosphere, for a woman making art, 
epitomises the continuation of a phallocentric logic that encompasses binary thought 
as well as processes of othering and representation. Natalie Loveless, in a book 
review for The M Word: Real Mothers in Contemporary Art (2011) on binary 
distinctions, states that ‘as is well known, feminist theory has, since its beginnings, 
worked to problematise binary distinctions and the seemingly fixed ‘nature’ of identity 
categories’ (Loveless, 2013, p. 4). 
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1:3 My Studio Performances with Matilda (2011-2012) 
The practice I am submitting with this thesis has been consciously, and purposely, 
directed to camera rather than to a live audience, and this methodology is 
subsequently described as ‘performance-to-camera’ which distinguishes it from 
documentation of performance. This photographic performance space is part of an 
ongoing critique about the terms of women’s visibility and its continuing paradoxical 
nature as outlined previously53. 
 
Irigaray’s term phallocentrism is of utmost importance to this analysis because, in the 
words of Grosz, when Irigaray uses this term she not only refers to ‘the continuing 
submersion of women’s autonomy in the norms, ideals and models devised by men’ 
(Grosz, 1990, p. 174), she also refers to the treatment of the sexes as if they were 
just variations of the same sex (ibid). A challenge to this system can be relatively 
subtle, Irigaray is interested in women’s mimicry and hysteria as methodologies that 
are subversive to more regimented versions of gender. Grosz points out that ‘the 
hysteric mimes’ and is therefore able to replace the real with simulacrum, where ‘the 
hysteric mimes and thus exceeds, patriarchal requirements of femininity’ (ibid). Is the 
potential agency in a photographic image limited, or at least conflicted, by its 
mechanical aspects and their impact on the visual and perceptual fields? I argue that 
intentionality, which can take the form of performance-to-camera, can be used by 
women as a means by which to attempt to reclaim the representational field and 
counteract the camera’s reclamation of ‘reality.’ If performance is also tasked with 
collapsing the binaries that the camera helps police, I assert performance-to-camera 
can destabilise its mechanical detachment. In my performance, My Nana’s Wedding 
Gown (2010) (Fig. 4), I attempt this by staging one representation of a claim to a 
universal aspect of femininity, namely the hysteric54. If to mimic lacks agency when it 
                                                                 
53 I have chosen to merge this paradox with maternal aesthetics in Chapter Two to overcome the 
inertia and desperation created by the othering potential of digital interaction; see Wood’s practice at 
the beginning of this chapter. I hope to promote agency through the continued insistence on 
embodiment and a form of presence in the subject and the inter-subjective nature of the play between 
myself and my daughter Matilda. 
54 This relates to feminist psychoanalytical theories of woman as a mask or masquerade as theorised 
by feminist thinkers such as Irigaray in the 1970s. Hilary Robinson defines the tension described by 
Irigaray in the performance of the mimetic act as, the pressure to masquerade as a woman, that is, 
within the bounds of pre-formed notions of femininity at odds with the transgressive potential of 
mimicry. Robinson argues that ‘if woman’s adaption of ‘femininity’ is a mimetic process’ (Robinson, 
2006, p. 36) then apart from the pressing problem of its restrictive nature there is also the possibility 
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is enforced, in this context by Irigaray’s notion of phallocentrism, then to become the 
hysteric is to regain autonomy in the act, in this instance the act of being 
photographed. I argue that this work is a departure from the ironic Instagram projects 
I have discussed previously, because the maternal and matrilineal methodologies 
give the work a depth of meaning that is informed by Irigaray’s project to access 
hidden feminine subjectivity, and because Elizabeth Grosz contends that this 
subjectivity will invariably exceed or overflow’ (Grosz, 1990, p. 176) oppositional or 
binary structures, which addresses the research question: how can maternal 
aesthetics re-invigorate women’s performance-to-camera in the light of the failure of 
historical feminist interventions to successfully oppose the maintenance of gender 
binaries? I liken Woods’s performance-to-camera to this analysis of the function of 
mimicry in destabilising patriarchal mythology around what constitutes an acceptable 
(that is, non-threatening to masculinity) form of femininity, where Woods manages to 
mimic, and simultaneously become hysterical, through her acts of mimicry, for 
example, her mimicry of Kim Kardashian.  
 
The excessive nature of the maternal, which encompasses visceral abjection 
through to narcissistic identification, is therefore, in the context of hysteria that I am 
siting this practice, potent. Irigaray argues that in a phallocentric system, the 
dominant mode of being will always win out, where ‘whatever has been defined as 
“more” (true, right, clear, reasonable, intelligible, paternal, masculine...) [wins out] 
over its “other,” its “different” [...] its negative, its “less” (fantastic, harmful, obscure, 
“mad,” sensible, maternal, feminine...)’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 275). Irigaray employs a 
counter-strategy against ‘women’s containment within an image and a logic that 
renders them mute and hysterical’ (Grosz, 1990, p. 174). She seeks to do this by the 
turning phallocentrism inside-out, ‘holding the mirror up to itself’ (ibid), and for 
Irigaray, this creates an ‘enigmatic feminine figure’ (Grosz, 1990, pp. 174-175). I 
develop notions of jouissance and hysteria within my performance-to-camera which 
is in part a continuation or visualisation of these inversion techniques. The coupling 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
for subversion and an over-mimicry, therefore Robinson argues, that Irigaray defines hysteria as ‘a 
calculated continuum of the masquerade ‘femininity’ (ibid). This results in two things happening one is 
that, in psychoanalytical terms, women will be frequently pushed over the edge into hysterical acts 
because it is a logical conclusion of the processes of mime and masquerade acting as a straightjacket 
and suppressing them through the lack of originary voices; and two, that there is conversely, within 
the hysterical act, space to reclaim subjectivity and agency.  
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of a maternal aesthetic with a woman’s sexual desires is challenging, as is the 
hysteric’s capacity to destabilise phallocentric realities.  
 
Thus far, I have been discussing performance-to-camera as a series of experiments 
to disrupt phallocentrism, such as when the processes of representation and 
objectification are deployed by women artists in a self-reflexive or mimetic manner 
they are rendered hysterical acts in the way Irigaray proposes. By placing the 
performance so consciously inside what, on the surface is a distinct frame, I critically 
comment on Western aesthetics historic handling of “woman” as mute material or 
matter. I argue that the exposure of the opposition of matter and form in feminist art-
making is purposeful rather than coincidental, as is the clash of the particular 
experience with the symbolic. An ironic deployment of universal or more generalised 
stereotypes are used in my practice to undermine the implicit aesthetic function that 
the frame defines as matter and keeps that which is unformed, or un-aestheticised, 
or chaotic, on the outside. It has become commonplace in feminist theory to 
comment on how this aesthetic process has particularly excluded women (e.g., 
Pollock (1988), Jones (2006), Schor (1997), in short, because women have been 
confined as matter they have been denied agency55.  
 
As my practice submission for this thesis developed the maternal, its relationship to 
the feminine has become the rupture in the frame, a disruption that is necessary to 
bring that which has been excluded into aesthetic focus. The maternal aesthetic that 
I developed was in response to the desire, outlined above, to disrupt the mechanism 
of the frame and the construction of binary phallocentric thinking and logic in direct 
response to my experience as a mother-artist. The maternal aesthetic is therefore 
based in the enactment of care and the pragmatism this elicits, and is heavily reliant 
on chance and process, also called ‘givens,’ play, and transformation 56 . The 
                                                                 
55 In Chapter Two I will evidence this assertion by discussing Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron’s 
The Swinging Sixties: We Were There! Yves Klein’s Anthropométrie de la Periode Bleue (1960) 
inspired performance in the early 1990s.   
56 Lena Šimić has encouraged me to think of the situation of child-rearing and art-making as not 
mutually exclusive, by introducing the notion of ‘givens,’ as part of a maternal methodology. ‘Givens’ 
is a way to work with what you have and explore the creative potential of your specific circumstance 
and even find use or purpose within the performance. Šimić’s example is putting her baby to bed, 
which was part of the work yet also useful as her baby was asleep by the end of it Šimić, performed in 
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maternal aesthetic exists within a wider feminist framework whose aims are not only 
empowerment and agency but also the opening up of representational discourse to 
include the maternal experience. The maternal aesthetic is able to push further the 
critique of photography and representation, which began with women’s self-reflexive 
performance-to-camera, and this is possible because the maternal elicits more 
profound or complex destabilisations of the frame. Western art has conventionally 
used aesthetics to provide distance between the artwork and the audience and 
thereby uphold the aura of an artwork57, this form of aesthetic art production relies on 
binaries (Derrida, 1987a) and collapses when there is no demarcation between 
inside and outside. My practice, for example when working with ‘givens’ or put more 
literally ‘what you are given’ is an immersive style of aesthetic production that 
abandons the aforementioned conventions and collapses binary structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Sid Jonah Anderson (2008). Similarly Cameron’s washing of her twins can be viewed as a ‘given’ and 
also useful (Cameron with twins and Angela Carter, Washing the Twins, 1977). In a similar vein, my 
playing with Matilda MSP with Matilda (2011) can be viewed as a ‘given’ as I keep the baby 
entertained and engaged whilst creating my work. 
57 Walter Benjamin, in his famous essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
(1999), argues that mass re-production of the art image has reduced the distance between the 
audience and the artwork and thereby dissipated its aura (effect). 
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1:4 Photography and ‘Reality’ in Performance 
 
 
Fig. 4. My Nana’s Wedding (Gown), Myfanwyn Ryan, (2010). 
 
Flusser claims that reality, defined here as ‘corporeal presence’, is destabilised by 
the photographic universe (Flusser, 2000, p. 65) that we all inhabit. However, this is 
not so for feminist interventions in performance and photography, as they often aim 
to establish new or fresh views of the world through discovering hidden truths, and in 
this way, my performance-to-camera strives to embody the image. Flusser perceives 
the destabilising effect of photography as rendering the photograph and the act of 
photography commonplace and naturalised, or even un-aesthetic. The notion that 
the photograph is an everyday but extra-ordinary object is useful to feminist critique, 
because such critique seeks instability in ‘reality’ as a means with which to exploit 
53 
 
and expose hidden structures that suppress the subject. That which is concealed 
can then be revealed as a form of empowerment, in this case specifically the 
intimacy between mothers and daughters. If the authority of the photograph is 
destabilised, it can be exploited and its ability to present a totality, mimicked. This 
can be so because, as Heidegger asserts (1971), new worlds are opened by the 
artwork, which can be read as a collapse of aesthetic distance (Susan Broadhurst, 
1999, p. 36) and, arguably, this also includes photography. In short, there is no 
reality from which the photograph can extract data any longer, as the photograph is 
the ‘world’. Where Flusser works hard to maintain the oppositions constructed by the 
camera, the binaries of inside and outside the frame, the ‘world’ and then what the 
camera extracts from the world as material in the interplay between matter and its 
framing as ‘formed’ for a new world. My approach to photography and the camera 
follows, instead, Irigaray in that performance’s excess coupled with the excess of the 
maternal is able to exceed the image. This idea of excess is key in order to not 
enable the normative aspects of the camera to take hold, therefore the coupling of 
photography and performance within a feminist maternal aesthetic creates the 
radical difference. In this overflow that permeates binaries we can overcome 
repressive phallocentric structures, it is advantageous for feminists to claim the un-
aesthetic everyday marginalised space and politicise and aestheticise it because it 
has been neglected and because it challenges our social norms about value and 
importance.  
 
I see my initial performance-to-camera, MNWG (2010), as a treatment of the camera 
as possessing the potential to expose, reveal and break down distinctions between 
past and present, interior and exterior, front and reverse, as well as here and there. 
In this instance, the performance does not concur with Flusser’s constructed 
universe, nor Metz’s notion of the cut (Squiers, 1990) where something has been 
severed from reality, as I am not presenting a slice of reality or a ‘new’ world that has 
been clinically removed or parted from the everyday, but rather that which has been 
obscured, ignored, concealed or overlooked is presented as ‘part of the world.’ A 
revealing of the obscured rather than a removal of the everyday to a place where it 
can be aestheticised in a distant unemotional manner. My attitude to the camera and 
photography also differs to that of Weber’s, who argues that for Walter Benjamin, the 
54 
 
camera ‘penetrates deep into the fabric of the given’ (Weber, 1996, p. 91), and that 
the camera violates the body’s integrity (ibid). I do not agree that the camera only 
produces images that are ‘torn apart’ and that both disperse and fragment being 
(Weber, 1996, p. 92). Rather, like many contemporary subjects, I use the 
photographic space to ‘become real’ or rather ‘realer’ and create relations and links 
between myself and others, in this instance, my deceased grandmother and my 
oldest daughter and our negotiation of separation58. I open up the photographic 
space and our notions of absence and presence and the past to the possibility of 
yielding something more than absence or regret, lack or excess. Jane Gallop (2011) 
argues that Roland Barthes’ work in Camera Lucida (1980), opens up such a path 
‘for those of us who, like Barthes, would presume that our subjective experience – 
particularly our subjective experience of photography – might also count as 
knowledge’ (Gallop, 2011, p. 236).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
58 Here I am referring to MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), which I will discuss in Chapter Two. 
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1:5 My Nana’s Wedding (Gown), (2010) 
This performance-to-camera, featuring my Nana’s wedding dress, is my attempt to 
explore the potential in the camera to realise and sustain, not simply a visualisation 
of my grandmother as she prepared for her wedding in the 1940s, but a physical 
manifestation or act of embodiment. Both myself and her dress are ‘real entities’ 
(Fig. 5. below) and we can see the effect of this on my body. However, it is not 
simply the fact of the dress or the scenario where I try to wear it (it is too small for 
me), it is the experience of being photographed while partly undressed, coupled with 
the vulnerability this exposure creates. The camera symbolises the potential for 
phallic repression and dominance, and mirrors the wedding dress’s symbolism of 
similar processes. However, this is not the whole picture, because we also see the 
potential for play within both performance and the space opened up by the camera, 
and this contradicts any sensation of repression or confinement.   
 
 
Fig. 5. My Nana’s Wedding (Gown), Myfanwyn Ryan, (2010). 
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The camera in this context has a very specific and practical purpose within my 
performance as a creative tool that can create a bridge or point of access between 
me and my grandmother. For Heidegger, tools are central to a conception of being, a 
conception not based in a transcendent model but rather in a being-in-the-world 
model (Heidegger, 1973), or in other words, the everydayness of being. Heidegger 
uses the hammer as an example, but I shall replace it with the ‘camera’ to state that 
‘the less we just stare at the [camera]-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become’ (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
98).  This form of knowledge can only be gained through use; theorising alone will 
not grant us this level of understanding of the camera, nor of its function in the 
representation of women or the possibilities it provides, because the tool is 
manipulable.  
  
The only image of my grandmother that remains is the formal one for which she 
posed with my grandfather, who is in uniform, on the steps of the Register Office. My 
grandmother clings to my grandfather’s arm and smiles into the camera. I am aware 
that many women lived independently during the war years. I doubt my grandmother 
married as a virgin. She had lived and worked alone, smoked cigarettes, rode a 
bicycle around London, delivered babies in the blitz, and married a black man in her 
late twenties.  
 
During the making of the work a locked studio was used where the performance was 
only ever encountered as ‘live’ by the cameraman who photographed me. This 
masculine eye was problematic at the time, and remains so because, as we know 
from Irigaray’s writing on the topic, ‘the ludic mimicry, the fiction, the “make believe,” 
the “let’s pretend” [...] are stopped short, impeded, controlled by a master-signifier, 
the phallus, and by its representative(s)’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 60). The hysteria 
performed in MNWG (2010) is aligned with Irigaray’s contention that ‘hysteria is 
stigmatised as a place where fantasies, ghosts, and shadows fester and must be 
unmasked, interpreted, brought back to the reality of a repetition, a reproduction, a 
representation’ (ibid) that fits with the original memory. This representation of the 
hysterical bride in my performance, exceeds phallocentrism in its displacement of the 
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‘real’ wedding and the mimicry of hysteria, and in its insistence on matrilineal 
connections.  
 
Within a feminist reading, it is the frame that is symbolic of a binary aesthetic, and 
specifically its function in maintaining an insistence on interiority and exteriority within 
an artwork that is subjected to change. There are a number of reasons for 
destabilising aesthetic distance, which has historically presented obstacles for 
women wanting to create art. I would argue that there is inherently something 
impossible in a divorce from the self, from a separation from the self in the artwork. 
In other words, there is an inherent problematic in any attempt to delineate a purely 
aesthetic space. I have found that maternal aesthetics provides a set of principles 
that inherently challenge binary thinking, and this, I assert is apparent in MSP with 
Matilda (2011-12) where the frame facilitates our interaction as mother and daughter.  
 
1:6 Performing the Photograph: a Feminist Intervention 
The notion of agency being enabled through the camera is contradictory, because 
the insistence on participating in representation and, in this instance, particularly the 
power to visualise and present the self to ourselves and to ‘others’ in Western 
culture, coincides with the redundancy of these gestures. The category of ‘woman’ 
becomes redundant, or more precisely, incorrect, just at that moment when women 
are better placed in the West to photograph and explore their subjectivity in readily 
transferable and self-publishable forms. This is amplified by the redundancy of the 
act of photographing yourself as being empowering. The feminist goal of embodying 
the photographic space to reverse the process of being hollowed-out (Sobchack, 
2004) is further problematized as we have moved into digital processes. Images 
have proliferated, and the speed of image transfer has become instantaneous. If we 
are not careful, we will return to a form of visual primacy that, when laid out in a 
patriarchal context (Hilary Robinson, 2006) results in the continued move away from, 
and exaggeration between, the difference of touch and form ‘which is what the 
phallic economy requires of sight’ (Robinson, 2006, p. 130), and is part of the 
maternal aesthetics potency that it is able to shift the emphasis between these 
modes of experience.   
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Fig. 6. My Nana’s Wedding (Gown), Myfanwyn Ryan. (2010). 
 
Women can easily fall foul of phallic domination, in their rendering as hysteric (Fig.5, 
Fig. 6.), or irrational and incoherent, or unformed like matter. It is for these reasons 
that Robinson describes women’s interventions in the visual and their attempts to 
visualise themselves as ‘poignant and [...] heroic [and] with deeply political potential’ 
(ibid, p. 64). In this vein, Irigaray has argued that ‘representation can dispense with 
and supplant the role’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 116) that woman has been assigned as a 
flat mirror. The metaphor of the flat mirror (ibid, pp. 167-168), in Irigaray’s Speculum, 
could easily be replaced with the metaphor of the photographic image as a reflective 
device within Western culture, used to shore up masculinity.  
 
On several occasions, I have worked with the motif of going behind the screen, and 
in this thesis the works I made with Matilda often involve inverting the image or 
revealing its underside. This inversion is achieved by collapsing screens or crawling 
behind them. In one sequence, I roll myself up in part of the backdrop as we play 
hide-and-seek together. In this way the performance aspect in the term performance-
to-camera enables us to traverse what Irigaray describes as ‘the reverse of the 
mirror’ (Robinson, 2006, p. 67), the back of something that is concealed from the 
‘phallocentric gaze’ (ibid). The ability of performance to traverse this space is reliant 
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on the disruption of the two-dimensional aspects of the flat image, since the viewer 
must be taken into the structure of the photographic image. This invitation to view the 
reverse results in the practice I have submitted here that is best conceived of as a 
consideration of the frame, both symbolically and conceptually, within the 
performance-to-camera submitted with this thesis.  
 
This break with two-dimensionality involves the presentation of a concave mirror and 
the cavity it also elicits. This is of interest here, because it directly correlates with the 
imagery Irigaray plays with to evoke a difference to masculine visual norms in our 
culture. Irigaray’s belief that there is something on the back, that not everything is 
visible, is precisely what led this thesis from matrilineal performance-to-camera, to 
mother-daughter performance at first in front of the camera, and then finally to the 
liminal site, as well as performance with my mother (this later work is not included 
here) who in a circular way becomes the grandmother. The inter-changeability of 
roles is typical of the maternal aesthetic when it centres on the matrilineal; I am 
daughter, mother, granddaughter; my mother, grandmother, and so on.  
I argue that performance as praxis exceeds rational thought or objective perception, 
and operates instead in sensation and instinct. This is illustrated in the first piece of 
work submitted with this thesis, MNWG (2010). Although performed to camera, my 
journal entry on the day of performing this piece is full of physical and sensory 
description obtained from my physical body. This body is important to emphasise; it 
is the locus and originary place where the work resides, the camera grants the 
performance the possibility of continuing on after the present moment enabling 
greater visibility for the performance but the camera is purely instrumental in a 
process that is embodied. 
Because women cannot separate themselves from the image, and struggle to 
ascend the matter form binary, they remain part of what Lacan has described as an 
‘imaginary realm.’ The effect of this is an inability to pass through Lacan’s mirror 
phase, the process whereby an infant self-identifies, that according to his theory is 
necessary for the perception of the self as a singular subject and the formation of the 
super ego or the ‘idealised self’ (Dolan, 1993, p. 125). In short, women are held by 
the frame. However, it is important to note that Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase 
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includes the idea of a misidentification with one’s image brought on by the big 
Other’s insistence on who the child is or represents, and in this context the question 
of whether the mother acts as a big Other or authoritarian figure over the child’s 
subjectivity is a pertinent one. This is exactly what I seek to examine, I the mother: 
all powerful or powerless, existing in the space where woman is rendered 
‘completely marginal to the signifying process’ (ibid, p. 125). Rather than arguing for 
women’s continued subjective lack, I argue that this inability to pass through the 
mirror phase places women in a perpetual transformation that the frame might seek 
to halt, or actually facilitate, as will become clear as this thesis progresses. The 
perpetual mirror phase is arguably manifested in performance-to-camera processes 
and methodology.  
 
My argument is thus, that the aforementioned perpetual nature of women’s 
relationship with the camera, which struggles to transcend the difficulties of the gaze, 
objectification, othering, and enforcement of normative behaviour, presents a 
troubled context for those of us choosing to work in this medium. The camera retains 
an internal ideology that facilitates accepted narratives of the feminine and the 
masculine and this is one of its frames. It holds an inherent ability to re-territorialise 
transgression through capture. Such things, its habit of mummifying the living and 
capturing and nullifying, make working with the camera conceptually problematic. 
Susan Sontag 59  wrote that the language of photography, the terminology of 
‘shooting’ and ‘capturing’ and the general air of penetration exposes the patriarchal 
subtext embodied by the camera (Sontag. 1977: pp. 13-15). In the case of Jane 
Gallop and her son Max, who are photographed by father and husband Dick Blau, 
this idea of apprehension is pertinent, Gallop writes ‘the idea of a wolf family 
suggests that here is a family [...] captured by the photographic gaze’ (Chernick, 
2011, p. 244). She refers to a photograph taken by Blau in 1990 (Chernick, 2011, p. 
243), where her son, who is in the bath and Gallop, who is standing beside the bath, 
both eye the camera with hostile expressions. Gallop describes these expressions 
as resentful but suggesting empowerment through their display of hostility and return 
of the gaze. Gallop recalls the circumstances around the image being taken and 
                                                                 
59 Susan Sontag was an American journalist, novelist, women’s rights and anti-war activist who was 
very active in the 1960s-2000s. Her seminal work is On Photography (1977) which asks ethical and 
philosophical questions of the photographic medium. 
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suggests the hostility in their gaze is inauthentic (ibid, p. 245), although it is still 
striking that they are living with a photographer who sells and exhibits their images. 
He had entered the bathroom unannounced with a camera to ‘capture’ them, and in 
that sense, both Gallop and her son are certainly ‘wild’ to Blau (ibid, p. 245).  
 
The indeterminacy of authenticity in the images captured through the lens is not a 
new sensation; it is a major theme that runs through all of the works I have outlined 
which are concerned with performance-to-camera. Am I caring or appearing to? 
Irigaray’s utilisation of the speculum as symbolism in her book, Speculum of the 
other Woman (1974), also comments on the power created by wielding a device to 
enhance vision. Irigaray argues that there is a need for devices as an aid with which 
to arouse oneself, and in this context the camera, as incarnate in the digital device, 
would represent this ‘arousal,’ as it provokes experimentation and literally invents 
new acts of seduction and sex. Conversely, these self-same devices of heightened 
awareness also function as devices for conformity, or what Irigaray would term 
‘unity’. Irigaray talks of a long search for ‘the instrument, the lever, and, in more 
cases than one, the term of his pleasure’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 232). In this instance 
‘woman’ becomes interchangeable with the ‘machine’ or the mechanics of arousal.  
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1:7 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed some of the many theorisations of the camera, and 
feminist analysis of the camera and the visual, more generally, as an important factor 
in the critique of phallocentrism through performance-to-camera. The initial ideas I 
explored were in relation to the merging of photography and performance and to the 
historic feminist interventions I have described, such as Ana Mendieta’s Rape Series 
(1972), as well as contemporary practice, such as Stehli’s Friends With Benefits 
(Stehli, 1999-2000) and Woods’s Fat Fucking Shrek Cunt series (Woods, 2015). 
Although the camera, in its capacity to create frames and frame experience, signifies 
a certain way of aesthetic thinking which involves a removal or distancing from the 
everyday I think that conversely, the frame created by the camera, permits acts of 
mimicry following Irigaray (1974) and Robinson (2006). In this light performance-to-
camera I argue is an important feminist counter-strategy, as explored in my practice 
MNWG (2010). After developing and exhausting the camera’s subversive potential, 
women artists have, through the maternal, discovered that the camera can serve as 
a means with which to facilitate the development of subjectivity and inter-subjective 
interactions60. I argue that women perform-to-camera without the pre-supposition of 
a stable subject, and in that way have less to lose than a fixed masculine position. 
Because of this women are more readily able to use performance-to-camera to make 
radical gestures and stake a claim to autonomous subjectivity 61 . The tactic of 
performance-to-camera is able to apprehend the subject’s placement within 
subjective lack and a world of perpetual surfaces and depthless presences, because, 
and not in spite of, the inherent contradictions it embodies as a methodology. That is, 
the contradiction of asserting agency and embodiment through the very thing (the 
camera) charged with framing the male gaze and control through the specular.  
 
                                                                 
60 Admittedly, this therapeutic potential, when photography is merged with performance, was 
crystallised in Jo Spence’s phototherapy in the 1980s and 1990s, which proposed the opposite notion 
to the one where technological performance symbolises a decentred subjectivity. 
61 Similarly this willingness to experiment with subjectivity in the photographic space can be observed 
in the LGBTQIA and BAME communities, those with disabilities or on the nuero-diverse spectrum or 
with mental health issues, as well as, amongst children and teenagers. And, as above, Jo Spence 
opens that photographic space up to those who have terminal illness also. In other words, the 
potential for mimicry enabled through the camera is both a form of repression and a form of freedom. 
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The anxiety of there being nothing there, which Irigaray argues is staved off by the 
reflection of masculinity back onto itself (1985), and that Cavarero argues women 
inherently represent for men (2006), is examined within the practice made for this 
thesis, for example, by performing against the blank screen/studio backdrop. This 
approach, where the blank photography studio was the setting, was reminiscent of 
techniques used to shoot objects, or catalogue style fashion shoots, with clinical, 
stark lighting that creates strong shadows; a white, sterile space with myself and 
later my daughter Matilda, cast as moving specimens. The neutrality exacerbates the 
hysteria and the irony because I am not offering myself up as raw material; rather I 
am presenting my subjective experiences.  
 
The camera inspects, records and restricts how, when, and what is seen. The 
camera is also a completely unique apprehension of the world, and within this 
context, it is useful to performance. However, the camera had too much control over 
these performances, and I struggled to transcend an object position because, at 
best, I oscillated between object-hood and subject-hood, similar to the way the 
mother does in culture and society. In Blau’s practice, the father photographs the 
family, and in an essay on the documentation of her pregnancy and family life, 
Gallop reflects on the object-hood of pregnancy, namely her pride in her swollen 
belly - ‘her prize watermelon’ - followed by the ‘shame in displaying [her belly...] that 
is soft and flaccid’ in a later picture of herself naked with her son, taken by Blau in 
1991. Thus, Gallop reflects on the ‘phallic dimensions of her pride and shame’ 
(Chernick, 2011, pp. 237-252).  
 
One function of the image of difference, rather than images of repetition, is that it 
may be possible to create a viewer who is primed for recognising the mechanisms at 
work in phallocentric images. This in turn lends, whether intentionally or not, a heavy 
irony to mainstream media or traditional representations where there is a reliance on 
the visual device of woman as a blank canvas or screen onto which to project. This 
uncertainty is embraced in a feminist methodology because of its resistant and 
political possibilities. Although the radical purpose that exists in women’s staged 
photography is not new, and now also extends to how different so-called ‘minority’ or 
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fringe groups have used the camera, it is clear that there is a consistent and 
prolonged critique in this vein.  
 
This irony is not lost here. Both my performance MNWG (2010), and the later MSP 
with Matilda (2011-2012), share, in their commitment to assert a subjectivity as a 
woman, whilst experiencing the failure of still operating in the framework of a binary 
system. I have been examining considerations of the camera as a function or by-
product of an ‘instrumental vision,’ coupled with the notion that a reassertion to 
phallic domination is the inevitable by-product of any exploration of women’s 
subjectivity. In short, discourse and dialogue are restricted within pre-existing 
patriarchal structures that seek to delimit experience for what it deems to be others. 
To present oneself as an ‘other’ to seek a subjective identity is only equally 
patriarchal if the new position also seeks to absorb all other positions. In my work, 
submitted with this thesis, the camera symbolises the paradox that precedes any 
feminist engagement with the digital camera and representation. That is precisely 
because the camera is, arguably, a pre-existing structure that embodies a visual 
language reliant on an instrumental vision that would, according to Sobchack, ‘make 
us view our bodies as images or objects’ (Meskimmon, 2003, p. 144) that it can be 
exploded by that which it may seek to obscure or repress. The photograph marks 
that moment of being neither subject nor object (Barthes, 2000, p. 14; Gallop, 2011, 
pp. 234-235). It is where the moment of becoming an object is felt as a doubling of 
subject and object (Chernick, 2011, p. 238), and where this ambiguity in the 
photograph and its boundaries. 
 
The subject who has put herself in the photograph intentionally, and is in control of 
her pose, context, costume, action and so forth, can further destabilise the 
mythology that exists in the realm of photography and representation. In a literal 
sense, there is an act of offering oneself up for reproduction and dissemination, 
coupled with a becoming, and an element of mediatisation, involved in the act of 
performance-to-camera that is inherently a symbolic relinquishing of control to the 
spectator. In Gallop’s essay (2011), it is striking how she is able to move between 
subject and spectator positions as she reflects on the work by her husband, and her 
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role as a mother in such work. These type of reflections led to a deeper exploration 
of the dynamic between myself and the subject in relation to the camera and 
photographer and to aesthetics.  
 
In conclusion, the link between the frame, and its inherent failure, as Derrida 
successfully argues (1987a), to accomplish the impossible task of maintaining a 
clear inside and outside, is exemplified in the insertion of women’s bodies that invoke 
unclear boundaries and confuse normative ideas and clear distinctions between the 
body and the mind and interior and exterior spaces. In the next chapter I will 
demonstrate that Derrida’s parergon is a useful methodology with which to create a 
feminist performance-to-camera practice as it actively seeks to undo distinctions 
between form and matter, and other binaries such as pre-aesthetic and aesthetic, 
inner and outer, and so forth. Further to this, I will argue that the maternal aesthetic 
compliments and makes execution of Derrida’s theoretical position possible. This is 
because the parergon, that Derrida describes as an intermediate zone, is there to be 
exploited, it is a space that holds the potential for play and subversion, its non-entity 
status chimes with the many of us who feel disembodied, disempowered or in other 
ways invisible or overlooked. However, I have been discussing the contradictory 
nature of the camera and the process of mimicry and hysteria, as well as, the notion 
of an image that is not flat, all of which are prevalent themes in performance-to-
camera. In this chapter I have put forth the argument that the feminist critique of the 
male gaze, through the camera lens and the photographic space, in the form of 
performance-to-camera, has the tendency to be deactivated and fail in its critique 
and be re-subsumed into a fine art canon that easily renders the gesture innocuous. 
In short these tactics have been attempted countless times and the male gaze still 
reigns supreme. 
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Chapter 2: Performing Maternal Aesthetics and Framing Mother-
Daughter Relationships 
 
Fig. 7. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
2:1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that women’s performance-to-camera when viewed as a 
critique of aspects of phallocentrism, as discussed in Chapter One, is re-ignited 
when mother-daughter relationships are explored in and through the frame. I will be 
addressing the research question: How can representing mother-daughter 
relationships re-invigorate women’s performance-to-camera in the light of the failure 
of historical feminist interventions to successfully oppose the maintenance of 
dualistic thought? In Chapter One I introduced work that was performed-to-camera 
and was concerned with feminine subjectivity I will now theorise performance-to-
camera through Derrida's parergon, a deconstruction exercise on dualistic thought 
and traditional Western aesthetics, to demonstrate one motivation for staging live art 
within the photographic space, as well as to demonstrate how much is at stake 
conceptually, theoretically and politically in this gesture. I will deploy Irigaray and 
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Alison Stone62 and will analyse Lena Šimić63 and Shirley Cameron’s performance 
practices with their children. I will combine this with recent writing on the maternal 
aesthetic from Andrea Liss64, from Šimić, and my own thoughts, to show how this 
maternal aesthetic breaks the frame by, not only surpassing the image, but also by 
exceeding those established boundaries65 that supposedly define the subject. As my 
practice has developed, I have been able to make connections with other artists who 
work with maternal symbolisms, and my work is now contextualised within this 
framework of what I shall call maternal aesthetics. An aesthetic which seeks to 
challenge phallocentrism through the insistence on a feminine maternal subjectivity. 
Artists Lindsay Page, Jennifer Verson, Grace Surman and Bernadette Laimbauer, 
who are my contemporaries and who all perform with their daughters, as well as, 
Shirley Cameron’s historic mother-daughter performances, in addition to Šimić’s 
work in the field of maternal aesthetics, all inform and contextualise my own practice. 
The maternal aesthetic is derived from experience, the everyday, the body, the 
breaking of boundaries, taboos and dualisms, the referent of maternalism and the 
mother. 
 
In the previous chapter, I focused on, the constraining principles of the photograph 
and the difficulties we face when attempting to disrupt this. Now I will focus more 
closely on some of the causes of phallocentric anxiety, namely the relationship 
between mothers and daughters and how this is representationally radical and can 
subvert the frame, and by association create aesthetic notions radically different to 
those which are more conventional. In the words of Stone, the feminist endeavour to 
explore ‘the possibility of female subjectivity’ (Stone, 2012, p. 4) has arisen out of 
Irigaray’s work to ‘rescue women from object status’ (ibid). I have been discussing 
this process via performance-to-camera, however, it is problematic to rely solely on 
                                                                 
62 Alison Stone writes on European feminist philosophy and is based at Lancaster University. She has 
focused on the maternal and feminine subjectivity. 
63 Lena Šimić is a mother to four boys. She is co-founder (with Gary Anderson) of the Institute for the 
Art and Practice of Dissent at Home, and she has compiled a collection of maternal live art for LADA, 
and also runs LADA’s Study Room in Exile from the Institute. Šimić is a live artist who works to 
camera as well as live. She has collaborated on performances with her children since the 1990s. She 
is politically active with the Family Activist Network and within the Labour Party in Liverpool. 
64 Andrea Liss is an American art historian and cultural theorist who focuses on feminist art, and in 
particular its relationship with the maternal. 
65 The metamorphosis that occurs in women’s bodies in the stages of pregnancy and childbirth and 
the cycles of menstruation, which all disturb any attempt to strictly demarcate the body as a confined 
and neatly delineated entity.  
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this methodology as potentially radical because of the concerns of binary logic and 
traditional aesthetics, which ironically, objectify. Therefore, I have chosen to focus on 
maternal subjectivity rather than feminine subjectivity, because I concur with Liss 
that it retains a level of discomfort which can be exploited (Liss, 2013), and because 
as Stone argues ‘there has been a widespread tendency to understand the maternal 
body and the self in opposition’ (Stone, 2012, p. 10). My maternal aesthetics seeks 
to bridge this gap, and in this way subject-object distinctions disintegrate.  
 
2:2 Deconstructing the Frame 
Derrida’s deconstruction of the Western aesthetic frame hinges on its indeterminacy 
(Derrida, 1987a), and in his reading the frame is unstable owing to the flawed pre-
supposition of inside and outside as distinct. Derrida explores the notion, of a space 
which is between the image and the world, an indeterminate area that is in excess or 
additional to the image neither intrinsic to it nor extrinsic, and calls this the parergon 
in order, to reveal the instability of aesthetic processes. In short, what exists between 
the image and the world is a construct called the frame or the parergon (Derrida, 
1987a) however, it is the presence of the frame that draws our attention to the 
constructed nature of the image. Ultimately, I would argue, this exposes the binary 
nature of traditional aesthetics in the West and sets off a chain reaction which 
destabilises other binaries. The parergon, as conceived by Derrida, as working both 
for and against the image by upholding a boundary whilst simultaneously making the 
boundary unfeasible is evident in the digital image, and how such images appear in 
the everyday. Here I will deploy the notion to address my research question: how 
does Derrida’s model of the parergon assist these explorations, and what 
relationship does the parergon share with Irigaray’s conception of the blind spot or 
reverse of the image as symbolic of the feminine?   
 
I have already indicated the importance of the maternal for invoking and maintaining 
transitions within my practice. In this instance, the potential openings and excesses 
to aesthetics are realised in the maternal aesthetic and the symbolism of the female 
body. The practice, submitted with this thesis, has been the space with which to 
experiment, but also to challenge notions of the fixed frame through the introduction 
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of the maternal as disruptive to distinctions of interior/exterior and the introduction of 
maternal performance as opening or re-opening that original corridor between 
selves. Following Derrida’s argument in the parergon section of his essay The Truth 
in Painting (1987a), the frame is already dissolving and is inherently unsuccessful at 
maintaining a clear outside and inside. Here, Derrida states that the frame: 
[...] labors (travaille) indeed. Place of labor, structurally bordered origin of 
surplus value, i.e., overflowed (debordee) on these two borders by what it 
overflows, it gives (travaille) indeed. Like wood. It creaks and cracks, breaks 
down and dislocates even as it cooperates in the production of the product, 
overflows it and is deduc(t)ed from it (Derrida, 1987a, p. 75). 
 
This is not simply a theoretical concern, rather it is manifested in my interest in the 
high-speed frame capture of digital cameras and in my construction of sequences of 
actions through still images, best illustrated in MNWG (2010), where I took a stop-
frame animation approach to the images I produced. Derrida’s argument hinges on 
the necessity that traditional aesthetics maintain distinctions between, for example, 
inside and outside, matter and form, as it is these very distinctions on which art relies 
to distinguish itself as aesthetic fine art. Derrida analyses Heidegger’s essay The 
Origin of the Work of Art (1971) as a means to demonstrate the philosophical 
presuppositions made by Heidegger in relation to art, which he presents as a 
concept. For Heidegger, art is a means to get to, or draw out, the truth. How it has 
become culture, and how this precludes others, is not his concern, which is why 
Derrida interrogates his philosophical premise. Likewise, I am concerned with the 
presupposition that art is separate to life and the ways this prevents, and has 
prevented, women from engaging fully in aesthetics.   
 
This assertion of the binary nature of art aesthetics, on the part of Derrida, is made 
possible because of the influential philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his distinction 
between natural beauty and the higher beauty found in aesthetics, in Critique of Pure 
Reason, first published in 1781 (Kant, 1934). In a patriarchal context, arguably such 
as we have inherited historically in the West, women have been assigned as nature 
or matter, the counterpoint being the cerebral high culture of man. Derrida utilises 
the symbolism of the frame and demonstrates its importance as an aesthetic device 
to maintain such distinctions. This encapsulates the difficulty of performing to the 
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camera, where the frame acts as a trap and, conversely, as a platform, and when I 
perform-to-camera I have to negotiate these contradictions.  
 
Derrida’s argumentation attempts to deconstruct Hegelian aesthetics through a 
critique of Heidegger’s text The Origin of the Work of Art (1971), where Derrida 
(1987a) argued that Heidegger’s essay presupposes a unity in the term ‘art’. Derrida 
argues that the danger in this assumption of conceptual stability is that of believing 
that ‘art has a meaning, one meaning’ (Derrida, 1987a, p. 21). Derrida’s analysis of 
the unifying symbolism of art as a false premise is important to women making art, 
because, ‘woman’ is also a false premise that pre-supposes conceptual stability. 
Although not explicitly stated by Derrida, the exclusion of matter and the originary 
distinction between art and nature form the patriarchal history that has excluded 
women’s art as non-art, and has governed the representation of woman as ‘matter’ 
or non-subject. If traditional aesthetics deem matter as chaotic and, therefore, 
problematic and in need of framing (Derrida, 1987a), then it follows that the 
conceptualising of meaning as the inner content of a work that is reliant on the 
device of the frame, signals to the viewer that there is an ordered meaning to be 
read that has been organised by an outside entity – the artist.  
 
Derrida contends that this binary of inner and outer is possible because the 
physis/tekhne opposition is irreducible (Derrida, 1987a, p. 21). ‘If one were to 
accredit so hastily its translation as nature/art or nature/technique, one would easily 
commit oneself to thinking that art, being no longer nature, is history. The opposition 
nature/history would be the analogical relay of physis/tekhne’ (ibid). In this section, 
Derrida is interested in how the history of art appears to dominate the philosophy of 
art. I use this quotation to demonstrate, as previously mentioned, the inherent 
patriarchal logic that dominates aesthetic processes, namely that matter needs be 
aestheticized or filtered and rendered something else by an act of framing that forms 
it as internal to a structure. This may sound sensible and innocuous, however, if the 
‘matter’ referred to is actually women and their bodies, as is the case in Yves Klein’s 
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performance 66 , then it is possible to critique aesthetics as phallocentric and 
controlling.  
 
The frame is never a stable entity in my performances, nor in the performances that I 
have described. Rather, the frame manifests the stress of trying to uphold the binary 
distinction of what is the art and what is not as well as the stress of what is a unified 
subject. The frame encompasses not simply the pictorial, but also any form of 
staging or display of an object or event where aesthetics has been at play. The 
conditions of a framed space when conceived of as a threshold, or an attempt at, if 
not an actually successful, stepping outside of the everyday, demarcate the collapse 
of aforementioned binaries, like the perpetual mirror-phase threshold. Derrida 
maintains it is Kant’s analytic of the beautiful, which sets up what Broadhurst 
describes as a ‘critical dogmatism’ (Broadhurst, 1999, p. 52), in perceiving the frame 
as a ‘fixed border’ (ibid), whereas the frame is a device which enables space for 
aesthetic and creative activity as it is marked by its failure to maintain an inside and 
an outside as distinct. Derrida argues that Kant sets up an oppositional logic where 
there are notions of ‘formal and material’ (Derrida, 1987a, p. 73), pure and impure, 
proper and improper, and inside and outside (ibid). For Derrida, the frame is 
inherently fragile, constructed as it is by Kant’s analytic to maintain a border, and 
Derrida asserts that the frame ‘both constitutes it and ruins it’ (ibid). I am concerned 
with Derrida’s exposure of the binary oppositions inherent within traditional Western 
aesthetics, and the frame’s role within this process. The frame does not simply 
uphold these binaries but can also be a means with which to critique these 
processes. An analysis of the underlying power bias of which these philosophical 
systems are comprised in their privileging of certain viewpoints is evidenced in the 
writing of Pollock (1988), Grosz and Lippard (1995), Irigaray (1974), Kristeva (1984), 
Cavarero (2006) and Braidotti (1994).  
 
Women artists, potentially, have an ideological disadvantage within this binary 
system, because woman in the traditional phallocratic logic is conceived of as 
property, or seen in her functionality as child-bearing and rearing, or more simply as 
                                                                 
66 Discussed later in this chapter. 
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‘matter’ in the opposition form/matter, where the male artist will aestheticise the ‘raw’ 
subject, as previously discussed. In this phallocentric conceptual schema, it ‘suffices 
to associate’ rationality with the formal, and the ‘irrational with the illogical, the 
rational with the logical, [and] to couple the whole lot to the subject/object pair’ 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 65). This schema is derived, Derrida contends, from Christian 
philosophy. Although Derrida discusses the oppositional nature of thought at play 
within aesthetics, as theorised by Kant, he omits any mention of subject positions or 
gender politics, and without this type of reflection on women’s subjectivity, caught up 
as we are so often in the object position in this so-called Christian schema, this 
analysis on Derrida’s part remains apolitical.  
 
In concurrence with theorists such as Irigaray (1974), Robinson (2006), Pollock 
(1988) and Grosz (1995), I would argue for the existence of a phallocratic subtext, 
which makes these oppositions and this type of dogmatism instrumental in upholding 
supremacy in the form of visibility. Derrida correctly theorises this type of thinking as 
violent upon the ‘thing,’ in that it is an aggressive superimposition ‘which enslaves it 
and, literally, conjugates it, under matter/ form’ (Derrida, 1987a, p. 67). The 
rendering representationally of woman as ‘thing,’ would constitute a form of 
enslavement which has been knowingly upheld, as well as subverted, in many 
artworks67. Furthermore, does a mother-artist’s inclusion of her child in the frame risk 
repeating this power dynamic by objectifying the child as ‘thing?’ To some degree, 
answers to these dilemmas can be sought within the logic of maternal aesthetics, 
through the suspension of the everyday allowed by the hybrid performance-
photographic space, and through Derrida’s analysis that the frame is inherently 
unstable, based as it is in a mythology of inside and outside to which the frame 
draws attention through the parergon. This possibility of an in-between is indicated 
by Derrida, when he proposes that in the formation of subject/object as well as 
matter/form, similar to the parergon, there is a possibility of there being something 
else, something which is neither one nor the other (Derrida, 1987a, p. 67). I propose 
that the fluidity of the subject is symbolised by the maternal and its capacity to 
transcend the limitations of the postmodern conception of an isolated or fractured 
                                                                 
67 Upheld, for example, in Klein’s treatment of women as material, and satirised by Cameron and 
Silver in the early 1990s which I discuss shortly. 
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subjectivity. In short, the maternal can both occupy different sites and time zones 
simultaneously and also muddy the distinctions between object and subject. 
 
This in-between, described by Derrida as not one nor the other (Derrida, 1987a, p. 
67), and by Jane Gallop68 as not subject or object (Chernick and Klein (eds.) 2011, 
pp. 234-235), is occupied by the pregnant woman, and by the mother and child when 
maternal aesthetics is invoked inside or upon the frame. It is this indeterminacy 
between subjects which renders the work transitional and subversive, and it is partly 
the ethical ambiguities and precariousness of this that render the maternal as 
explosive to the binaries of patriarchal logic that are still, arguably, prevalent in 
Western thought. This is asserted by Cavarero (1995), who Braidotti claims is ‘loyal 
to the methodological premises [of Irigaray]’ (Braidotti in Cavarero, 1995, p. viii). 
Cavarero, like Irigaray, believes that the metaphysical tradition in the West has 
legitimised patriarchal power (ibid). She also contends that ‘the noun “man” contains, 
buried in it, an absolute abstraction of the masculine, which is disembodied [...] built 
on a persistent dualism of body and mind’ (Cavarero, 1995, p. 6), whereas “woman”, 
‘finds she is a single whole of mind and body, and demands an adequate name’ 
(ibid). Cavarero believes that this name, which, is sought by women, must ‘resonate 
within the kind of symbolic order where birth [...] will also restore meaning to 
everyone, female and male’ (ibid). Likewise, the explosiveness that Irigaray believes 
is held by the maternal, is because patriarchy has disavowed birth, choosing instead 
to thrive on death (Cavarero, 1995). Irigaray argues that conception and birth 
reproduce the question ‘of her beginnings [...] and could insert woman into a specific 
economy that is genealogical and specular’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 76).  
 
                                                                 
68 Jane Gallop is an American artist who works in the maternal aesthetic. She has an essay in Myrel 
Chernick and Jennie Klein’s book The M Word: Real Mothers in Contemporary Art; Chernick and 
Klein eds. (2011) The interesting thing about Gallop’s essay, Observations of a Mother, is that she 
writes about performance-to-camera from the subject/object position. The work is a collaboration with 
her husband Dick Blau (who takes the photographs of her and her son). The images don’t have titles; 
they just have the photographer’s name and the date. For example, an image of Gallop lounging 
naked with her son is titled Dick Blau (1991). This is all somewhat problematic, as the masculine eye 
and the raw nature of the woman and child as his subjects would seem to reinforce normative values 
about masculine and feminine within aesthetic processes. However, Gallop theorises the process and 
finds agency this way. 
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In this way, I am convinced that Derrida’s notion of the parergon opens up the frame 
so that the ‘figure of the mother’ and her symbolism cannot remain invisible any 
longer (Cavarero, 1995, p. 6). Cavarero maintains that birth and the mother are 
philosophically suppressed, because in the philosophical tradition they are so closely 
related to death ‘in perfect symmetry as a coming from and a returning to 
nothingness’ (Cavarero, 1995, pp. 46-47). She also seeks to dismantle this 
supposed symmetry, which is a construct within Western philosophy in a manner not 
dissimilar to Derrida’s deconstruction of the supposed symmetry of the inner and 
outer in relation to the frame. The artificial relationship between death and birth, 
argues Cavarero, disavows the role of the womb and the mother in birth, and 
furthermore, to suggest we come from nothing is to suppress women’s presence 
(Cavarero, 1995, pp. 44-47). Women’s presence within philosophy is problematical 
because it disrupts the dichotomy between being and not being, which is a 
theoretical kernel of philosophy left over from Greek times (ibid). For these reasons, 
this philosophical tradition that obscures the mother (and birth), disregards her 
symbolism as a transformative being in the world, a being related to pleasure 
(Elizabeth Bell, 1995) in favour of a transcendental model formulated around death. 
Similarly, the frame literally takes the life from the artwork and preserves it for the 
museum or gallery. The question I am grappling with here is how to make 
photography work in this context as a creative impulse rather than as a disembodied 
mummified entity that lacks presence. 
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2:3 Performing the Maternal  
With these attempts, both the successes and failures, to destabilise myths around 
femininity through the frame of the photograph already established as the context for 
my performance-to-camera, I will now address those aspects of my practice that 
might more traditionally be described as the interior of the image, intrinsic to it, or the 
subject-matter. In this instance, that is, myself and my daughter, and more broadly 
what our evolving relationship, both in front of, and away from the camera lens, 
conveys about phallocentric myths of the mother and daughter relationship and how 
the camera can establish a space to refute some of those aforementioned myths. 
Myths such as women as mute, women as passive, women as hysterical, women as 
pure matter/ bodies. 
 
My performance, MNWG (2010) presents the maternal experience as a concept that 
transcends the factual requirements of being a mother, and in this way can be seen 
as a continuation of the personal, emotional and everyday conceived of as 
theoretical and conceptual within an artistic practice69. The transcendent potential of 
everyday mothering experiences re-configured as a maternal aesthetic70 hinges, in 
part, on Adrienne Rich’s71 (1977) argument about the universal aspect of maternal 
symbolism, namely that we have all directly experienced the maternal and, therefore, 
it has a symbolic potential that lifts it above mere anecdote or worse, essentialism. 
This is evidenced in the resurgence of feminist theory on the maternal. For example, 
Gallop makes the distinction between the desire to mother, or to be a mother, as 
distinct from the desire to have a child (Chernick and Klein (eds.), 2011, p. 238). The 
latter she equates with the desire to become this impressive object that, for us, our 
                                                                 
69 In the field of feminist art production the aim to prevent the sensory and everyday being suppressed 
and kept apart from intellectual or aesthetic processes, has been a major cause of critique. A good 
example is Mary Kelly’s Post-Partum Document from the late 1970s. Kelly insisted that her ‘personal 
experience be read against a conceptual, psychoanalytical framework’ (Chernick and Klein, 2011, p. 
7). 
70 In the introduction to their LADA study room guide on Live Art and Motherhood, where my 
performance My Nana’s Wedding (Gown) (Myfanwyn Ryan, 2010) is held, Šimić and her collaborator, 
Emily Underwood-Lee (another maternal aesthetics practitioner and theorist), argue that ‘all 
artist/mothers [...] engage with a specific set of methodologies of performance/Live Art-making and 
inevitably develop a certain individual maternal performance aesthetic’ (Šimić and Underwood-Lee, 
2016, p. 4).  
71 Adrienne Rich, now deceased, was an incredibly influential American poet and writer of non-fiction, 
part of the women’s liberation movement a feminist and civil rights activist. She wrote on motherhood 
and drudgery, poverty and inequality, and heterosexuality as a function of patriarchy rather than being 
biologically determined.     
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mothers once were (ibid, p. 238). Emily Jeremiah (2006) argues that feminist thought 
has been able to move away from the essentialist view of the maternal into a more 
poststructuralist position by shifting discussion away from the ‘mother’ and into 
‘mothering.’ In other words, the act of mothering, rather than the subject – the 
mother. However, I am more in agreement with Liss, who continues to find the 
maternal body and the physical presence of the mother as troublesome to ‘organised 
structures of power’ (Liss, 2013, p. 1) but also vitally important. Through the 
performance of the maternal, we achieve what theory alone cannot, which is 
‘proclaiming maternal agencies, insisting on the presence of the mother’ (ibid). 
According to Liss ‘the maternal – with its always-lurking-at-the-surface possibilities, 
threats of pregnancy and menstruation – is looked at patriarchically as female bodies 
out of control, signs of oozing bodies through and in arts making’ (Šimić and 
Underwood-Lee, 2016, p. 4), ‘out to overtake others, viscosity out of bounds’ (Liss, 
2013, p. 1). In this context, the maternal takes the form of material, influence, and 
the meaning interior to the work – the maternal is intrinsic and extrinsic. These are 
the practical circumstances in which I find myself as a mother with duties of care, 
and which provide the impetus for my practice. However, these are more than 
practical circumstances they are an inherent threat to the stability of the aesthetic 
frame. 
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Fig. 8. Cages, Shirley Cameron with daughters Lois and Collette, (1977). 
 
Following these theoretical and philosophical threads through maternal 
undercurrents and matricidal urges, MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) is a series of 
work I made in collaboration with my eldest daughter, which situates itself in the 
maternal aesthetic context and questions both maternal separation from daughters 
and feminine subjectivity. The focus on the matrilineal and mother-daughter 
relationships is not exclusive. In Chapter Three I will discuss Šimić’s acts of care with 
her son in her performance Sid Jonah Anderson (Lena Šimić, 2008), and later in this 
chapter, I discuss the collaboration between Cameron and Silver during the mid-
1980s and 1990s72, and I will also discuss Lindsay Page’s representation of maternal 
ambivalence as a counterpoint to obsessive and cloying stereotypes of motherhood.  
The positioning of oneself as a mother-artist, and the placing of oneself and one’s 
child in the frame (Fig. 8), is full of contradictions and problems within critical 
                                                                
72 The focus remains on the maternal aesthetic, and specifically how this is expressed through 
women’s connections to one another realised in matrilineal ties, as well as friendships, across time 
(Fig. 8).  
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discourses of essentialism and ethics. This is of critical importance within the 
Western fine art canon, as the depictions of love and jouissance73 between mothers 
and daughters, grandmothers and granddaughters, and between women, are few 
(Stone, 2012). Maternal aesthetics poses some significant questions within a 
feminist framework, such as how to discuss and represent a mother’s experience 
without invoking biological determinism, and how to address the child’s lack of 
agency. I will further explore these issues in Chapter Three, however, my focus is 
engagement with the unwritten rules and norms surrounding a mother’s behaviour, 
and therefore, my process responds creatively to the experience of these pre-
suppositions first-hand. In this way, my practice is a continuation of feminist 
performance interventions with the camera and representational autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
73 Conceived of here as excessive pleasure, abandonment, and letting oneself go. This work is a 
counterpoint to the repression and hysteria expressed in the work I discussed in Chapter One. 
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2:4 Towards a Maternal Performance Aesthetic  
Before focusing on my maternal performance practice I should share the following 
quotation which highlights the cultural and political importance of maternal 
aesthetics:  
Too often the mother has been invisible; a search through the creative and 
academic archives reveals she is often second to her child, reduced to a 
screen on which to project the antipathy, reverence or hatred of the central 
protagonist: she is the source of his problems or oedipal anxieties (Šimić and 
Underwood-Lee, 2016, p. 4). 
  
This quotation, from Šimić and Underwood-Lee’s introduction to the LADA study 
room guide on Live Art and Motherhood (2016), also presents some clues as to what 
could be construed as a maternal aesthetic. It seeks visibility for the mother; it aims 
to represent an active rather than passive mother; it refutes masculine phallocentric 
anxieties about the mother and matricide; it breaks with conventions and taboos, and 
if there is unity amongst artist/mothers, it is in community rather than sameness. 
     
The series MSP with Matilda (2011-12), five works in total, were conceived of as 
phenomenological explorations of the frame, and were created to continue the 
feminist deconstructions and critiques of traditional Western aesthetics (as discussed 
in Chapter One). The performances followed an emergent process where I 
improvised with my daughter to explore notions of being, in an ontological sense. To 
consider how this undoes the often disassociating and distancing effects of Western 
aesthetics, I will now discuss the power of maternal symbolisms in feminist 
discourse, their repression in phallocentrism, and what is at stake in my 
representation of myself as a mother. 
 
Stone argues that Irigaray overstates the degree to which our culture is symbolically 
matricidal (Stone, 2012). The disavowal of the maternal in Western civilization is 
paradoxical, as it is both venerated and repressed. Certainly, Irigaray exaggerates 
this process to expose the maternal undercurrents in, for example, Freud and Plato, 
as well as in Christianity, all of which draw on the mother’s importance and centrality 
to life, philosophy and theology. Irigaray identifies the maternal emphasis in Plato’s 
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cave as a metaphor for the womb (Irigaray, 1985, p. 243), the place which man must 
leave to find truth. Stone maintains that in a traditional way of thinking ‘the mother is 
deemed important [...] on the basis that she lays the selfhood of her children’ (Stone, 
2012, p. 51). Hence, Stone draws together the seemingly conflicted position that the 
mother occupies in the West, as both idealised and erased, by explaining that 
motherhood is presented ‘as the role by which mothers free their children from the 
maternal realm construed as bad, dangerous, and in need of being left behind’ (ibid, 
p. 52). The mother is foundational for the subject but when she has performed that 
function must be discarded74. Julia Kristeva75, deploys the term matricide, rather 
than the more simply put and less emotive term ‘separation’, because she is not 
describing a ‘neutral cognitive process’ (Stone, 2012, p. 66). Rather, Kristeva argues 
that the child’s development is an intensely bodily process. Stone contends that the 
child performs a form of matricide through viscerally ‘putting the mother outside of 
oneself’ (ibid, p. 67) however, she turns this linear developmental progression on its 
head by describing how we regress towards our own infancy later in life (Stone, 
2012, pp. 120-121).  
 
This regression is because the daughter, on becoming a mother herself, experiences 
again the intensity of the ‘body-to-body relation’ she had with her own mother with 
her daughter, and this ‘takes the mother back to her pre-Oedipal past’ (ibid). 
Feminist theorist, Rosemary Betterton76, argues that Irigaray, like Kristeva, sees ‘the 
repressed maternal relationship and the pre-Oedipal state of infancy as central within 
the formation of gendered subjectivity’ (Betterton, 1996, p. 16). In more established 
psychoanalytical Freudian theories that are a subject of critique for Irigaray, 
Betterton, Stone et al, feminine gender identity is full of shame and resentment. 
Stone claims that in this framework of separation the mother must be almost purged 
                                                                 
74 Such notions of using and discarding fit with a phallocentric conception of women’s passivity. 
75 Kristeva is a (Bulgarian born, based in France) feminist, psychoanalyst and cultural critic. Like 
Irigaray, she has been writing since the 1970s in, what is generally termed, the second wave 
feminism, which addresses patriarchy through structures. Kristeva has focused on language as a 
patriarchal tool of oppression, which she sought to critique through considering poetics, abjection and 
her ‘semiotic realm’, a pre-oedipal space that the infant inhabits prior to forming a subjectivity. The 
subject is conceived of as a process rather than as a fixed, stable or unified entity (French & Lack, 
1998, pp. 133-178). 
76 Betterton is based at Lancaster University and writes on maternal subjectivity and women’s bodies 
in art. 
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from us; according to phallocentric logic, and this is particularly difficult for the young 
girl because it requires her to deny her mother’s presence.    
 
The pre-Oedipal past described by Stone as the place to which a mother returns, is 
certainly influenced by Kristeva’s semiotic, as she describes it as a time before self-
identification and prior to ‘linguistic frameworks’ (Stone, 2012, pp. 120-121). The 
continued connection with this past presents a radical perspective in theorisations of 
the mother-daughter relationship, because it is the antithesis of separation. In this 
way, the mother precedes and exceeds selfhood. Traditionally, where the mother 
must push the child away to initiate that sense of self in the infant (Stone, 2012), in a 
feminist re-working of phallocentric psychoanalytical, philosophical and aesthetic 
tradition, we are not concerned to uphold or insist on the separations laid out by 
theorists such as Freud and Lacan. The push away occurs, but is challenged, to 
propose a new subjective position where the mother can remain an active agent. 
Through the performances I have made with my daughter, I argue for subjectivity as 
negotiation and this is always intersubjective and process-based. Even to ask the 
question “is emotional separation necessary?” is an act of resistance to underlying 
notions of mothering that are repressive to mothers and daughters, such as 
martyrdom and moving apart from each other77. The maternal aesthetic process that 
I want to explore in this chapter is not an interpretation of motherhood, but an 
embodied enactment of motherhood and a visceral and emotive, as well as 
somewhat obsessional, response to the same and this is a radical gesture.  
 
Artist/mother Bernadette Laimbauer has produced a series of performances in 
collaboration with her infant daughter, Matilda (2016-2017), and she explained to me 
that she began to perform with Matilda because, in her words, ‘there was simply no 
other opportunity78’ (Laimbauer, 2017) to make performance other than when they 
were together. She describes the necessity, the urge and the desperation to 
continue artistic production whilst caring for an infant. I asked Laimbauer about her 
maternal aesthetic process: 
                                                                 
77 There are many archetypes for the mother. The omnipotent, the controlling, the clingy, the 
manipulative, the evil, the nurturing, the sadistic, the cold, the neurotic, and so on. 
78 Conversation with the Artist. See the Appendix. 
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I wanted to do my performance, Matilda wanted to be with me. So she 
became part of the performance very naturally. I realized it might be very easy 
to combine spending time with my child and being productive [...]. Matilda 
shows interest in an action or material, I take the action/material and set 
myself a task with it. 
 The task usually has to do with repetition. How Matilda participates is up to 
her. We never arrange anything before we start performing (Laimbauer, 
201779). 
 
Laimbauer calls these ‘performative sketches’ and explained how she ‘catches them 
with a camera to look at our actions. Somehow they are a kind of training for me, to 
accept unexpected things, to deal with a situation and Matilda plays’ (ibid, 2017).  
 
Fig. 9.  backe kuchen milch – (performanceserie mit kind), Bernadette Laimbauer with Matilda 
Laimbauer, (2016). 
Laimbauer also described to me the importance of the performance’s title in relation 
to her process with Matilda and how the work and their relationship is 
interconnected: 
The title is bake milk cake – (performance series with child). There's a 
German song Matilda loves to listen to. It's about baking a milk cake, and the 
milk might end soon as one of our biggest physical, emotional connections. 
The milk, is running out and something new will come (Laimbauer, 2017). 
 
With regard to this milk, Irigaray argues how ‘milk, is able to nourish but also kill, 
rape or poison the sexuate body of the child’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 37). Irigaray points to 
the seductiveness of the mother and the rich ties to the mother possessed by the 
little girl, but she is surprised by the fact that in Freud’s conception, the attachment to 
the mother ends in hate (ibid). Irigaray is clear on the ambivalent nature of the 
                                                                 
79 Laimbauer wrote to me about this performance in 2017. I have included the transcript with the oral 
history recordings. 
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maternal as representative of femininity in Freud’s writing, where the maternal needs 
de-activating, where the ‘dangerous, the embracing, the aggressive mother/body’ is 
as much a threat as a source of comfort (ibid, p. 37). Irigaray also questions Freud’s 
assumption, that devotion to the father must denigrate the love once held for the 
mother. She argues that the result of this is that ‘the little girl comes to devalue her 
own sex by devaluing her mother’s’ (ibid, p. 40). In short, such a process, defined by 
increasing hostility towards the mother from the girl-child is damaging for the girl’s 
self-esteem. 
  
When I performed in the photography studio with my daughter Matilda, I was in the 
process of weaning her, and she was discovering more of a sense of her 
autonomous self, as was I, having almost forgotten what ‘alone’ felt like after my 
journey to the pre-oedipal realm. Irigaray claims, and I would concur, that there is a 
trauma elicited through weaning because it is, in her words, ‘the final break’ for the 
infant of the ‘material contact with the inside of the mother’s body’ (ibid, p. 40) in a 
phallocentric order. My performance-to-camera with my daughter does not explicitly 
deal with breastfeeding, but following Stone’s analysis, the work can certainly be 
viewed as negotiating maternal symbolisms. Here is the push-and-pull of mother-
daughter relationships. 
 
With this push-and-pull in mind, my brief disappearances in MSP with Matilda (2011-
12) could be viewed as preparatory steps in the process of weaning and the 
impending trauma of separation from the interior of the maternal body, symbolised in 
‘the denial of the breast’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 40), except that I confound this by re-
appearing in a manner that draws parallels with MNWG (2010). This communicates 
two things. Firstly, the process is non-linear, since the relationships ebb and flow, 
sometimes they stop and start, and sometimes they break entirely, although this is 
not inevitable. Secondly, who is in pain? Matilda is not always concerned at my 
disappearance as she is beginning to feel safe while alone.  
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Irigaray states that ‘the urge to devour the mother, to destroy the original nature-
body 80 ’ (ibid, p. 40), stems from this ‘inevitable separation,’ one that we must 
‘eternally return and refer back to’ (ibid). Eating the mother offers a solution to this 
eternal return to the trauma of separation, except that: 
If [the mother] is eaten, she will no longer be there to serve your needs-
desires or to guarantee a certain representation of the place of origin and the 
original bond. So this “hunger” [for contact with the material causes of the 
child’s body] is indeed insatiable, and no food will ever satisfy it. In fact it is 
not a matter of its being satisfied (ibid). 
 
This mother that we eat does not appear to have much to say in the matter. Jessica 
Benjamin81 argues that ‘for Freud, woman’s renunciation of sexual agency and her 
acceptance of object status are the very hallmark of the feminine’ (Benjamin, 1990, 
p. 87). In addition to this, and the subsequent rejection of Freud’s definition, 
Benjamin asserts that ‘even today, femininity continues to be identified with passivity, 
with being the object of someone else’s desire, with having no active desire of one’s 
own’ (ibid). In relation to motherhood, a woman who complains, or desires a 
separate identity outside of the mother role, is often defined through maternal 
ambivalence, which is rather limiting. In my work in the studio with Matilda, there is 
the active re-establishment of the subjectivity of both mother and daughter through 
interaction and playfulness however, there is an unsettling edge to the play 
expressed in my concealment and her confusion, which swiftly turns to delight. 
Through these performances to camera, I test the degree to which I, whilst 
representing a mother, can retain or establish subjectivity as a woman. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
80 It is my opinion that the use of the image of breast feeding is partly symbolic. One reason for 
strongly emphasising the body as playing such a vital role in mothering is to make a provocation and 
demonstrate the embodied nature of the relationship between an infant and its mother. The image of 
breast milk is also provocative, because it represents a woman as active rather than passive. 
81 Jessica Benjamin is a contemporary American feminist psychoanalyst who considers problems of 
domination, subject formation, gender difference, authority and sexual relations. 
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2:5 Mother-Daughter Relationships  
I will now look more closely at some of the tensions and contradictions that arise 
from mother-daughter relationships, where the theoretical and narrative flow of 
seeking something which remains hidden continues to play out. The concealments 
and reveals that make subjectivity fluid are performed in MSP with Matilda (2011-
2012) as a game between mother and child. If we can accept that the mother 
simultaneously embodies both nurture and poison for the infant then this is potent in 
the pleasure and peril of our game (MSP with Matilda, 2011-2012), where the nature 
of power is challenged and re-configured between us as we take turns to hide. As a 
result the underlying assumptions are questioned, foregrounded in Freudian 
narratives of separation and disavowal of the mother/the feminine, which I have just 
discussed via Stone’s and Irigaray’s theorisations of mother-daughter relationships. 
Following Irigaray, Stone argues that since women’s loss of their mothers is 
repressed and remains unconscious, the birth of a girl child brings it to the fore. For 
women, this loss can become a form of intense over-identification and a denial of the 
daughter having any real autonomy to the mother (Stone, 2012). Certainly, my own 
attempts to fit, both literally and figuratively, inside my grandmother’s wedding dress 
can be seen as symbolising this process, as can my repetitive sequences with 
Matilda in the photography studio, where, at least for a time, we are unable to move 
past that stage. In the image below, it is possible to read Cameron’s performance 
with her daughters as creating a maternal realm that is both a part of, and also apart 
from, the rest of society. She is representing the confined space in which mother-
daughter relationships are able to exist culturally whilst spectators crowd around the 
cage and peer in at the occupants. Cameron also presents a degree of ambivalence 
in her role as mother, trapped, othered and scrutinised.    
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Fig. 10. Cages, Shirley Cameron with her daughters Colette and Lois, (1977). 
Stone questions what constitutes some of the actual concrete features of typical 
mother-daughter relationships (Stone, 2012), and asserts that there is a surprising 
gap on this when it comes to reviewing writing on mothering. Much of the theorising 
has been done either by men or by women with sons, and when feminist 
psychoanalysts have explored this topic they have tended to focus on mother-
daughter relationships as problematic (ibid). For example, Stone refers to Helene 
Deutsch’s argument, formulated in 1945, that Freud is incorrect to argue that the 
mother has a baby as a substitute penis. Rather, she argues, the mother has a baby 
to return to the ‘early conditions of her own life’ (Stone, 2012, p. 114). Thus, to 
merge with her child is to re-unite with her (own) ‘long-lost mother’ (ibid, p. 115). If I 
consider MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) in this way, as in Deutsch’s term, a ‘psychic 
umbilical cord’ (ibid), then the process of play and the depiction of the interactions 
between us are an attempt to rediscover my lost relationship with my own mother. 
The sense of being lost and found certainly fits with our game of hide-and-seek, and 
the underlying terror that I felt at the thought of leaving Matilda can be explained as 
the fear of separation destroying me once again (Stone, 2012), as it did when I was 
an infant. In a similar spirit, Cameron’s interactions with her twin daughters (Fig. 10.) 
can also be viewed as the establishing of a shared space in which they can play and 
interact. However, I suspect there is a degree of resignation in the gesture Cameron 
makes of being publicly confined with her daughters. 
 
87 
 
 With regard to the specific nature of my collaborations with Matilda being performed-
to-camera, for me, hiding from the camera is a return to the need to be seen and 
recognised by the ‘other,’ or to be seen conforming to particular mythologies. 
Mythologies, such as an obsession with ‘perfection82’. Continued commentary and 
intervention in the digital realm is absolutely necessary, especially because of the 
proliferation of digital images and the widespread availability of image capture 
devices in the Western world. All of which has resulted in a weary audience which is 
desensitised to the notion that women are not equal to their male counterparts. 
Maternal aesthetics is a renewed form of expression of feminine subjectivity and 
collective experience, born from these cultural circumstances and the theoretical 
torpor created as a result of over analysis of the gaze, coupled with the theoretical 
inability to universalise experience from an ethical and critical viewpoint. The 
maternal conflicts with the mechanism of the camera, as it is difficult to uphold the 
insistence on the camera as a neutral intermediary when it has been granted a 
specific performative function as relational facilitator or representational tool.  
 
I argue that when the camera is combined with the maternal aesthetic, new ground 
can be established. Kristeva asserts that through art we can re-enter the semiotic or 
pre-linguistic primal state of the infant (Betterton, 1996), while Betterton contends 
that the suggestion made by Kristeva is that ‘the artist and the mother represent two 
points of entry into the same experience’ (ibid, pp. 40-41). Crucially, here the 
difference is that ‘the artist may represent the maternal state, the mother may not 
‘represent’ herself’ (ibid). Betterton also maintains that Kristeva, in delineating this 
nuance between interpretation, representation and enactment, thereby upholds a 
binary. However, I maintain the subject-less position of the mother, stems from the 
phallocentric nature of the traditional Western aesthetic process, which is both 
disassociating and binary. Kristeva points out that fine art aesthetics are presented in 
phallocentrism as akin to birth, and also superior to it, or so we are led to believe.   
 
Does this lead towards the possibility of a revised relationship with the camera, and 
through it, representation? Is it a relationship that does not hinge on phallic 
                                                                 
82 Perfection is satirised in the work of Woods in her Fat Fucking Shrek Cunt series (2015), where she 
explores her obsessional relationship with the selfie and Kardashian. 
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domination of the visual field in the form of ‘othering’? Is it a relationship to the 
camera that does not construct a removal of spectator and subject from each other, 
and can at times become a joyous and humorous process that is, first and foremost, 
relational? It certainly proposes the possibility of creativity and fluidity, where the 
camera may be viewed as a means with which to interject in the tendency to oppose 
mother and child. In the words of Liss, ‘rather than construing the mother-child 
relation as an essentialised binding, the coupling can be embraced as yielding the 
fruits of reciprocal relations’ (Chernick and Klein, 2011, p. 82). 
 
I argue that this concern for the relational aspects and reciprocity between mother 
and child prevents my work (or the work of Cameron or Šimić) becoming ethically 
mired in the charge of exploitation, as has occurred for the artists Mann (Woodward, 
1992) and Gearon (Gearon, 2001). In Gearon’s case, the police came to inspect her 
work in the exhibition I am Camera (2001), after it had been reported as obscene. 
Hirsch believes there is more at stake here than reading the mother as phallic or 
monstrous, for example, in the critique of Mann’s work there is arguably a tendency 
to present mothers behind the camera as potentially harmful to their children, rather 
than appreciating the intense scrutiny under which the mother is placed, and the fact 
that empowerment flows from, not to, the maternal gaze (Hirsch, 1997). Hirsch 
contends that Mann’s portraits are representations of the mother, rather than 
objectifications of her children (ibid, pp. 153-15483). Gearon amplifies this undertone 
of insipid moralising of the mother artist’s role by, for example, being photographed 
in a monster mask and making one of her daughters cry84.  
 
Liss concurs with Rich’s assertion that the concept of maternal sacrifice is part of the 
‘unexamined assumptions [...] that a “natural” mother is a person without further 
identity [...], that maternal love is, and should be, quite literally selfless’ (Rich, 1977, 
p. 22). Mann’s practice is a direct challenge to these assumptions, because we are 
                                                                 
83 Mann likes to push boundaries in her work. She went on to photograph rotting corpses for her book 
What Remains (2003), while herself remaining steadfastly out of view behind the camera, which is 
challenging in itself towards conventional conceptions of feminine roles, including how we care and 
what we care about. On Mann and her relationship with the camera, Hirsch explained how ‘when I 
look, I am seen’ (Hirsch, 1997, p. 176) to which I would add, judged. 
84 Tierney Gearon’s Mother Project (2006), is not intended to exploit her family. Rather, as she 
explains in the narration of the film, she sees it as ‘healing’ (Gearon, 2006). 
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aware of her indulging her creative impulses and exposing her children, seemingly 
for her own ends. My representations of my own relationship with my daughter, 
structured as they are around enjoyment and our playing together, also break with 
the link between motherhood and maternal suffering (Stone, 2016), because we are 
depicted taking pleasure in each other. The obviously staged environment of the 
work, which begins to collapse over time (Fig. 11. below), is another method of 
drawing the viewers’ attention back to the image as construct, by not allowing them 
to buy into the image as authentic. Examinations of the disconnection between 
representation and experience is a common thread in women’s performance. More 
generally, I would argue that it is realised both explicitly and implicitly when women 
perform with their children. 
  
 
Fig. 11. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
 
Simultaneous to the subversive depiction of the disruption of mother and baby, is the 
broader disruption of a myth of a reality that is mundane and which offers no 
seduction; a reality of drudgery in which a woman may quite feasibly find herself 
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trapped. This lack of domesticity, and this lack of the pressing reality of care and 
chores, is seeping into the fiction of the image in MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), and 
in this instance, it politicises the representations through the decadent absurdity of 
the process. It is a politicised act, or at least a radicalised representation of such, 
because of a lack of power and visibility felt by mothers in many geographical 
locations, coupled with the intense sense of helplessness that descended over me 
whilst I was pregnant, giving birth and child rearing.  
 
Fig. 12. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
Here because the disruption of subjectivity and physicality is, arguably, uniquely 
bound to women, how does a woman reconcile the disruption to her body and her 
life after having given birth to and nursing a child? Secondary to this, working with 
images inevitably encompasses aspects of vanity and representation, and the 
particular problem which is quickly encountered is how to appear natural, how to be 
a woman (Fig. 12). In fact, I would argue that the problematic nature of subjectivity is 
inherent in the act of being photographed (Barthes, 2000, pp. 10-11), where we 
switch between subject and object positions. I believe in the process and know that 
beautiful images are, however seductive, simply a by-product of my closed 
performances (MSP with Matilda, 2011-2012) that were only viewed by camera and 
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cameraman. To accomplish my aim of a deconstruction of processes of aesthetic 
distancing and re-establishment of phallocentric ideology, it is necessary to be wary 
of the seduction of the image. It is a flat glossy surface and it is beguiling but what I 
seek is obscured, at the outer limits and also on the reverse. The frame represents 
the capacity of the camera to objectify, and I am wary that ultimately it is impossible 
to control perception or subjectivity, because simultaneously the frame is an act of 
control and the moment that control collapses. A definition of woman within a 
maternal aesthetic is that; woman is an act of becoming and simultaneously the 
dissolution of any subjective stability. Photography, in its insistence on a frame, 
always suggests there is a pushing at the outer limits of definition and perception, 
and at the limits of what is tangible and what is not. The combination of the camera’s 
inherent instability which is born out of its overreliance on a frame, and women’s 
inherent instability as a subject always in the process of emerging, and the maternal 
which often breaks taboos and mythologies, results in an effective critique of 
traditional Western aesthetics and phallocentrism.  
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2.6 Lack, Excess and Mimesis  
To establish this encounter with the maternal and performance-to-camera 
philosophically, I utilise Irigaray’s analysis of phallocentrism as a repression of the 
feminine, together with Derrida’s meditations on the impossibility of preventing the 
collapse of the frame. In short, I assert that it is impossible to repress the feminine 
and similarly it is not possible to maintain closely guarded binaries, since both will 
eventually cave in on themselves. Through the mother, I can access a referent that 
symbolises my subjective instability and the many ways I am both repressed and I 
am oppressor, and the many ways I am other. Kristeva argues that the mother lives 
on in the adult psyche as a fantasy or ‘lost continent’ (Stone, 2012, pp. 120-121), or 
as a religious idea. The daughter’s search for the mother in my performances is 
meaningful and poignant because of the immense absence across time and the 
historical attempts to erase the importance of the mother-child relationship.  
 
Feminist methodology (Irigaray, 1974, Ettinger, 2006, Liss, 2011) contends that this 
mother-daughter/granddaughter relationship I am depicting is overlooked in 
Freudian/Lacanian analysis of the origins of subjectivity, which revolve around 
castration and penis envy85. In Irigaray’s Speculum (1974), the issue of women’s 
representation is manifested as lack, or a blind spot, which is because, for Irigaray: 
[...] woman has no gaze, no discourse for her specific specularization that 
would allow her to identify with herself (as same) [...]. Hence, woman does not 
take an active part in the development of history, for she is never anything but 
the still undifferentiated opaqueness of sensible matter, the store (of) 
substance for the sublation of self, all being as what is, or what he is [...] 
(Irigaray, 1985, p. 224). 
 
In the staging of a game of ‘hide-and-seek’ from the camera 86 , 
daughters/mothers/grandmothers, take on a resistant function when considered in 
the context of a culture which attempts to suppress the importance of the ‘maternal 
space from which all subjects emerge’ (Schor, 1994, p. 64). 
                                                                 
85 In Chapter Three, where I will be discussing Benjamin’s analysis of intersubjective interactions 
based on mutual recognition, it is evident that the importance of mother-child interaction has been 
much more central in child developmental theories for the last 25 years, at least since the emphasis 
has shifted increasingly to earlier developmental stages (Benjamin, 1990, p. 12). 
86 I refer to both MNWG (2010) and MSP with Matilda (2011-2012). 
93 
 
 
The mother-daughter relationship remains potentially unsettling to more mainstream 
mythologies, because it can operate autonomously from the phallic economy and 
symbolises different expressions of love and desire, physicality and sensuality, or 
what Irigaray has termed jouissance87. In psychoanalytical terms, the anxiety of 
castration88 is what, arguably, brings on an insistence on covering up the mother, the 
nude, nothing, where, in this instance, that covering is the frame acting as it does in 
the non-designated space of not-image and not beyond image. Coupled with the 
strict regulation of inner and outer that the frame polices, used, amongst other 
things, to stave off any references to women’s apparent lack coupled with all their 
unknowability, they are from that ‘dark continent’89 of femininity (Irigaray, 1985, p. 
110) or in Derridean terms the abyss90. 
On the parergon (Derrida, 1987a, pp. 37- 82) Derrida writes about the clothing on 
statues as being in addition to the image, and thereby another example of a 
parergon. It is neither an internal nor an extrinsic element of the image (ibid, p. 57). 
The clothing acts as something which both ‘decorates’ and ‘veils’ their beauty (ibid, 
p. 57). Derrida is right to identify this ‘veil’ as pushing at the edge of both the artwork 
and the represented body, as the frame pushes at the limits of reality. He asks ‘what 
is it that is lacking in the representation of the body so that the garment should come 
                                                                 
87 Jouissance translates as enjoyment, which Lacan develops as essentially phallic term in that it is 
not related to the other Encore (Lacan, 1972-1973), whereas for Irigaray, it points much more towards 
repressed feminine pleasure that is not derived from the genitals (Irigaray, 1985). 
88 Irigaray talks about women’s supposed lack of value in a phallocentric world where their only 
invention has been weaving. This is heavily ironic on Irigaray’s part, as she states that ‘woman can, it 
seems, (only) imitate nature [...] but this is paradoxical. Since nature is all’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 115). 
Therefore, because nature is all and cannot appear as no thing (ibid), then women weave to veil their 
lack ‘to mask the faults of Nature, and restore her in her wholeness. By wrapping her up’ (ibid, p. 
115). The ‘wrapping’ or the veil, function for Freud as a means of hiding difference from the ‘horrified 
gaze of the little boy, and the man’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 115). 
89 Andrea Liss argues that the political project for feminism, as outlined, she asserts, by Rosi Braidotti, 
is now to shift the definition of woman away from that idea of a ‘dark continent’, or ‘eternal 
masquerade’ and re-embody femininity through ‘essentialism with a difference’ (Myrel and Chernick, 
2011, p. 80). Although not specifically my aim here, Liss is aligning maternal aesthetics within this 
new branch of essentialism. In short insisting on biological difference can be an empowering move for 
women when they are confined within a culture that often suppresses the body and experiences such 
as child birth and pregnancy.  
90 ‘The analogy of the abyss [...] is an analogy between two absolutely heterogeneous worlds’ 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 36). Furthermore Derrida describes weaving and folding back cloth as ways to save 
yourself from ‘falling into the bottomless depths’ (ibid, p. 37), of said abyss. Although he is not directly 
referencing gender politics or feminine subjectivity, here I am appropriating the idea of an absence 
and the subsequent anxiety it induces to those ends.  
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and supplement it?’ (Derrida, 1987a, pp. 57-58)91. My response, is that this wrapping 
is designed to deliver the depiction of femininity to us in a way that does not create 
horror in the male gaze. In other words, the question would, more aptly be, what is at 
stake in representing the body completely unadorned? It is no coincidence that for 
Irigaray the ‘veil’ or ‘wrapping,’ is designed to alleviate masculine castration anxiety; 
following her close reading of Freudian psychoanalytical theory in Speculum (1974), 
while for Derrida, it alludes to, whilst attempting to suppress, the inherent lack or 
emptiness at the centre of any artwork. This is because both Irigaray and Derrida 
make attempts to challenge aesthetic presuppositions inherited from the classical 
era when art was deemed secondary to life in its status as a representation92.   
 
The traditional consignment of the feminine as “substance” or interior for aesthetic 
art93 was the topic of Silver and Cameron’s performance, The Swinging Sixties: We 
Were There (Cameron, Silver, 199294) (Fig. 13.), at Nottingham Women’s Centre, 
was constructed around their awareness that the audience would be solely women 
and that this would be intrinsic to the critique of spectatorship of the female form 
legitimised as high culture in fine art. This performance is clearly a critique of Yves 
Klein’s Anthropométrie de la Periode Bleue (1960), body performance. 
 
                                                                 
91 Derrida does not correlate women’s phallic lack with the use of a parergon in the form of a veil as 
directly representative of castration anxiety, nor does he explicitly bring the veil to bear as a 
supplement for this absence. This is despite him using a female nude ‘Cranach’s Lucretia’ (Derrida, 
1987a, p. 58) to illustrate his point about items that exceed the image through not being integral. If we 
relate this to Irigaray the veil may actually prove more integral than initially supposed.   
92 Aristotle’s argument that art merely imitates life, is refuted in Heidegger’s essay The Origin of the 
Work of Art (1950), where he attempts to persuade us that art speaks of a higher truth and creates or 
opens worlds. 
93Activity is associated with control and exteriority, and passivity with submission and interiority 
(Ettinger, 2006, pp. 78-79).   
94 As well as Yves Klein’s performance, they also performed a version of Yoko Ono’s Cut, and 
performed their version of Bagism which was part of John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s peace campaign 
in the 1960s. Bagism provides a different reading of matter to Klein’s, where in this instance, climbing 
inside the bag allows all participants to be just matter and, thereby, free from cultural constraints.  
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Fig.13. The Swinging Sixties: We Were There, Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron, (1992). 
It has been argued that in Klein’s work, the nude female performers are configured 
as matter for Klein, who, as the ‘artist’, gets to ‘form’ them. Jane Blocker argues that 
for Klein ‘the flesh, which the female models simply and self-evidently are, is known, 
dominated, and distanced [...] presented as nature’ (Blocker, 2004, p. 67). In the first 
instance, this is achieved through the performance of traditional fine art aesthetics 
which revolve around what Irigaray has described as ‘poles of matter’ and their 
separation from culture, and secondly, through the distancing and framing effect of 
the camera. Blocker believes that at the time of this work, Klein’s manifesto, was 
‘ideologically dangerous in its gendering of nature’ (ibid, p. 68). In other words, this 
work is heavily reliant on patriarchal binaries that are over-invested in women’s 
alleged inherent passivity and potential maternity and metaphors of their fertility, for 
example, as ‘nourishing soil’ (Stone, 2012, p. 51). According to Joanna Hodge, 
Irigaray seeks to destabilise the notion that philosophy is gender neutral (Hodge, 
1994), and she achieves this by an act of mimesis that allows her an ‘autonomous 
philosophical voice’ (ibid, p.198). She then uses this voice to ‘open up reverberations 
within the texts of male, masculinist thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas 
and Foucault’ (ibid). Hodge further argues that Speculum is a ‘work of self-
constitution that operates by retrieving moments in the philosophical and 
psychoanalytical tradition at which the silencing of women and murdering of mothers 
are both marked and repressed’ (ibid, p. 193).  
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Silver and Cameron’s critique of Klein’s original methodology, was that the 
performance was aimed at an all-female audience who were not specifically 
educated in art. Their performance was heavily reliant on the representational power 
of their bodies as mature women’s bodies, a departure from Klein’s ‘nubile’ women, 
bodies that had experienced child-birth (on the part of Cameron), and bodies that 
were more generally lived-in and aged. Silver and Cameron had originally intended 
to wear body stockings as they were unsure how comfortable the audience would be 
in the presence of nudity, which Silver felt had again become rather taboo during the 
1990s. However, according to Silver: 
[...] later in the evening we abandoned the body stockings and stripped and 
threw paint at each other and rolled on the paper. We felt totally free and 
liberated. Our purpose had been to reclaim the original Yves’s Klein 
performances involving nubile young women. (Cameron and I were both in 
our early to mid-forties when we performed our version.) It was performed in 
the context of a non-commercial non-art world environment, framed as a 
‘cabaret’ in a community centre, so we were free from those constraints’ 
(Silver, 201695) 
 
                                                                 
95 The full conversation can be found in the oral histories included in the appendix. 
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Fig. 14. The Swinging Sixties: We Were There, Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron, (1992). 
The constraints, to which Silver refers, are described by Jill Dolan as ‘perhaps [due 
to] a more elitist avant-garde’ audience (Dolan, 1993, p. 152). These types of 
constraints did not exist in community settings. In the words of Dolan, a cabaret, or 
non-proscenium arch staging can ‘profoundly disturb the standard one-way direction 
of the gaze’ (Dolan, 1993, p. 154). Of course, the cabaret format also brings the re-
staging of a 1960s fine art performance back into popular culture, completing a full 
circle of elevation to fine art and back again to entertainment via ironic trivialisation. I 
would argue that the material is deployed ironically within Silver and Cameron’s 
feminist critique to destabilise the work’s universal truths about women occupying a 
space closer to nature through lowering its stature to mere ‘entertainment’ (Fig. 14. 
and Fig. 15).  
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Fig. 15. The Swinging Sixties: We Were There, Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron, (1992). 
If the above work can be read as the excess of femininity expressed through the 
flesh and abandonment in the moment then the photographic work of Canadian artist 
Lyndsay Page96, performed to camera with her (un-named) daughter in Spawn, 
(2007) is at the opposite end of that spectrum and expresses an overwhelming lack. 
There is a visible disconnection or ambivalence between the mother and daughter 
that differs from the sensation apparent in my own games with Matilda. In one of the 
images from Spawn (2007 - ongoing), Page lies in a meadow of long grass, where 
she is concealed, apart from her hand and her arm which appear to be signalling to 
her daughter above the long grass. At the forefront of the image, her daughter crawls 
in search of her mother. There is a suggestion of abandonment, coupled with a 
suggestion that the mother, the child, or both, may be in some sort of peril. This is 
echoed in another image from Spawn (n.d.) in which the baby lies on a bed, 
seemingly blissfully unaware that her mother is under it with only her legs protruding 
out. This last image is a parallel image to one from my own series in the studio with 
Matilda, where my legs protrude from the black drapes, although in my case there is 
an element of seduction rather than distress. Page describes her process as, being 
                                                                 
96 Cited in the introduction to this chapter as one of my contemporaries because of the way she 
collaborates with her daughter in front of the lens. 
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made in response to how she felt emotionally when her daughter was born. She is 
often absent or inert in the images, the inference is that she feels this way as a 
subject. This impression is evidenced in the following quotation from Page, in which 
she describes performing as a mother as a conflicted stance; ‘when my daughter 
was born, I felt overwhelmed by a sense of disappearance, that my self-identity (and 
my identity as an artist) was being eclipsed by this generic label of “Mother.”’ (Page, 
2012). 
 
 
Fig. 16. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012) 
100 
 
 
Fig. 17. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
I was unaware of Lindsay Page’s Spawn (2007 - ongoing) when undertaking similar 
practice, however, I can relate to her feeling that she would disappear. She 
formulated a methodology around the experience of motherhood and the urge to 
resist erasure and invisibility, as did I. Grosz contends that women continue to be 
silenced through the endless metaphorization of femininity, which is evident from 
Plato through to Derrida (Grosz, 1995, p. 124). For Grosz, the maternal body is 
‘made to carry the burden of what it is that men cannot explain [...] what men 
continue to represent as an abyss’ (ibid). Both Page and I have wrested back control 
of representing our motherhood, in our own way (Fig. 17.).  
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2.7 Conclusion 
Thus far, the thesis has been focused on the potential interactions between 
spectators and performers (Chapter One), or watchers and the watched that are 
involved in the mechanics of performance-to-camera. In Chapter Two, I have 
discussed the interactions between mothers and daughters within a fine art context 
as a methodology to develop and sustain feminist representational critique. I have 
juxtaposed this with the collaboration between Cameron and Silver, The Swinging 
Sixties: We Were There (1992), which critiques the aesthetic binary of women as 
matter, or simply as material for artworks in a phallocentric culture. My aim has been 
to examine the effectiveness of performance-to-camera as a strategy for countering 
prevalent myths about femininity when including the frame, combined with maternal 
aesthetics as a discursive strategy. The frame symbolises binary thought, as well as 
internally deconstructing the processes of maintaining the inside and the outside, 
because the frame always makes us think of what is beyond. For Derrida, the frame 
simply works too hard to be credible (Derrida, 1987a).  
 
The maternal is not invoked to claim that it is the essential nature of femininity, rather 
its invocation is to allow the maternal to reverberate around the confined space of 
traditional aesthetics. For it to challenge the supposedly neutral processes of 
aesthetic creation, the ideology needs uncovering through the discomfort of inserting 
the mother within the frame. The maternal realm, as described by Stone (2012), is 
counter to phallocentric logic and actively resists conventional structures. In the 
West, there remains a paradoxical relationship with the maternal, where our culture 
both venerates and performs matricide on the same. 
 
My performances with my daughter are concerned with separation and boundaries, 
and for Stone this is the contested site for feminine subjectivity. In the maternal 
realm, which is supposedly dangerous for the infant, should they stay there too long, 
the mother experiences her past. Through her body-to-body relations with her 
daughter, she returns in the immediacy of their contact to a pre-Oedipal state (Stone, 
2012). Viewed in this way, my performances with my grandmother’s wedding gown, 
and with Matilda, are explorations of this cyclical non-linear time, voyages into 
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another realm that conflicts with phallocentric ideas about disavowing connections 
between women and men and their mothers.  
 
In this chapter, I have described my process and reflected on how working in this 
way refreshes the critical dialogue between women and representation, aesthetics 
and the camera. Working critically in a way that challenges traditional binary 
distinctions of women’s place within art, situating mothers as makers and subjects, 
rather than as voiceless objects, the maternal aesthetic presents a radical gesture 
within fine art process where the inside and the outside of the frame collapse. I have 
combined this with Derrida’s meditations on the nature of the framed space, and our 
pre-assumptions about what is extrinsic and intrinsic to art. 
In the next, and final chapter I will consider maternal aesthetics not only as an artistic 
practice, but also as a process of care, and as an encounter with the subject. I will 
consider Šimić’s notion of ‘givens,’ or working with what you have got, as a taboo-
breaking depiction of a mother’s pragmatism. I will then relate this pragmatism to 
notions of ethics as contingent upon circumstance.   
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Chapter 3: Maternal Space and Acts of Care 
 
 
Fig. 18. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will deploy Jessica Benjamin’s intersubjective developmental 
model 97 , to answer the research question: Can performance-to-camera be a 
relational process that facilitates subjectivity when maternal aesthetics is invoked? I 
will argue that this emphasis on inter-subjective process creates a maternal space 
where performance and art-making can be acts of care. The theme of the maternal 
follows on from the previous chapter where I argued, following Stone’s theorisations 
on the mother-daughter relationship that an insistence on the infant’s separation 
from the mother is a phallocentric myth that is potentially damaging to the conception 
of self. The experience of motherhood offers a regression which inevitably 
challenges this premise. A regression to what Kristeva has described as a pre-
semiotic state and pre-oedipal space. The conception of such a space is useful as it 
provides an alternative to paternalism and its associations, for example, over-
identification with the ego, too fixed a sense of individualism, reliance on binary logic, 
and suppression of the other to sustain itself. Through my performance explorations 
My Studio Performances with Matilda (2011-2012) I have sought to liberate myself 
from the social and cultural expectations of a final break from my daughter, choosing 
instead to follow an intersubjective developmental model as theorised by Jessica 
Benjamin (1990)98.    
 
                                                                 
97 Benjamin proposes this model (1995) as an alternative approach to the person-object theory or 
internalisation theories of psychoanalyst thinkers such as Robert Kegan and Bollas. Kegan theorises 
the mother as a foundational stage in the child’s developing subjectivity, an object that one must cast 
aside for subjectivity to emerge. Kegan illustrates this process with the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha 
who, in Roman poet Ovid’s Metamorphoses Book I (43 B.C. - 17 or 18 A.D), are the only living people 
on earth after the great flood (Kegan, 1982). The Gods exhort them to “throw the bones of your 
mother behind you.” Kegan argues that, similarly to Deucalion and Pyrrha, ‘the infant has survived a 
flood [and] lives in a world without separate others’ (ibid, p.132), and if healthy, he argues, the infant 
will ‘throw the bones of her mother behind her’ (ibid). This conjures up an image of the child 
consuming what it needs of the mother, while dispensing with the remainder. There is no doubt that 
there are both psychological and philosophical complexities at work when the maternal is invoked.  
Bollas, a proponent of object relation theory, states that the ‘primal maternal object’ - in other words, 
the mother - is experienced by the infant as a transformational object (Bollas, 1991, p. 32). In Bollas’s 
words, this ‘object’ (the mother) is identified by the baby/infant ‘through the processes of 
transformation of the self’, and these transformations are a direct result of ‘transformations of the 
infant’s surroundings by the mother’ (Bollas, 1991, p. 37), which are aimed at fulfilling the baby’s 
needs. 
98 Jessica Benjamin is a practicing psychoanalyst based in New York, and has developed feminist 
critique of psychoanalytical theory.  
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This final chapter explores maternal aesthetics as holding the potential to create a 
space that breaks from phallocentrism and creates performance as acts of care that 
diverge from the more duty bound moralistic conceptions, grounded in justice and 
abstraction that are associated with traditional ethics99, instead the care that occurs 
is of a deeper more ontological form as proposed by Heidegger (1973). In essence 
then the maternal performance aesthetic that I discuss here is one that seeks new 
ways to care100. This is expressed in my desire to creatively negotiate my separation 
and proximity and intimacy with my daughter, and it is evident in my interest in 
Šimić’s notion of ‘givens’101.  
 
I have been exploring and challenging boundaries, aesthetic ones, social norm/ roles 
assigned to the mother, in order to develop a unique relationship with my daughter 
that is our own and a unique methodology for my art-making. In a similar way to how 
Laimbauer describes her process (in Chapter Two), I feel the performance and our 
relationship, from at least a process perspective, are, at times, one and the same. I 
think, in essence, this is really what Šimić means when she talks about the 
performance being useful, this statement can easily be reversed and we could talk 
about the baby or child being useful, which naturally may provoke questions about 
ethics. In this context it is not an ethical question, but best understood in a non-
binary way as mother-infant roles are very interchangeable and everything, if we 
abandon the phallocentric myths, is negotiable. The creative processes discussed 
here all stem from the pressing need to care in its broadest metaphysical (rather 
than duty/ chore bound) sense. The mother-artist is immersed in her mothering and 
her art-making and the two things do not detract from each other and are not neatly 
separable and this does not render her position unethical 102 , it strongly 
                                                                 
99 Feminist philosophers Sara Ruddick (1990) and Alison Jaggar (1995) have presented arguments 
that this form of ethics does not relate to those involved in care and empathetic and interdependent 
relationships.    
100 Where care is not to take over or step in for the other or create dependency, but rather care is 
ontologically the very nature of our being. I discuss in due course how Heidegger takes apart the 
Cartesian notion of the mind being separate from the world it inhabits.  
101 I will discuss this in due course in relation to mother-art-making and maternal pragmatism. 
102 On the nature of a mother’s power American based contemporary feminist philosopher Sara 
Ruddick states: ‘to a child, a mother is huge – a judge, trainer, audience, and provider who must be 
placated’ (Ruddick, 1989, p. 34). However, Ruddick continues, the mother often feels powerless 
because ‘she is beholden to the workings of “nature” [...] illness, death [...] added to this unavoidable 
powerlessness is the fact and feeling of social impotence. Many mothers placate the will and serve 
the needs of a father. [...] Contrary to myth, mothers do not work in private. They are always in public’ 
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communicates the nature and form that mother’s lives take and the compromises 
that are made. Sara Ruddick is clear on the mother’s influence on her children, they 
learn a ‘mother-tongue’ (Ruddick, 1989, p. 35) and Ruddick argues mothers decide 
‘what to reveal about their children’ (ibid). The paradoxical nature of a mother’s 
power is confusing for children, who tend in Ruddick’s view to both love and resent it. 
However, as mothers we should be honest in admitting that ‘power is desirable’ (ibid, 
p. 37), Ruddick argues many mothers deny this desire (ibid). The context I have 
outlined above is important because I argue that the maternal aesthetic can create a 
maternal space and this is supported by Ruddick’s view that to mother effectively a 
mother must develop a ‘maternal thinking’ (ibid, p. 37).   
 
 If maternal performance-to-camera is offering something which breaks from the 
frame and collapses or turns inside out aesthetic process, from a western fine art 
perspective, then I argue that this occurs because a maternal space is created. This 
is not a gendered space, but a pre-oedipal one where the other is not repressed or 
clearly demarcated and interactions are facilitated by the camera. I think it is useful 
to consider Martin Heidegger’s argument about the subject and object relationship 
that traditionally the ontology of being has been formed around (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
228). Heidegger introduces Dasein, literally Being-there (Heidegger, 1973, p. 27) to 
distinguish from ontological presuppositions on the nature of being and its more 
traditional Cartesian dichotomy103 where being has been understood in relation to its 
separation from the everyday104  (Heidegger, 1973). Heidegger argues that if we 
insist that knowledge comes from inside (ibid) then the problem of ‘how this knowing 
subject comes out of its inner “sphere” into one which is “other and external”, arises. 
He continues, contending that we are assured we should not conceive of this “inside” 
or inner sphere ‘as a sort of box or a cabinet [or frame]’ (Heidegger, 1973, p. 87) 
because when taking this kind of approach ‘one remains blind [...to knowing as] a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(ibid), as they are constantly judged and assessed and treated condescendingly by healthcare 
professionals, teachers, etc.  
103 That of mind and body being separate, Heidegger favouring instead a conception of full immersion 
in our surroundings where ‘being can be something conceptualised, but it never completely fails to be 
understood’ (Heidegger, 1973, p. 184).   
104  Our being as consciousness, conceptualised here as an immersed form of existence where we are 
fully present and fascinated, as opposed to being able to retreat, a Being-there (Dasein) ‘directs itself 
towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has 
been proximally encapsulated’ (Heidegger, 1973, p. 89).  
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mode of [...] Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1973, p. 88). There is no inside to return 
to with the ‘booty’ (ibid, p. 89) we have grasped, we are ‘even in perceiving, 
retaining, and preserving’ (ibid) on the outside alongside the object but still inside 
simultaneously. When our consciousness is conceptualised in this way divisions 
between inner and outer fall apart and rendered irrelevant.  
 
The forming of MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) was also an un-forming and the 
process flowed in two directions, I was unsure where reality and fiction began and 
ended. We had, Matilda and I entered an ill-defined zone where dark things can 
occur, my frustrations and ambivalence as well as hers and our love were all 
revealed. This love may become excessive and spill over into the realms of taboo 
breaking or uncomfortably controlling, the child may or may not be a willing 
participant and if unaware the child will not have been able to actively consent. The 
mother may be conflicted, caught between the seeming necessity of duty and 
responsibility and her own desires. Love and closeness may come naturally and with 
ease or alternatively can feel like a struggle, the mother is romanticised, worshipped 
but also demonised and extinguished in our culture (Alison Stone, 2012. Ruddick, 
1989).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
3:2 Experiments with Leaving and Returning 
In contrast to the dominant object-relation model contemporary feminist 
psychoanalyst Benjamin (1995) uses an intersubjective model, arguing that 
mothering is a process of mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1995) and this has the effect 
of granting agency to both mother and child. I align my style of mothering and my 
maternal aesthetic (I do not think it is possible to keep the two mutually exclusive) 
more closely with this theory. I, like Benjamin, am critical of object relations theory, 
where ‘the formation of the self is tied to separation’ (Virginia Held, 1995, p. 41), and 
sets up an opposition to ‘the experience of self to the experience of connection with 
others’ (ibid). Not only does the conception of separation oppose individuals to each 
other, but as Benjamin argues, it also sees the child’s interactions as part of this 
process and ‘leaves in the unexamined background the aspects of engagement, 
connection, and active assertion that occur with the mother as other’ (Benjamin, 
1995, p. 31). Benjamin contends that the mother-object conception is ‘infantocentric’ 
(ibid), and misses the pleasure of the evolving relationship with an ‘other’. This is the 
evolution I explore in the work made with my daughter MSP with Matilda (2011-
2012).  
 
Intersubjective theory differs from separation-individuation theories, because it is not 
concerned with how much we can, or do, take from the other (Benjamin, 1990) to be 
able to go away. Rather, intersubjective theory is based on the notion that ‘the other 
plays an active part in the struggle of the individual to creatively discover and 
[crucially] accept reality’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 45). In short, I would contend that an 
analysis of the relationship between mother and child, if accurate, must reflect the 
inherent instability of power relations between the two. Benjamin proposes that the 
theoretical lacuna that surrounds the mother as subject ‘profoundly impedes on our 
ability to perceive the world as comprised of equal subjects’ (ibid). I would continue 
this analysis by arguing that because of the interchangeable nature of the mother-
child subject position, choice and agency are less distinct as a result of this process 
of ‘mutual recognition’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 16, 1992, pp. 45-46). As Benjamin 
asserts, the very moment of self-awareness, in the form of recognising other minds 
and understanding that we can share feelings is also when we learn that our child 
can (and will) disagree with us (Benjamin, 1995, p. 35), and we can disagree with 
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our child. This mutual recognition between a mother and child should be central to 
our conception of subjectivity, because if this process does not occur then the 
subject is left with a warped sense of their relationship with the other and the world. 
The inter-subjective model proposes that the interactions between a parent and a 
child promote recognition coupled with the desire to be recognised (Benjamin, 1992, 
p. 46). The framework of the intersubjective model can help us achieve this mutual 
recognition. Benjamin, like Stone, is critical of the type of separation-individuation 
theory where the maternal being is an object of transformation for the child (Bollas, 
1991). I contend that it is difficult to avoid objectification and objectifying entirely 
when mothering, however, it is the conflict between being an object of desire and 
achieving independent subject-hood which, to a large extent, defines early 
motherhood. Interestingly the subjective struggle for mothers mirrors feminist 
debates about representation and subjectivity and this is this process I interrogate in 
MSP with Matilda (2011 – 2012). Where the need to entertain her is prevalent, it is 
this need that is the initial reason for our game of hide-and-seek and our subsequent 
disruptions of the space. I do not see my role as incidental to her development. I am 
not passive, she does not consume me. I play with my daughter because we are 
becoming better acquainted through our interactions. During the course of this play 
we are able to establish subjectivities that transcend the limitations of a statically 
conceived symbolic mother that exists at the disposal of the infant. However, my 
daughter’s role in this should not be side-lined, through taking an inter-subjective 
approach I accept the nature of the performance as collaboration. I do not direct her, 
I do not tell her what to do, I have no particular aim (at the point of executing the 
performance) just some ideas I want to explore.   
 
The mother’s leaving, dramatised in MSP with Matilda (2011-12) when I disappear in 
the drapes, becomes a focal point in the child’s conception of separate minds and 
others independent aims (Benjamin, 1995). However, in my game the mother leaves 
and returns. In developmental terms, Benjamin explains how: 
[...] beginning when the child is about fourteen months of age, a conflict 
emerges between her grandiose aspirations and the perceived reality of her 
limitations and dependency. Although she is now able to do more, the toddler 
is aware of what she can’t do and what she can’t make mother do – for 
example stay with her (Benjamin, 1995, p. 37). 
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A large part of why Matilda was with me, on the day I had arranged to hire the 
photography studio, was her continued need and desire to be close to me, and 
likewise my need and desire to be close to her, physically manifested in the symbolic 
and actual form of breastmilk. Our subjectivity was fluid and flowed between us; the 
milk both represented and exemplified this connection. To suggest that it was simply 
a case of the artist handling the child as material in a manner akin to Yves Klein’s 
models, would be to disavow the intensity of emotion between the subjects who are 
at times distinct and at times still joined together. In MSP with Matilda (2010-2011), 
where the viewer perceives a game being played, the game is more complex than 
the superficial meaning of a mother’s coercion. Indeed, the game is a negotiation of 
boundaries and presence and absence. Therefore, the nuances of a new 
relationship between a mother and her child, when perceived as developmentally 
inter-subjective, begin to be dynamic and process based. In short, through the 
performance and the photographic space, we begin to emerge as subjects and this 
emergence is profound, and it extends beyond the literal moment of being 
photographed because, it insists on a recognition that exceeds the limitations of 
conceptions of normative gender roles and established maternal representations. 
Through MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) I sought to problematise the standard 
perception of mothering and femininity where the mother is a martyr who, according 
to Kegan’s theory (1982), is to be discarded. The mother emerges in my work, not 
only as a developmental facilitator, but as a subject negotiating her own subjectivity.  
 
Grace Surman in her video performance with her daughter, I Love My Baby and My 
Baby Loves... (2010) experiments with both the physical and the emotional distance 
she puts between herself and her baby. Halfway through the performance, Surman 
hides behind the kitchen counter while her baby encounters and then orally explores 
a pile of flour left out for her by Surman. Initially, I found this image amusing, but it 
then began to disturb me, verging on the distressing, as the baby retched and 
gagged on the flour. I was aware of the proximity of Surman, and I was aware that 
the baby was unsure of the presence of her mother. In another part of the 
performance-to-camera, Surman lies on the floor lifelessly while her baby crawls on 
her and pulls at her face. Surman is aware of the potency of what is occurring and 
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allows it to play out for an uncomfortably long period of time. There is no sense of 
the mother helping her baby, and even though Surman is present, the baby seems 
abandoned. This challenges and upturns the spectator’s notion of the nature of care, 
and begs the question of responsibility and the role of the artist-mother105. 
 
As I continue to watch Surman’s performance-to-camera an alternative narrative 
begins to emerge, one in which I see the mother as enabling the baby to explore and 
experiment in a relatively unmediated and un-directed manner. We are presented 
with a different notion of care, a different maternal subjectivity based on allowing the 
child to experience risk and the sensation of loneliness without assuaging those 
fears. What makes this compelling, if uncomfortable viewing, is how far it is taken, 
coupled with the questions of when or indeed if it constitutes neglect?  The 
underlying air of ambivalence in the work and Surman’s maternal subjectivity is the 
question of how far she will go for her work and how much she is prepared to 
sacrifice the immediate needs of her baby.  
 
In the early 1970s, Cameron was engaged in similar meditations on her subjectivity 
in the light of becoming a mother. Her performance, Rabbits, whilst pregnant with 
twins in 1974, was a means to negotiate both the sexualised representation of 
women through the stereotype of the bunny girl, and the maternal stereotype of 
having been reduced to a ‘breeding machine’ through the inference of rabbits being 
good at breeding or being rapid breeders.  
                                                                 
105 There are many precedents for moral outrage at the seemingly callous, neglectful, unethical and 
controlling actions of mother-artists. American photographer Sally Mann photographed her children 
nude whist remaining resolutely dressed and behind the camera. In the article The Disturbing 
Photography of Sally Mann, New York Post (1992), which purported to be a review of her exhibition 
Immediate Family, Richard Woodward proceeds to describe what sort of ‘mom’ she is, favouring, we 
are told, ‘a subdued a-sexual preppy look’ (Woodward, 1992) in her dress sense. Mann sent her two 
oldest children to psychologist Daniel Shybunko, to ascertain whether they had been emotionally 
damaged or abused by her photographing them, he concluded that they were ‘well-adjusted and self-
assured’ (ibid). At an exhibition of her work at the Milwaukee Art Museum, in 1991, the Rev. Vic 
Eliason demanded the police and D.A. come and investigate the show under indecency laws (ibid). In 
London, during an exhibition at the Saatchi Gallery in 2001, police threatened to seize two of 
photographer Tierney Gearon’s portraits of her children under British indecency laws. Interestingly, in 
her defence, Gearon claimed that her photographs were far less sexualised than Mann’s (Gearon, 
2001). Gearon also made the rather pertinent point that photographer, Richard Billingham, has taken 
images of his family that are far more revealing, but they do not attract the same moral outrage.  
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Fig. 19.  Rabbits, Shirley Cameron, (1974). 
In this performance, a heavily pregnant Cameron had a stove on which to cook and 
other domestic trappings, and was dressed somewhere between a mother rabbit and 
a bunny girl (Fig. 19.). Cameron continued to tour this performance, accompanied by 
her husband and their twin babies. The performance consisted of Cameron caring 
for the bunnies, and reading Peter Rabbit stories in an attempt to civilise them and 
teach them how to be good little bunnies. Cameron described the performance to me 
as ‘part funny, but also sinister as I was a pregnant woman in a cage’ (Cameron, 
2016). The performance lasted all day and after the twins were born they were cared 
for elsewhere by Cameron’s mother-in-law. At this point the twins had not been fully 
integrated into Cameron’s work, however, being separated from them when they 
were a few weeks old in order to perform can still be constituted as an act of 
pragmatism that pained her to some degree.  
 
In another performance Cameron performed Washing the Twins (1977) with 
daughters Lois and Colette, and her friend the feminist novelist, Angela Carter. The 
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performance site was in front of a bronze statue of twins in a park in Portugal. Carter 
washed the bronze twins while Cameron washed her twin daughters. Of course, this 
functions very differently as performance-to-camera than it would have done as live 
art; it speaks to me of the politics of ethics and vulnerability, because the women 
represented are seemingly confined in this role of care even whilst they attempt to 
create something aesthetic. Cameron’s subsequent collaborations with her 
daughters were a direct consequence of her needs as an artist and her desire to 
lead an unconventional lifestyle as a mother, coupled with the seeming impossibility 
of merging these concerns. 
 
Fig. 20. Washing the Twins, Shirley Cameron, Angela Carter, Colette and Lois Cameron, (1977). 
When I spoke to Cameron about this performance she explained that: ‘once we had 
washed them, she (Carter) dressed the sculptures and I dressed the twins. It did 
cause a little rumpus with the nearby art gallery who thought it was a bit disrespectful 
of their sculptures – which it was’ (Cameron, 2016). As a viewer of these images, 
and as a mother of young daughters, the level of exposure to which the twins are 
subject here is challenging; the portrayal of intimate detail is not merely portrayal 
because they are nude, and they are being washed publicly. It is interesting that, 
compared to Mann’s or Gearon’s work in the 1990s and early 2000s, the controversy 
recalled by Cameron is centred on her and Carter’s treatment of the sculpture, rather 
than their treatment of the twins, thus exposing perceptions of value and worth and 
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what is perceived to be in need of care, and furthermore, how such care should be 
administered and how this perception has changed over time. I suggested to 
Cameron that today the controversy would be more likely to centre on the mother’s 
treatment of her children, because of the public enactment of what is ostensibly a 
private moment and because of the questions the work begs with regard to the 
mother’s relationship to her children. The challenge presented by this type of 
practice to a more detached conception of aesthetic process, where objects are 
moulded or placed, is key to understanding the radical nature of maternal aesthetics. 
Maternal practice is often realised from total immersion in the moment and through 
the relational. A strong sense of immediacy resonates in this work, where the twins 
and Carter collaborate in Cameron’s pressing need to produce art, however 
momentary. I argue that this work of Cameron’s is a fine example of the feminist 
concern to elevate or aestheticise the act of care.  
 
Fig. 21. Washing the Twins, Shirley Cameron, Colette and Lois Cameron, (1977). 
It is worth stressing that when I questioned Cameron on the ethical nature of 
washing the twins and performing this intimate moment publicly (Fig. 20. and Fig. 
21.), she was rather nonplussed. My understanding was that ethics had not been her 
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concern106 and that what is being addressed is that encounter of aesthetics with the 
everyday in a context that, arguably, suffers from moral exclusion. By this I mean 
that, in her desperation to be creatively productive, a mother may feel like she has 
prior claim both to her child’s expressive nature and, literally, to their body. For 
Cameron, this performance was very much concerned with the tension between high 
art and aesthetic process, and the everyday nature that caring for her twins was 
often perceived as whilst also maintaining a presence as an artist. The maternal 
aesthetic challenges the very notion of what form care and responsibility take on the 
part of the mother because it presents situations that reveal the pragmatic and 
ambivalent sides to care as well as reminding us of its deeper metaphysical 
dimensions. The role of the artist mother, presents a new paradigm of care between 
mother and child that is grounded in process and interaction and ontology 107 
expressed in the development or subjectivity and the physicality of the relationship.  
 
I have been discussing Surman and Cameron’s work as practises that embody risk, 
ambivalence, emotional distance or pragmatism, and aesthetics. These artists push 
against the expectation that a mother must care in a certain way, and what 
constitutes that care, and how expectations, myths and everyday realities influence 
an artist’s process. For Cameron108 the performances were devised as responses to 
the dual concerns of the situation in which they found themselves, namely what was 
available in situ and the need to care for the babies, and in this way the maternal 
performance is both useful and honest.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
106 This draws parallels with Hirsch’s argument with regard to Mann’s work discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
107 For Heidegger care is the ontological basis of our existence, he argues that ‘care emerges in 
connection with the familiar way of taking a man as compounded of body (earth) and spirit [...] in care 
this entity has the “source” of its Being [...] the entity is not released from this source but is held fast, 
dominated by it through and through as long as this entity “is in the world” (Heidegger, 1973, p. 243). 
In short, care holds us fast to our bodies which are the basis of our existence in the world.  
108 See Appendix Oral history recording with Shirley Cameron. 
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3:3 ‘Givens’109 
In this section I examine this concept of ‘givens’ and discuss the work of Cameron 
and Šimić who both merge their motherly duties with their artistic duties. This is a 
prevalent theme for those who work in maternal aesthetics, and has prompted Hirsch 
to declare that ‘the social pressures placed on mothers who want to be artists is 
exposed in such practices’ (Hirsch, 1997, p. 154). However, the concept of ‘givens’ is 
problematical in that, on the surface, it appears to propose a certain degree of 
dispassionate and strategic thinking about one’s child. Traditional male-centric ethics 
would uphold the moralistic and the universal perspective that, as mothers, we are 
culturally primed to maintain the narrative of care which places the child’s needs first 
(Jaggar, 1992). Should a mother who is an artist, include her child in the frame? I 
maintain, based on what I have learnt and experienced through performing with my 
daughter, that what is at stake in mother art-making and maternal aesthetics is the 
enmeshing of subjectivity and practice, where maternal processes and aesthetics 
are not separate from the actuality of mothering, and where something more 
profound occurs than simply representation. My subjective and immersed position in 
the material and subject matter of mothering presents me with not only a different 
aesthetic approach, but also with a non-Cartesian way of being, and it also presents 
me, as an artist who is also a mother who collaborates with her children, with 
different moral obligations. However, my role as mother does not grant me exclusive 
rights to treat and depict my children as I see fit, or as props in my representations. 
MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) dramatises both the ‘basic tension between denial 
and affirmation of the other’ (Benjamin, 1995, p. 39) and they offer a solution in the 
form of the potential to establish a shared reality (ibid). For the reasons stated 
above, to perform with one’s daughter cannot simply be dismissed as exploitative 
(although it may be), since the sense of pragmatism and ambivalence that often 
inspires work of this nature is due, in part, to the continued underlying skewed 
picture presented in certain theoretical models, such as Kegan’s, where the mother 
is passive, or the child is passive.   
 
                                                                 
109 This was something discussed at a LADA Study Room in Exile event in 2016, which was hosted by 
Šimić and Emily Underwood-Lee at The Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at Home. 
Subsequently, there has been a live art and the maternal archive created, which is held at the Live Art 
Development Agency. My performance-to-camera MNWG (2010) is now held as part of this collection.  
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Fig. 22. Lena Šimić, Sid Jonah Anderson. (2008). 
Jaggar proposes a feminist ethics of care, where the basis of ethical decision making 
is placed more in ‘relationships, responsibilities, particularity, and partiality’ (Jaggar, 
1992, pp. 363-364). The significance here is that the aesthetics proposed by her 
work are entirely relational, and the spectator is tasked with involvement, even if 
simply on an emotional level, and there is no attempt to distinguish clearly between 
art and life because the process is grounded in specific relationships and daily 
responsibilities. 
Writing on Šimić, Imogen Tyler explains the process thus: 
[...] Sid Jonah Anderson by Lena Šimić was staged in March 2008 as a part of 
MAP Live event at Source Café in Carlisle. It was composed of a live art 
performance in which Šimić went through Sid’s bedtime routine. As Šimić 
notes: The live action on stage consisted of performing the daily routine with 
Sid: bathing, dressing, feeding, laying down to sleep. This very banal 
everyday action was heightened through its staging. My movements on stage 
were quite sharp, neat and timed. Props were arranged and the performance 
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space was highly organized. Additionally, the action was complemented by 
audio-visual footage: extracts from my diary and photographs from my walks 
in the park (Tyler, n.d.). 
 
Recently, whilst hosting the Motherhood and Live Art (2016) event, Šimić described 
this performance as ‘useful’, because Sid needed putting to bed, so why not include 
it in the performance? In this work and the accompanying piece, together titled 
Maternal Matters (2007-2008), Sid features in live performance or performance-to-
camera with his mother so that she can continue to ‘get on with her life as an artist 
and a mother’ (ibid). It is easy to be moralistic about the pragmatism in her attitude 
and the apparent placement of her baby as a ‘prop’ in her work. However, I would 
argue that it is not the mother’s intention to objectify her child, because women, like 
myself and Šimić, are concerned to represent what Hirsch terms the ‘interconnected 
plots of mothers and children’ (Hirsch, 1997, pp. 175-176). Šimić’s performance has 
parallels with the work of Polish duo KwieKulik (1972-1974) who created a series of 
‘actions with their baby son’ (Angela Harutyunyan et al, 2012, pp. 225-226). 
Harutyunyan et al (2012) further connect these activities with a reaction to the wider 
loss of privacy in Eastern Europe at the time (ibid). KwieKulik created over 900 
images, titled Activities with Dobromierz (1972-1974), where their baby was 
surrounded with different objects, one of which featured knives and forks, while 
another included blocks of ice110. Over time Šimić’s maternal practice has evolved 
and has been responsive to the different ages of her children and their differing 
needs and desires, in addition to her own.   
In my own initial performances-to-camera made with my daughter, where attempts 
were made to de-fuse the camera’s authority as a witness by working with it in 
performance as something that can be ignored, or can simply be utilised as an 
instrument to depict time spent together, or as something excessively present. My 
aim was to disappear from the camera’s view to question its authority as a signifier 
and a tool enabling visibility. This is critically the case in Cameron’s 1977 
performance A Cage, Enmeshed (1974) 111 , and Washing the Twins (1977), all 
                                                                 
110 Twin Gabriel, is another example of an Eastern European family performance ensemble.  
111 The cage motif appears in other performances of the time and continues in work to the present 
day, Elia Arce performed an installation which involved her hunched figure inside a birdcage, attached 
with a label that read “feed me” In, I have so Many Stitches that Sometime I Dream that I’m Sick 
(1993). Meiling Cheng described this as feminist excess (Cheng, 2002, p. 137). Bonnie Ora Sherk 
also performed Public Lunch (1971) in which she was in a cage next door to a caged tiger. It is clear 
119 
 
performed with her twin daughters. Here, the camera attempts to be factual and is an 
aside to the main drama, which occurs in the here-and-now, and in the present. It is 
remarkable to reflect on the absence of digital devices and cameras, and how the 
spectators who crowd around the cage containing Cameron and her daughters are 
doing just that - spectating without recording. The camera’s role is strange, being 
somehow out of place and not of central importance. What is pertinent to me, 
enabling me to contextualise my own maternal explorations through the historic 
example of Cameron’s practice, is her negotiation of ethical boundaries and also her 
communication of a sense of entrapment or confinement in her role as mother. In my 
performance-to-camera aesthetics, the frame and maternal expectation are all 
boundaries to transgress. Over time I have come to realise that these experiments 
with my daughter, in front of the camera, were more than simply resistance to 
phallocentric representation, because the camera granted a relational space in which 
we could develop our subjectivities. Alison Stone argues that the model of ‘potential 
space’ (Stone, 2012, p. 68) can help us develop the idea of a mother who is not 
‘mere background to her child’s speech and imaginings’ (ibid). Stone is proposing a 
mother who ‘co-speaks and co-imagines’ (ibid, p. 68) with her child, where the 
potential space is an opening that enables ‘two where one had been’ (ibid). In this 
case I argue that the camera allows that to happen and is the facilitator that enables 
a relational space to occur, thereby maternal performance does hold the potential to 
overturn myths about the mother and overturn or up-end the mutual powerlessness 
experienced by mother and child. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
that all these works are making ironic observations about the animal or ‘natural’ emphasis placed on 
the feminine as well as fetishism of women.  
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3:4 Acts of Care 
In the practices I have discussed it is not simply the emotional and practical basis in 
which mothering occurs and what our subjectivity means when we become mothers 
and how this furthers debates on the terms through which we are visible, with which I 
am concerned. I am also interrogating the perception of care and its gendered 
character in our culture, as well as its superficial associations with dependence, 
submission or weakness.  
From the late 1960s through to the 1980s, feminist artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles 
created her Maintenance Art Works (1969-1980), and her Manifesto for Maintenance 
Art (1969). In the manifesto, Ukeles declares that she will no longer separate art 
from her other roles - as mother, as wife - nor from her chores. In her maintenance 
art proposal for an exhibition titled ‘Care’, Ukeles explained how she would: 
Simply do these maintenance everyday things, and flush them up to 
consciousness, exhibit them, as Art. I will live in the museum and [do what] I 
customarily do at home with my husband and my baby, for the duration of the 
exhibition. [...] MY WORKING WILL BE THE WORK’ (Ukeles, 1969). 
 
Ukeles attempts to elevate the importance of tasks often consigned to the menial or 
described as women’s work through aestheticizing and also politicising them 
appropriating the form of the manifesto, used by artists and activists alike, in order to 
do so. In this way she stakes a claim for her process being inseparable to her daily 
routines and the physical experience of her existence, as well as her social context.  
Exposing the hidden work of women through such representations, and raising the 
importance of care as a meaningful and aesthetically beautiful activity, has been an 
important driving force behind women’s performance with their children, of which 
Mary Kelly’s practice is another pertinent example. Andrea Liss argues that Kelly’s 
‘labour-and-time-intensive project meticulously establishes that the mother is 
anything but passive in the infant and young child’s development’ (Liss, 2011, p. 77) 
an argument that resonates with Benjamin’s claims as well as my own on the 
potential the maternal space created through artistic interventions and inventiveness 
holds for mothers and children alike.  
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I am expanding this conception of care beyond the nature of it being unpaid and 
often designated as women’s work, and the feminist project to elevate its status in 
our culture. Taking Heidegger’s theorising on the nature of ‘taking care’ as 
constitutive of, in ontological terms, being-there (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 235-244), it is 
clear that the turn towards the maternal as an aesthetic is not solely focused on 
raising concerns with regard to who performs acts of care; it is also a means of 
configuring subjectivity beyond passivity. Although care, if confined to the feminine, 
becomes oppressive, it is inherently a means of encountering the world which holds 
incredible meaning, philosophically, for how subjectivity is developed and 
maintained. This is evidenced in Heidegger’s writing where care is carefulness and 
devotedness (ibid, p. 243) and care is intrinsically linked to our apprehension of the 
other, evident in the phrases “to care about” or “care for” and in the act of 
solicitude112. 
 
For Benjamin, theorising from the Hegelian master-slave dialectic (Georg Hegel, 
1979), the term mutual recognition provides a model of interaction that is not based 
on domination and requires acceptance of the nature of our dependency on others 
and ‘domination begins with the attempt to deny’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 52) this 
dependency. Benjamin argues that the balance of self (ibid, p. 53) in Hegel’s theory 
of recognition is reliant on the self to have ‘the opportunity to act and have an effect 
on the other’ (ibid). The self, to exist for itself must also exist for another, and ‘there 
is no way out of this dependency’ (ibid) therefore we must care for each other to 
maintain independent existences. Benjamin continues ‘if the other denies me 
recognition, my acts have no meaning, I can only submit’, and it is when this 
happens that domination occurs and our ‘desire and agency can find no outlet, 
except in the form of obedience’ (ibid). Therefore, true independence is the balance 
of asserting oneself whilst recognising the other, something which, Benjamin argues, 
both Freud and Hegel seem to equate dependency as being the same as surrender 
(Benjamin, 1990) and this is where the urge for mastery over the other springs from. 
In this instance Benjamin’s insistence on mutual recognition within the mother-child 
                                                                 
112 Heidegger argues that there are two distinct forms of solicitude, there is the first type which is 
disempowering for the Other and takes over and dominates them, and the other form does not so 
much ‘leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him [...] not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to 
give it back to him authentically’ (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 158-159)  
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relationship requires Heidegger’s separation of the two forms of solicitude (see 
footnote 16). I am discussing the possibility to appreciate the other, in this case my 
daughter, as a being in her own right (ibid). To do this, I have been at pains to 
dismantle the stereotypical mother who belongs to the child and who is an extension 
of the child’s will, and the stereotypical mother who is all-powerful (ibid). I have used 
the theoretical tools provided by Alison Stone and Jessica Benjamin to challenge this 
conception, they both argue for more autonomy and fluidity in the mother-child 
relationship (Stone, 2012. Benjamin, 1990) and I have extended my analysis to 
incorporate Heidegger’s theory of being-there as grounded in care which holds us to 
our bodies (Heidegger, 1973) because there is no inner Cartesian sphere which we 
can escape to. 
 
The idea that the mother has sacrificed herself has a profound effect on her 
daughter, for whom the mother ‘is not only an object of love but a mainstay of 
identity’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 79), and for Benjamin the association of masochism and 
femininity stems from this identification. Benjamin argues that ‘femininity and 
motherhood have been tainted with submission, self-abnegation, and helplessness’ 
(ibid, p. 80). The sense of abnegation and helplessness that I felt on becoming a 
mother stems from the perception of mothering that is grounded in object relations 
theory, because it not only denies the mother’s subjectivity it also problematises girls’ 
continued connections with their mothers (Held, 1995, p. 41) and ‘sustains a series 
of oppositions that have been central in Western thought and moral theory’ (ibid). 
Carol Gilligan113 argues that these antagonisms are ‘the opposition between thought 
and feelings, self and relationship, reason and compassion, justice and love. Object 
relations theory also continues the conventional division of psychological labour 
between women and men’ (ibid). 
 
In fact, care is the act of mutual recognition between others which grants agency to 
each subject involved in the exchange. It is through the act of care and its reciprocal 
nature that we learn intersubjective processes, such as how ‘to move and affect one 
another’ (Held, 1995, p. 40). Feminist ethicist, Gilligan argues that there has been a 
                                                                 
113 A contemporary feminist philosopher on ethics. 
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tendency, in philosophy, psychoanalytic theory and psychology to ‘associate care 
with self-sacrifice’ (ibid, p. 41), a view which is at odds with the currently held belief 
that ‘care’ is a ‘coherent moral perspective’ (ibid) that can be applied to establish or 
retain a sense of justice. Care, as a moral framework operating independently 
outside of a justice framework, is based in the intersubjective where the ‘self is 
responsive and, therefore as arising in relationship’ (ibid, p. 36), and this is very 
different morally to the conception that all actions emanate from the self. This is also 
very different to how the notion of care operates within ‘a justice construction’ (ibid) 
where ‘care becomes the mercy that tempers justice’ (ibid), or shows forgiveness, or 
is less exacting. To summarise then, care is, in a Heideggerian sense, a being-with 
the Other and is a manifestation of being-there which constitutes the essence of our 
existence because care ties us to the physical world through our bodies and their 
actions and experiences (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 242-243). The maternal space I 
describe in the section below manifests out of the commitment to mutual recognition 
(Benjamin, 1990) accomplished through acts of care, in conjunction with the broader 
and deeper meanings of this term such as devotedness and attentiveness 
(Heidegger, 1973) and then relating these acts of care back to Ruddick’s maternal 
thinking (1989) in order to create a maternal aesthetic that is defined as a new space 
that is not framed in a traditional aesthetic sense as truly separate to the everyday 
normative conceptions of the mothers role and subjectivity.   
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3:5 The Maternal Gaze 
 Both performance and the maternal share ground and inter-relatedness in their 
reliance on presence, care in its metaphysical sense, as discussed above, and their 
associations with lack and an element of excess. Similar to Mann, Šimić and 
Cameron, I have used the proximal to the point of invasion, and been obsessive in 
the quantity of images I have produced. For example, my studio performances each 
comprise 365 images, making a total of approximately one thousand images of 
myself with my daughter during this period of time. Equally, representing this process 
could be viewed as overly sentimental to the point of transgression, as is the case for 
artist Eti Wade in her performance-to-camera Kisses (2001), where she repeatedly 
kisses her son’s naked torso. In all instances of mother-art-making there is the 
potential to perceive or understand that ambivalence, invasion, excess, even lack, as 
part of the act of mothering and, likewise, as part of performance. Even putting to 
one side the ethical implications of including one’s children, there are often difficult 
choices to make when leaving an infant for work. In Tracey Kershaw’s work, What I 
Found in My Son’s Pockets (2016), she displays a collection of the items saved from 
her son’s pockets over a ten-year period. In Kershaw’s maternal aesthetics, hoarding 
encapsulates her sense of sadness at the impending and inevitable separation from 
her son114. However, this piece (which Kershaw discusses in the oral history 
recordings in the Appendix), although inextricably tied up with her deep feelings for 
her son, communicates an image of a controlling mother prying into her child’s inner 
world, albeit that this is a somewhat superficial reading.  
 
My daughter’s presence in my performances during this time, MSP Matilda (2011-
12), which I have been arguing was in her capacity as an extension of the mother’s 
subjectivity in the first instance, and then in our subsequent negotiations of 
separation and establishment of identity, may do little to reassure those concerned 
for the child’s lack of agency. The ethical dimension of my process is derived from 
our relationship to each other and the restrictions placed on me as practically sole 
carer to an infant, as a subject who did not want to give in to the impulse to self-
                                                                 
114 As part of The Mother as Artist, The Artist as Mother. Curators Tracey Kershaw and Sam Rose, 
Lace Market Gallery, Nottingham (2016).  
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abnegate and choose instead to retain an independent set of ideas and desires, and 
to represent these needs through performance-to-camera. Most importantly, this 
process was joyous and restorative; it made my relationship with my daughter 
stronger. I would argue that lack, or loss of agency through submission, does not 
occur when we are engaged in games that seek the other. Mother and child must 
together emerge from the subterranean space where normative modes of 
subjectivity ceased or were, at least, suspended for a time.  
 
In defence of Mann’s practice, Hirsch argues that it is not simply intention that alters 
our understanding of the complexities of the ethical questions posed by the work. 
There is also the matter of context (Hirsch, 1997), and this type of work changes the 
ethical position because the artist has a clear feminist agenda, and has set 
boundaries for herself, and has spoken to her children about what is permissible and 
what is not. The first point about context is entering into the territory of what is called 
virtue ethics, as theorised by Plato (Rosalind Hursthouse, 2016), which is not how I 
would personally choose to justify my practice. However, the second point, which 
concerns Mann’s verbal arrangements with her children on what images she can 
create, is clearly an ethical standpoint where consent is not assumed but active. 
Mann describes the process thus:  
All three children exercised veto power over certain images: Virginia didn't 
want people to see her urinating; Emmett objected to a pose in which he had 
socks on his hands. "You know what they're really worried about?" asks Mann 
incredulously. "They don't want to look like dorks. They don't want to be geeks 
or dweebs. Nudity doesn't bother them." (Woodward, 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, the notion of the children’s adaptation to their mother’s artistic process 
and how that infiltrates into their upbringing and outlook is extremely interesting in 
the context of the maternal aesthetics in which I have situated my own practice. I am 
not sure that the children’s role in the work is solely an issue concerned with ethics, 
since I would argue that it is a feminist issue, because the mother is making art 
which gives (or should give) immense value to the process she is undertaking with 
her children. This is problematic when faced with a very narrowly defined conception 
of the caring role and the moral dimension of this role. Joan C. Tronto, a professor of 
political science, argues that the moral judgements we make about a mother centres 
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on her failure to ‘meet her duty of care’ (Tronto, 1989, p. 104). She also argues that 
these type of judgements are deeply rooted in ‘social, classist, and cultural 
assumptions about mothers’ duties’ (ibid). Crucial to Tronto’s argument about this 
‘duty’ is that the role has been assigned from outside and, therefore, moral 
judgements that have been made about children’s roles in their mother’s art practice, 
for example in the cases of Mann and Gearon, can be read as a reflex to capitulate 
back to the normative standard of caregiving, making this methodology a radical act. 
A woman taking control of her own representation, and by extension enabling her 
child to do the same, and weaving that process into her duty of care, upsets not only 
regulated versions of feminine subjectivity but also the normative care duties (some 
essential, as will be illustrated below, and some culturally programmed) that have 
been pre-assigned for the mother to perform.  
 
My artistic decisions and my treatment of Matilda stem from the necessity of moving 
beyond the functionality of nurture and hygiene, because I am, after all, a creature 
with complex needs and desires above the base instincts, and I am eager to impart 
this to my daughter. I continue to be attentive to her and the particularities of me 
caring for her, which centre on my knowledge of her and the life we lead together. 
On the occasion of the first MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), I had arranged studio 
time for the cameraman (Alan Duncan) to assist me in what I had conceived of as an 
exploration of the frame as a phenomenological performance. I intended to perform 
on the boundaries of the image as an intervention on the underlying ideological 
nature of the aesthetic frame as a separation between inside and outside. However, 
on the morning in question, when I arrived at the photography studio, Matilda would 
not settle and fall asleep in her pushchair as I had hoped, and my attempts to 
entertain her and simultaneously undertake my performance inevitably merged and 
intertwined and resulted in her inclusion. My attention was repeatedly pulled back 
towards her as she was determined to pursue danger in the form of electricity 
cables. My playing with her was intended to keep her happy and out of harm’s way 
while I made some art. To discuss this in terms of is theoretically stilted and in this 
context irrelevant. When I use the term natural, in reference to the inclusion of 
Matilda within this thesis and my practice, it simply felt right instinctively as her need 
was to be with me. The work, therefore, is pragmatic; a combination of necessity, 
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care as devotedness and attentiveness and also an element of duty or responsibility, 
and the place where my own desires and wishes as an artist intersect with my role 
as a mother and my daughter’s own role and wishes. This process, particularly as a 
first-time mother, was often the site of mental conflict and guilt on my part, such as 
berating myself for being excessive or thinking that Matilda is perhaps too attached 
to me. However, as can be witnessed in the images taken, the consequent juggling 
and compromising, as well as the internal struggles with duty as an imposed external 
framework and the instinctive acts of care that I now realise were inter-subjective, 
the maternal aesthetic is at work. This was a space where care became creative and 
playful, and thereby, freedom, the involvement and representation of love and 
pleasure, as well as desperation, lack of control and exploitation, were all allowed 
some time and exploration.  
 
The process I describe above, although aesthetic, stems from the wider process of 
mothering and its practice, described by feminist philosopher Ruddick in the 1980s 
as ‘maternal thinking’ (1989), namely the development of critical self-appraisal that 
we undertake when reflecting on our interactions with our children (Ruddick, 1990). 
In this work, I am representing and questioning what sort of mother I am, rather than 
seeking to expose Matilda. My daughter’s self-awareness increased as we 
progressed through the sequences of performance-to-camera between her first and 
second birthdays, and this was both challenging to the process, because that sense 
of blissful unawareness was so beautiful in the initial sequence, and it also prompted 
reflection on the nature of consent. The only way to ascertain if this work is 
psychologically damaging for children, or renders them powerless, was through the 
first-hand research with other mother-artists, undertaken as part of this thesis. The 
aim was to examine their intentions and also the processes whereby they involved 
their children. Having worked directly in performance with children and having 
encountered the practices and met with other mother artists115, I am able to assert 
                                                                 
115 Perambulator, Clare Qualmann (2014); And She Watched, Deej Fabyc (2003); 
Maintain, manu tenere: hold in the hand, Emily Orley and Katja Hilevaara (2015); Patience, Emily 
Underwood-Lee (2009/2010); Breastcups, Eve Dent and Zoë Gingell (2011), I Love My Baby and My 
Baby Loves … ,Grace Surman (2010); Things Stack Up, Grace Surman (2015); Mother Stories, Helen 
Sargeant (2015), Your Grandmother’s Middle Name was Rose, Jennifer Verson (2014); 
Medea/Mothers’ Clothes, Lena Šimić (2004); Contemplation Time (including Sid Jonah Anderson by 
Lena Šimić live art event), Lena Šimić (2007/2008); Maternity Leaves, Lizzie Philps (2013); The 
Pilgrimage of the Prodigal Daughter, Lizzie Philps (2014); 31 Days Old, Sarah Black, Jane and Lynne 
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that a major part of mother–child performance is the re-establishment of boundaries 
and, crucially, the negotiation of separation. The nature of how power and control 
play out within these aesthetic interactions sheds light on the taboo nature of our 
mothers’ invasions and colonisations of our own bodies when we were infants or 
children. The perspective I offer is an articulation of both sides of this interplay 
between subjects. This includes the memory of a mother’s excesses, the absences 
and the disappearances, in addition to the awful wrench experienced when the infant 
is left, or leaves, perhaps by crawling away. In the midst of this my position is that I 
still maintain the right and the desire to represent and negotiate my subjectivity. 
 
 
Fig. 23. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) (Fig. 23.) was an improvised performance that 
emerged from the necessity of care and the role of attentiveness in this process, and 
our mutual desire to be together, coupled with my personal desire to make some art. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(2016); 20 Minutes, Tracy Evans (2012), Caesura, Tracy Evans (2013), Rehearsal for a Birth Story, 
Tracy Evans (2015); Cradle, Zoë Gingell (2012).   
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We disappear behind the drapes, sometimes together, and sometimes apart (Fig. 
23.). Matilda is alone, I am alone, and then we listen out for each other and watch 
the movements of the drapes. In these images, the drapes are the backdrop to our 
drama of separation, and they represent the outer limits of the frame, the void, a 
black-spot. The suggestion of a reverse side to the image, symbolised by our going 
behind the drapes, conjures up Irigaray’s concave mirror and this forms a literal and 
figurative backdrop to the images we are creating together. I use the term ‘together’ 
because we are engaged in this performance together, in a process of 
intersubjective becoming. The process of separation, although negotiated here 
playfully, may present the mother with conflict especially where the child’s demands 
can become threatening to her sense of autonomy. In MSP with Matilda (2011-
2012), the child will not be, or is no longer, the mother’s object (Benjamin, 1995). 
This tension between ‘asserting one’s own reality and accepting the others’’ (ibid, p. 
38) is deeply felt in these performances. I was frequently not in control of what 
happened to me, often in thrall to my child, or at a loss as to what to do with her and 
her irrepressible energy and desires and this is mirrored in the performances that I 
was also not fully in control of. 
This ambiguity between self and other is what shifts the power balance in my 
performances with Matilda, and thereby it presents an explanation of the ethical 
nature of the process. In essence, the play that occurs in the photography studio is a 
series of transitional moments, where separations, developing subjectivities and 
subject-hood are negotiated and established. If this did not occur, if there were no 
transition or change between the series of images taken over the course of a two 
year period between her first and third birthdays, then the ethics would be very 
different, as this would simply be something maternally narcissistic in nature. 
Transformation between the status of the mother and child is not only evident in my 
own practice. In fact, Cameron describes early performances with her daughters 
where her main focus was on their needs and the changes that took place as they 
got older (Cameron, A Cage and Enmeshed 1972 - onwards).  
 
Over the years, on occasion, Cameron’s twins would go off with a babysitter, 
sometimes they would take a full part in the work. Nevertheless, on some level, 
working directly with young children does require an awareness of the moral 
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dilemma of never having obtained their full consent. Therefore, there is the 
inescapable problem of presenting self-portraiture, live art practices with children, 
and maternal aesthetics as resistant to dominant representational forms, while 
simultaneously relying on the potential objectification of the child to achieve the 
required result. This exposes the configuration of women and children’s subjectivity 
and agency within wider culture and theorisation. In this context, the maternal within 
performance is a means of conceiving of a space between subject-hood and object-
hood. I argue that it is both the mother and the child that occupy this indeterminate 
space, although this can encompass all subjects. It is clear that the element of play 
involved in MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) may, as a process, conjure up for the 
viewer visions of collusion and coercion, but this is a judgement that originates from 
the patriarchal moral framework I have already discussed, and this is not the stance I 
make in response to this work, as I argue that the benefits far outweigh any ethical 
dilemma. 
 
The maternal informs the nature of this continued exploration between subjects. 
Experience and behaviours observed and encountered while mothering lend an 
atmosphere of childlike irreverence to the performances. These include being 
inattentive, playful, taking on the role of the outsider, transgressing physical 
boundaries, the use of senses other than sight, such as sound or smell, and an 
intersubjective or permeable approach with the spectator. Benjamin argues that ‘we 
must reject the assumptions underlying the psychoanalytic early gender 
development. These are: that mothers cannot offer their daughters what fathers offer 
their sons, the figure of separation and agency’ (Benjamin, 1990, p. 112). Benjamin 
continues in this vein, stating how she believes that ‘given substantial alterations in 
gender expectations and parenting, both parents can be figures of separation and 
attachment for their children’ (ibid). A strong factor within maternal aesthetics is both 
how to negotiate and renegotiate separations and also how to represent them, and 
the radical nature of representing this process should not be downplayed. The 
games depicted in my performances to camera remain radical, because of the 
continued difficulty in transcending outdated gender and parenting models. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
When I created MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), what fascinated me, in particular, 
was Matilda’s complete absorption in me and her surroundings and her inattention 
to, and lack of awareness of, herself and the camera. In this context, the camera was 
very imposing as it was a tripod-mounted device and the cameraman was a figure 
lurking in the shadows. When Matilda began to look at the operator I ceased making 
these works with her. There were other factors involved, such as having to complete 
risk assessments that meant having to describe in advance what I thought would 
occur, which detracted from the initial spontaneity I had felt. Later, I would come to 
realise that we had performed her discovery of self-awareness, and the development 
of an intersubjective relationship between us. The beneficial role-playing that 
occurred in MSP with Matilda (2011-2012), is in part what Benjamin describes as the 
type which provides an environment where the child can imaginatively entertain both 
roles of ‘leaving and being left’, and in this way begins to transcend the 
complementary mother-daughter relationship (Benjamin,1995, p. 43). In other words, 
in these performances we do not witness a child’s oppression, but rather through the 
form of play and performance, a child’s becoming. In the light of the fact that the 
beginnings of subjectivity were fostered in this photographic performance space, and 
through the play a new found intersubjective dimension emerges in the relationship 
between myself and Matilda that continues to develop, dismissing the work on 
ethical grounds – coercion through play perhaps, or the child’s assumed lack of 
agency - is erroneous and disavows the radical nature of this gesture. There is 
another dimension to this which further radicalises the gesture, which is that my 
subjectivity can be seen to re-emerge. As Benjamin argues ‘it is this blindness, the 
inability to symbolically represent that first relation and the separation from it that 
makes of woman a dangerous hole into which the individual may disappear’ (ibid, p. 
85). 
    
Inverting this idea and revealing some part of this process of separation, as occurs in 
MSP with Matilda (2011-12), is a powerful gesture. A mother who can play with her 
child, a mother who is actively mothering, shows her daughters that ‘girls (later to be 
women) [can] learn “that they do not have to grow up to be motionless mothers”’ 
(Benjamin, 1995, p. 111). Of course, the nuance here is that an active depiction of a 
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woman is a radical idea since the patriarchal norm is passivity. Benjamin comments 
that the difficulty that this presents for ‘feminist consciousness is to imagine how a 
woman, as daughter or mother, can transform the space of inevitable separation and 
loss into a space of creation and play’ (ibid), which I maintain is precisely the 
concern I am encountering whilst making this work. Emphasising play, and the 
process of emerging subjectivity, alters any assumption that the child’s lack of 
awareness renders them without agency, because what we observe in the process 
of play and care which embody intersubjectivity very instigation of that capacity.  
 
 
 
Fig. 24. Signs/Sights, Shirley Cameron with daughter Colette, (1995). 
The practice I have discussed, which includes my daughter in my performance and, 
similarly, Cameron’s twin daughters who are included in her performance works, as 
well as Surman’s performance-to-camera provoke questions about the lack of 
agency of the infants/ children and can be perceived as troubling. However, I would 
reiterate that it is exactly this examination of agency which is the crux of this critique 
as an exploration of women’s representational power and subjectivity, explored 
through normative and radical connections to maternal symbolism and acts of care. 
In making the link, between myself, Šimić and Cameron as sharing a maternal 
aesthetic in our performing with our children, I make an original contribution to 
knowledge because there exists only a minimal amount of study into women’s 
performance with their daughters, and Cameron’s work has never been analysed in 
this way.  
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Fig. 25. Service. Shirley Cameron & Roland Miller and daughters Colette & Lois, (1987). 
 
Fig. 26. Enmeshed. Shirley Cameron and Roland Miller with daughters Colette & Lois, (1974). 
Both mine and Cameron’s practices, with our daughters (Fig. 25. 26. 27), challenge 
phallocentric objectification through the insertion of the maternal in aesthetics. In the 
practice I have submitted, I have used performance-to-camera as a means to invert 
the gaze, and I have performed the hysteric full of longing and desire. These are 
continuations of feminist challenges to the photographic space and its potentially 
normative functioning through rendering difference the same. However, in this 
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chapter I have aimed to argue that that same photographic space freed me from the 
constraints I felt at the time, for example, from the expectations of a final break from 
my daughter symbolised in stages such as the process of weaning, and the mirror 
phase and self-recognition. My argument is, that the depictions that remain from our 
studio experiments and the other examples of maternal performance I have given, 
demonstrate the notion of mutual recognition and in this way, equality and agency 
developed between myself and my child. This presents a radicalisation of acts of 
care and abandons ideology grounded in passiveness, dominance and dependency 
when conceiving of the mother-child relationship.    
 
Fig. 27. MSP with Matilda, Myfanwyn Ryan, (2011-2012). 
 At stake in mother art-making and maternal aesthetics is the enmeshing of 
subjectivity and practice. The argument for the inclusion of Matilda in my work begs 
the question of why an artist who is a mother should position her child outside of the 
frame. My question centres on the maternal aesthetic as a performance process that 
can collapse the distancing effects and, conversely, the invasiveness of the 
photographic space, and thereby destabilise the power inherent in the binaries of 
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passive spectatorship and the objectified subject. The practice I have made since 
these series of performances-to-camera, is informed by my observations and 
interactions with my daughters, without them having to be there necessarily. This is 
because the maternal invokes process and negotiation, of which separation and 
absence are major factors, as much as attachment and togetherness. It marks a 
coming full-circle from the performance where I miss/possess my grandmother to the 
performances where I hide from my daughter, where I also both miss and possess 
her. The extreme phallocentric position grants woman no interior subjectivity; she is 
just surface, just outside (Irigaray, 1985, p. 197).The performance in the frame of a 
maternal aesthetic is a direct assault on what constitutes the interior/exterior, as well 
as other binaries such as presence and the conception of an “I”. The practice I have 
submitted forms part of a dialogue about the nature of being, from a subjective 
position that is uncomfortably and insistently Other to traditional aesthetic distancing 
effects created through framing and displaying, instead physicality and everyday 
experiences foreground my experience of art-making and my aesthetic alongside the 
world and the Others I encounter it with, namely in this instance my daughter. The 
maternal space that I have created through these series of performances-to-camera 
challenges the basis that my role as a mother is constituted upon and reminds us of 
the deeper metaphysical nature of care. These performances demonstrate the 
relational potential of performance and photography and their combined potency 
when aligned with a maternal aesthetic. 
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4: Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed different moments in women’s historic and contemporary 
performance-to-camera. Artists Ana Mendieta, Dawn Woods, Jemima Stehli, Lena 
Šimić, Evelyn Silver and Shirley Cameron have been discussed in order to identify, 
and evidence, some of the different modes performance-to-camera can operate in. 
This thesis argues that performance-to-camera remains vital in women’s art-making 
because of the unresolved relationship it has to the frame, binary oppositions and 
aesthetic processes. The idea of separation as a false premise for the art-object, as 
proposed by Derrida through the parergon; when practicing non-traditional or critical 
modes of aesthetic enquiry, complimented Alison Stone’s theorisation that the 
mother does not have to separate (at least not violently or in a finite sense) from her 
daughter. The making of performance with my daughter was already a challenge to 
the more prevalent viewpoint that a point of separation will be reached in due course 
as part of mothering. I turned, instinctively, to performance to help navigate this 
territory and find out another way to be with my daughter.  
 
The final part of this enquiry sought to connect the challenge of a critical 
performance-to-camera practice to established patterns and representations of 
sexual identity, most pertinently, in this context, the mother’s role, the establishment 
of agency, and the development of a toolkit to enhance visibility and act as a 
counter-strategy to lack through care and apprehension of the other. Evidenced here 
is how the practice-based elements provided a deeper understanding of 
performance-to-camera practice in conjunction with maternal aesthetics, which by its 
very nature, is an emergent and fluid methodology because it draws upon personal 
experience and the desires of mothers and their children. This exploration of the 
maternal in aesthetics has taken performance-to-camera away from the tired 
analysis of the critique of the male gaze, where it was trapped, and has 
demonstrated how much is at stake in the potential for performance-to-camera to be 
a radical address to Western fine art aesthetics and metaphysical knowledge and 
subjective representation. This becomes clear in the final section of the thesis when 
care and its role in maternal performance is explored, not whether to not to care or 
be caring, but rather care in terms of that which we give our attention and focus and 
how this informs our experience. 
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In Chapter One posed the research question: ‘does photography empower the 
subject, or conversely, are feminist interventions in photography, subsequently 
described in this thesis as performance-to-camera, a failed critique?’ Performance-
to-camera can remain116 too reliant on aesthetic distance and therefore is uncritical 
of binary thinking; which is phallocentric in origin, and thereby not clearly establish a 
subject position different from the masculine one. The distancing effect of aesthetics 
is difficult to dismantle within a form like photography that is so bound to the gaze 
and the frame. Stehli’s Friends with Benefits (2000) proved to be an important 
example of the continued critical enquiry into subjectivity, culture, the camera, power 
and the gaze that is the filter that women’s performance-to-camera tends to get 
understood and theorised through. Most interesting is that in Stehli’s practice the 
gaze shifts between masculine and feminine positions which is, arguably more 
sophisticated than that of Laura Mulvey’s fixed male gazer117 (Narrative Cinema and 
Visual Pleasure, 1975). The thesis charted the camera’s use in performance away 
from it being a fraught relationship in which women artists confronted phallocentrism, 
for example, Mendieta’s Rape Scene (1973), to its transformation into a playful 
discursive space, for example, Stehli’s interventions. Somewhere in the middle the 
work of artists such as Dawn Woods and Amelia Ulman reside, they are obsessive 
and perhaps exhibit addictive, compulsive, and also approval seeking behaviour in 
their, what can only be described as, their somewhat troubled relationship with the 
camera and the broader spectrum of social media118.  
 
A critique of the power of traditional aesthetics to pacify dissent through containment 
and diffusion was problematised here because of the inclusion of young children in 
some of the practice-based work included. However, intention is key to an 
understanding of the maternal aesthetic that includes one’s daughters in the frame. 
The ethical dilemmas presented by the frame and the child’s lack of agency are 
                                                                 
116 There are other avant-garde performances and live art practices that also interrogate the false 
premise of aesthetic distance, displacement of the audience and participation, for example, are two 
techniques that have been used. Allan Kaprow’s ‘happenings’ in the 1960s, sought to close the 
distance between performers, artists, and their audience. However, arguably the most effective and 
uncontrived way I have found to do this is through the maternal aesthetic.  
117 I review these debates in the introduction to the thesis, the male gaze forms the background 
context rather than the main trajectory of my practice or argumentation. Kaja Silverman and Jacques 
Lacan are important voices aspects of the gaze.  
118 To clarify, Woods and Ulman play with the camera and do not display hostility towards it nor are 
suspicious of its power and effect over them, instead they appear somewhat in thrall to its charms. 
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mirrored by the mother’s lack of agency when photographed as a passive subject, 
but performance-to-camera is far from passive. I began by perceiving performance-
to-camera as a discursive, if flawed, critique that could never fully escape those 
technological aspects of the device that favour rationality, or the aesthetic distance 
that can be established via the frame. This penetration into the visual, by what, in 
some patriarchal discourses, has been rendered the pure and inescapable 
materiality of women, is pertinent with regard to the double aspect of the camera, 
which is that the camera is controlled by human and machine, and Flusser perceives 
this as embodying a battle between machine and humanity (Flusser, 2000), whereas 
it is actually apparent that the conflict is situated between the pre-supposition of 
binary logic and its inevitable collapse. 
 
In Chapter One Stehli’s performance-to-camera Friends with Benefits (2000) was 
considered as a means to explore methods of approaching the photographic space 
that invert, disrupt or problematise the relationship between subject and cameraman. 
Subsequently, in chapter one, there was discussion of the practice-based elements 
performance-to-camera specifically MNWG (2010) which, like Stehli’s performance, 
explores the relationship between the subject and the cameraman. The performance 
is my work, I used my relationship with Duncan, the camera-man, to question the 
relationship of the looker and the looked and the binary of inside or outside the 
image. The argument throughout this chapter is that simply presenting objectification 
and violence against women, or the phallocentric myth of their passivity, does not 
actually destabilise power imbalances. Traditional aesthetic conventions such as 
‘women as material in need of aestheticizing’ and the inevitability of the framing and 
normalising capacity of the camera act as ways to maintain and police subjectivity 
and representation. Therefore hysteria and the misrepresentation of women in front 
of the camera, which is the theme of MNWG (2010) are strategies to discuss 
women’s muteness and invisibility at a cultural and philosophical level. 
 
Chapter Two addressed the research question: ‘how can representing mother-
daughter relationships re-invigorate women’s performance-to-camera, in the light of 
the failure of historical feminist interventions to successfully oppose the maintenance 
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of dualistic thought’. There is a growing awareness of the radical nature of 
representing mother-daughter relationships in the face of the potential matricidal 
urges prevalent, in accord with Irigaray, in our culture. This was then linked to the 
potential the camera offers as a space to open up discourse, and via Heidegger, 
enabled a way to move away from perceiving the camera as a battle-ground 
between binaries, such as real and fiction, and nature and technology. Although this 
is also combined with an awareness that the camera is paradoxical in nature. In 
Heidegger’s essay The Question Concerning Technology (1977), he defines 
technology by appropriating from the ancient Greek meaning (techne) to 
demonstrate its roots in creativity and poetry. The practice based research here 
acted as an important counterpoint to the more restrictive and negative conceptions 
of technology, and provided a framework so that the potential of the camera as a 
creative and experimental tool could be realised.  
 
 Within the practice-based element of the thesis there is a strong inter-relationship 
that exists between the frame and the camera, and performance-to-camera. This 
thesis, by focusing on the frame has been able to connect the strands - Irigaray and 
her blind spot (1974), and Derrida’s parergon (1987a), and integrate these themes 
within feminist critique born out of the debates on embodiment and the return to 
theories of the maternal in the 1990s and 2000s. Lack refers poignantly to the role of 
an ‘eternal void’ that women have been tasked to play (Alison Stone, 2011). This has 
been remedied, to an extent, through the practice-based approach that has deployed 
performance-to-camera, because the camera, through the utilisation of Derrida’s 
parergon, now acts as a bridge between inside and outside or to take an Irigarian 
perspective, the front and reverse, and in this way, the visibility of women can be 
explored in a critical mode within this thesis’s research. The camera can enable the 
inversion of positions, and this was the aim. Collaborating with Duncan and Matilda 
meant that both the passive, and the active roles, could be examined and, perhaps, 
altered. 
 
The thesis has theorised that the maternal acts symbolically by pushing at the edges 
of representational conduct, it is taboo breaking even whilst it often remains subtle 
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and nuanced. Stone’s (2012) theory of the importance of the mother-daughter 
relationship has been utilised in order to demonstrate, in Chapter Two, how it 
confounds binary logic. A progression to this was demonstrating how Jessica 
Benjamin’s (1993) psychoanalytical theory proposes a resistance to the logic of 
separation between mother and infant, and thereby opposes the presentation of the 
maternal as an object to be consumed. The desire to leave one another and return, 
hide away and reveal ourselves, explore and expand and huddle together, and 
theories of transition, the mirror phase, weaning, separation and counter-theories 
that are resistant to Freudian narratives are all combined with the experiential, with 
what was occurring in the space between myself and my daughter. This resulted in 
reflection on how feminine sexual identity and subsequently how subjectivity is 
formed and influenced by external as well as internal factors. Stone and Benjamin’s 
stance on separation was crucial to the conception and execution of the work made 
with Matilda, which began as an emotional rather than an intellectual pursuit. Directly 
experiencing the pressure from extended family, social constraints and parenting 
and developmental theories to initiate separations from my daughter caused us 
distress. In the light of how unnatural, perfunctory and upsetting it felt I sought out 
feminist theorising that contradicted the mainstream rhetoric from which I felt 
alienated. The practice manifests this struggle and the uncertainty of motherhood 
and the, what seemed to me, inevitable clash with phallocentrism that motherhood, I 
argue, automatically sets up. In the myriad ways it breaks down boundaries between 
bodies119, and its metamorphosing, and the many ways that carers interact with 
children in their care and how intersubjectivity, as proposed by Benjamin (1993) 
provides a far more accurate model of the process that occurs120.  
 
In Chapter One I discussed, how the camera (like the frame) is paradoxical, and how 
it internally deconstructs what it supposedly maintains on the surface. In short 
                                                                 
119 Theories of embodiment from Irigaray, to Elizabeth Grosz, and Bracha Ettinger, et al, support this 
view. 
120 Intersubjectivity, for Benjamin, is a radical address to the more traditional psychoanalytical 
conceptions of the mother as a transitional object for the infant. The traditional viewpoint can be 
deemed phallocentric as it relies heavily on the mother to remain passive and, in a sense, allow the 
infant to consume her. My performances with Matilda ask why can’t the mother take an active role in 
her child’s psychological/subjective development? Further to this when the passive model of the 
mother is abandoned it enables the conception that other relationships can be developed where 
intersubjectivity and equality are the central focus. Therefore the mother, potentially, has a lasting and 
radical impact on the way her child is formed and the shape their future relationships will take. 
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although there may be a claim for some degree of exteriority from the world this is an 
illusion. The camera is a framing device, but photographs are full of objects and/or 
subjects in excess of the content of the images, whether by design or by accident. It 
is these extraneous things that Derrida uses as evidence (1987a) to support his 
theory on the parergon, I engineered MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) in such a way, 
so that the subjects are never able to pose and thereby take up the focal point in the 
image. I give Matilda my focus and she gives me hers and the camera is 
disregarded. Are we attempting to escape the cameras gaze or is it that we are not 
actually the subject matter at all but rather the parergon in a Derridian sense 
(1987a), this uncertainty puts the frame under pressure and, by extension, 
phallocentrism is also put under strain. To this instability I bring the confusion of my 
relationship with my daughter. I choose the word confusion as our presentation of 
intersubjective becoming confounds conceptions of the subject that are reliant on 
isolation and distance from the other brought on through separation.  
      
Chapter Three examines the question: ‘can performance-to-camera be a relational 
process that facilitates subjectivity when maternal aesthetics is invoked? Conversely, 
I wondered whether a mother-artist’s inclusion of her child in the frame risks 
repeating the phallocentric power dynamic of enslavement through representation 
(objectification) by treating the child as ‘thing,’ and treated as other. This is less a 
strictly ethical concern in this context. Rather, I find it conceptually contradictory to 
demand agency for myself whilst denying the same to others. In addition, if a subject 
is rendered mute, this upholds the matter/form binary prevalent in Western 
aesthetics, which is in part disrupted when the subject controls the representation 
from the inside, as is the case in performance-to-camera. By not allowing the subject 
a voice or agency they become purely material, and this empowers neither the 
mother nor the child. However, I conclude that the mother’s pragmatism in making 
work with her child is in itself an unsettling act, as it rejects notions of the mother as, 
ultimately, a disposable vessel for the infant. Here, Grace Surman’s performance-to-
camera, I Love My Baby and My Baby Loves... (2010), is an important reference 
point for me in this respect, as it attempts to navigate the troubled territory of free 
will, of agency and the intersection of the mother’s desires. I have considered 
Stone’s critical re-evaluation of Julia Kristeva’s position that the child’s separation is 
142 
 
a violent matricidal process (Stone, 2012), and I concur with Stone that play and 
imaginative interaction with the child can be used to begin to establish subjective 
positions for both mother and child that are both distinct but also linked to the other. 
Like Stone, I was interested in Jessica Benjamin’s (1990) idea of a space, or what 
Stone describes as a third term. Following the psychoanalytical model of the infant’s 
triangular relationship with a mother and a father,121 but replacing the father figure 
with a place where the child and mother can, in a sense, find one another, enables 
the mother and child to further establish and continue to interact without the 
necessity of a violent separation, whilst also completely dispensing with the 
patriarchal power inherent in the triadic model. Stone’s argument, and my 
representation of a continuing connection with my daughter (MSP with Matilda 2011-
2012) can, therefore, be viewed as a radical act in Western culture because it does 
not adhere to the view of the mother’s inevitable erasure. I conclude, therefore, that 
the powerful meaning and radical intention behind my work far outweighs any 
question of dubious ethical judgement in this context122, and I make reference to the 
photography of Sally Mann and Tierney Gearon to provide evidence of the pariah-
like status that mother-artists can attract in wider society to demonstrate the intensity 
of emotion work such as this provokes. These emotions can include disgust and 
anger towards mother-artists, as has been the case for the aforementioned, but I 
have only experienced mild disapproval.  
In MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) Matilda’s inattention towards the camera is not 
affected, it is real and she is ignorant to its presence. She poses as the naive 
counterpoint to our collective immersion in the image123. The child, who remains 
uninterested in the camera, can be read as oppositional to Flusser’s notion of the 
universe being comprised of photographs. However, MSP with Matilda (2011-2012) 
simultaneously secures a conception that the universe is situated in the photographic 
site because, to an extent, I see her development as encapsulated in that space and 
                                                                 
121 The triangular model is the traditional paradigm of the family, where the father is the third term, or 
the thing that gets between the infant and the child, as developed by Freud and Lacan in their 
developmental theories. Upended entirely by Stone’s suggestion that the third term in a mother and 
child’s relationship is play (Stone, 2011).  
122 Here, I am responding to the criticism levelled at my methodology by a white, middle class, male, 
university lecturer, that play is an act of coercion to secure the child’s apparent co-operation. Rather, 
play is the element that creates the space that allows our interaction and the development of my work 
simultaneously.  
123 This process which began in the 1980s, according to Flusser, and has yet to subside. This pre-
dates our regular encounters with digital devices Flusser first described the world as a ‘photographic 
universe’ in the 1980s (Flusser, 2000, p. 65).    
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time even though her development is continual. This is because it has been within 
the photographic space where some of my first meaningful inter-subjective 
encounters with Matilda first occurred, it is where I learnt how to act out changes and 
progress our relationship through the means of interaction. This process was 
completely creative and was not pre-scripted, although in retrospect I can apply 
Stone and Benjamin’s refusal of matricide and the establishment of a third term as a 
space for play as inherent to the Studio Performances I was making in 2011 and 
2012.  
 
If the problem I have been addressing is that the mute subject, when solely 
represented by others is not empowered and cannot transcend the position of 
material or object existing in a psychoanalytical sense within a subject order as 
object or negative inversion of masculinity, then a solution can be found in my 
methodology where the dialogue between the frame, performance-to-camera and 
maternal aesthetics seeks to disrupt binaries of external and internal, and, subject 
and object. The camera’s process, to frame and interiorise the real and exteriorise 
and reject what is deemed un-important, or un-aesthetic or un-interesting based on 
pre-ordained value judgements that immerse our culture124 is inverted and portrays 
its own reverse or underside. Like Stehli I seek to comment on the hierarchical 
nature of sexual difference by taking control of the image away from the 
cameraman125. The overall aim of disrupting these binaries is empowerment through 
                                                                 
124 I have been discussing how performance-to-camera maintains a critical relationship to this 
process, but people who ‘Selfie and Instagram’ are inherently un-critical in their utilisation of these 
processes, where to be seen for seeing’s sake appears to take on an addictive and compulsive 
dimension. I speak from observation and discussion with others, with artists such as Dawn Woods 
and Amelia Ulman, and the behaviour of young people towards screens and cameras that I encounter 
in secondary schools and in the art galleries in which I facilitate. 
125 Stone argues that Irigaray radically rethought feminist analysis of sexual difference by arguing that, 
in Western culture, there is only a difference between the sexes in terms of hierarchy. In all other 
aspects, women simply present the negative of masculine attributes, for example by being passive to 
man’s productive, being weak to man’s strength, and so on. Stone asserts that Irigaray successfully 
argues for the non-subjective position that women play, which is not born from genuine sexual 
difference, but rather stems from the repression of the other, and is designed in a hierarchical way to 
disempower women. Here, the term women is meant on a psychical level as the specific conditioning 
a young girl has received that she carries into adulthood: 
 
These hierarchical meanings of male and female, masculine, and feminine, are at the core of 
the Western symbolic order. They organize a whole set of binary oppositions that make up 
this order—that is, the underlying structure of meaning that constitutes the backbone of 
Western culture: contrasts of mind/body, culture/nature, reason/emotion, reality/ appearance, 
truth/deception, good/evil, active/passive, and order/chaos [...]Irigaray concludes that no real 
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process, and interplay and communication between the mother and the child. In 
addition, the emphasis on an intersubjective approach fosters discourse inter-
generationally. I conclude that the focus on an inter-subjective approach, by its very 
nature, emphasises process over end result, the performance-to-camera pieces I 
have submitted are merely the by-product of my closed performances. They are 
more than documentation because in concurrence with Dixon’s definition of digital 
performance, that was a starting point when I was pinpointing the nuances between 
documentation and digital performance for my literature review; the digital 
performance is self-reflexive and always comments upon the media used in its 
creation (2006). In my practice, this takes the form of meditation on the frame, and 
what it is to frame. I choose to focus on the camera, rather than broaden my scope 
to other media in this thesis, because the frame is so apparent and so integral, and 
because in our contemporaneity that remains strong, despite the proliferation of 
digital media. This meditation has proved both fascinating and fruitful.  
 
Why does the camera continue to overbear and control and inflict a gaze which 
confines the subject so easily? I do not simply re-iterate the Lacanian mirror phase 
and the camera/gaze coupling ascribed to by theorists such as Mulvey (1975) and 
Silverman (1996); I am more concerned with how we set up the shot, how we frame 
something and what that says about us. My position upholds the mother’s agency 
and maintains that it is not automatically unethical to include ones children in your 
art-making as it is an expression of subjectivity and in many ways enriches the 
mother-daughter relationship. I conclude that the maternal methodology, coupled 
with performance-to-camera, particularly as my focus is mother-daughter 
relationships, is a radical re-think of the medium. However, this does not completely 
resolve the ethical questions that present themselves in this methodology, namely 
issues of agency, consent, autonomy and abuses of power. My approach to 
resolving this has been to explore the caring nature of this work, and to look at how 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
sexual difference has ever existed at the symbolic level, in the sense that it is only as a man 
that one has been able to be a thinking, speaking, acting subject. Rather than genuine 
difference, there has only ever been hierarchy and binary opposition between 1 and 0, where 
1 is male, 0 the female construed as mere lack. Irigaray nevertheless refers to this traditional 
refusal of genuine difference as sexual difference, under the hierarchical, oppositional 
interpretation it has had up to now (Stone, 2018, p. 9). 
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subjectivities are intertwined and how this also challenges the phallocentric ideal of 
subjectivity that worryingly veers towards the erasure of the mother. In the final 
chapter, I considered more specifically the depth of meaning in maternal art-making 
and its potential to establish a new symbolic order. I re-focused on the act of care 
through Heidegger’s writing on being as co-dependent on being-here (Dasein). The 
experience of care, like all aspects of our experience, is immersive and connected 
physically to others and also to objects. Care is not to be confused with being kind 
(that is ‘caring’). Rather care is the attention we pay to another or a thing (Heidegger, 
1973) and the time we give to such care. In this way it is possible to begin to 
conceive of the act of care for a child as an act that is metaphysical and 
transcendent to the chore-based, mundane, unskilled and everyday conception that 
appears inherently attached to childcare, at the very least at the worst end of 
phallocentric misconceptions. Sara Ruddick supports the view that to mother is not 
simply menial, it is a complex intellectual and interpersonal activity. Further to this, 
and in alignment with Benjamin’s view that mothering provides a unique as well as 
radicalised perspective, this does not sit well with binary thinking because, as 
Ruddick argues, interaction with children demands an ‘open-ended, reflective 
cognitive style’ (Ruddick, 1990, p. 96). She also argues that thinking which relies on 
sharp distinctions between self and other, and fiction and reality, would be 
impossible to apply whilst caring for a child (ibid). Mothering also enables a re-
assessment of the act of domination because, as Ruddick further asserts: 
A mother learns first-hand, as agent and spectator, in the position of the 
stronger and of the weaker, that the cost of dominating is paid in the fear and 
hatred of the dominated and anyone who sympathises with them. Mothers 
have many dominating moments and therefore experience in their own person 
what it means to lose the trust of the dominated and to watch those they 
dominate lose pleasure in themselves. Most mothers also know what it is to 
be dominated (Ruddick, 1990, p. 182). 
 
This quotation is important to me for two reasons. Firstly it shows why mothers are, 
uniquely equipped to critique hierarchy and power, and secondly it shows that care is 
not domination. Maternal aesthetics is to care rather than to dominate. Ruddick 
argues that ‘a mother may measure her power in terms of her ability to nurture a 
child whom she cannot dominate, a child lively with her own desires and projects’ 
(ibid).   
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Šimić’s term ‘givens’ is key to forming a maternal aesthetic moving through themes 
of documentation, classification, aestheticizing the everyday through re-assigning its 
purpose, and bathos – or elevation of mundanity. Givens encompasses all of the 
above and clearly outlines the necessity for working with what you already have, 
weaving day-to-day activities including childcare and domestic chores into the 
practice and how this, in turn, becomes a political activity. Mierle Laderman Ukeles, 
Maintenance Art Works (1969-1980), and her Manifesto for Maintenance Art (1969) 
as one of the most pertinent historic examples used in the thesis which clearly states 
this aim.   
 
Lastly, I want to re-iterate that in this time of image saturation, we must go further 
than historic performance-to-camera to critique phallocentrism, and that invoking the 
maternal is a radical proposition in the medium of performance-to-camera. I have 
demonstrated this through the interplay between the frame and the world and the 
maternal, and the role of aesthetics and the significance it takes on for mothers. The 
intersubjective dimension of the maternal aesthetic has led me to produce further 
work since my PhD submission, where intimate engagement with others is not solely 
reliant on photography, nor on purely visual or digital means – my initial medium. 
Through performance, the evocative nature of touch, sound and smell have all 
become key. Increasingly, I have taken inspiration from the literal in-between of the 
corridor and the pregnant body, as well as the infant state, all of which are 
transitions. These transitions all point to possible methods that can dismantle 
structures of oppression. Bearing in mind how oppression can be subtle, such as 
feeling isolated or mentally unstable, and can be manipulated as a form of control, 
the subtleties of oppression and deviance are aspects that I have exploited in more 
recent works following those included in this thesis, including Waiting, Resting and 
Sniffing in Public Spaces (2012-2013).  
The themes that have emerged through the course of the thesis, most pertinently the 
emphasis on mother-daughter relationships and women recounting their own stories, 
has resulted in the creation of oral history recordings that are an original contribution 
to knowledge. My methodology works across generations and includes my female 
relations and continues to inspire new works and ways of working. MNWG is now a 
flagship example of intergenerational performance and is an original contribution to 
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knowledge. I have devised additional inter-generational performances such as one 
with myself and Cameron performing What’s it Like Growing Up in Performance? 
Performed as part of Adele Senior’s With Children! The Child as collaborator and 
performer, Leeds Beckett University (2017). In this work, I invited Cameron to 
present a slide show of her historic practice whilst I read statements I had obtained 
from her daughters (now in their forties) about what they remembered as children 
about performing and being in the work. Grown children’s accounts of performing 
with their mothers is extremely unique to this field. My method of staging an 
unstructured open performance across generations is cutting edge and made 
possible through the foundational work carried out in this thesis which contextualises 
my approach to intersubjective performance and it is an original contribution in the 
field of performance. 
My thesis has also foregrounded a symposium I organised on the ethics of working 
with children, held at the Institute for the Art and Practice of Dissent at Home, hosted 
by Lena Šimić as part of LADA’s Study Room in Exile (2017). During this event my 
approach of inventing my own maternal aesthetic ethical framework, an original 
contribution to knowledge within this thesis, was extended to a group of mother-
artists and we developed a document that is available on the Institute’s website126. 
Since 2016, I have been re-staging avant-garde performance in community settings, 
looking at engagement with a family audience. I have re-staged Ana Mendieta’s 
Face Press Glass (1972) as a walk-about performance for children. I also performed 
John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s 1960s movement of ‘Bagism’, in a park with my 
mother and my daughters, and I performed as a bearded lady proclaiming Greek 
philosophy. I have also made a Rebecca Horn/Louise Bourgeois style performance 
for children.  My interest in the maternal has progressed into an interest in inter-
generational performance, and I have both studied and worked with Sybille Peters, 
Theatre of Research, which created the Playing Up! Game (2016) in conjunction with 
LADA and Tate Modern. I now work in the Tate’s early years and family’s curatorial 
department as a supervisor and facilitator, delivering their programme to engage 
families through live art practice, including the Academy of Destruction (2017). I have 
developed this practice in direct response to the experience and methods I gained 
and established whilst collaborating with my daughter Matilda. 
                                                                 
126 Included in the Appendix. 
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In the wider world, there has been an issue on maternal performance in the 
Performance Research Journal, guest edited by Šimić and Underwood-Lee, who are 
now working on a publication about maternal performance as a live encounter. On 
this topic they argue that: 
The maternal in performance, as opposed to other art-forms, is able to move 
from pure representation into the realm of lived and immediate experience; 
that is, when we present our mothering on stage in a live art encounter we are 
not simply performing it, we are doing it – we are negotiating identity in real 
time, in an immediate and shared encounter with an audience. The 
construction of a maternal identity is happening before our very eyes 
(Underwood-Lee, 2017). 
 
This presents a different focus to that presented in this thesis, which has looked at 
visual representation and the discursive relationship of the maternal with 
performance-to-camera and aesthetics.  
 I have accomplished original historical research on the maternal practice of Shirley 
Cameron and due to the recent resurgent interest in the inter-generational I have 
been able to critique this through a maternal aesthetic and assess its importance 
away from the overused analysis of the gaze and narcissism. My original contribution 
to knowledge has been in the field of maternal aesthetics, and the broader context of 
feminist enquiry. My practice has both helped set-the-scene, as well as, establish a 
precedent ethically and practically for how best to collaborate with children in live art 
methodology. I have established clear philosophical links between the frame, 
women’s subjectivity, the maternal, and performance-to-camera and this is an 
original contribution to knowledge in the field of performance studies and Live Art/ 
Fine Art theorising. 
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